


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Soviet Union

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 7, July 1991

N O T I C E

Beginning with the August 1991 issue, material from the Soviet monthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA [SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES] will no longer be published as a separate JPRS report. Articles from the journal will be included in the FOUO JPRS *Political Affairs* Report, which will be available only to U.S. Government consumers and their contractors.

Soviet Union

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3 January 1992

[Selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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GULAG (The Historical-Sociological Aspect)

925D0001A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 91 (signed to
press 10 Jun 91) pp 3-16

[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Zemskov, candidate of historical sciences and senior science associate at the Institute of USSR History under the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has been repeatedly published in our journal. This article is a continuation of the one in Issue No 6, 1991]

[Text] By the start of the war, the number of prisoners in the GULAG [State Administration for Corrective Labor Camps] camps and colonies was 2.3 million persons. On 1 January 1944, their number had dropped to 1.2 million. Over the 3 years of the war (up to 1 June 1944), 2.9 million persons had left the GULAG camps and colonies and 1.8 million convicts had newly arrived. In one of the reports dated 12 January 1945, it was pointed out that from the start of the war through December 1944, 3.4 million had left and 2.55 million prisoners had arrived [1]. By the end of 1944, the prewar structure of GULAG was restored. As of 1 December 1944, within the GULAG system there were 53 ITL [corrective labor camp] with a total number in them of 667 camp divisions and 475 ITK [corrective labor colony]. This number included 17 camps with harsh conditions and 5 camps for holding political prisoners [ibid.].

During the first years of the war, there was a sharp drop in the arrival in GULAG of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Moldavians and Poles. This, of course, in no way means that the fascist occupation was a good thing for the designated peoples, for the policy of the conquerors was predominantly of a repressive nature. As the occupiers were expelled from USSR territory, the places of incarceration began receiving evermore inhabitants of the Western republics and oblasts, basically on charges of traitorous activity (these accusations, as a rule, were just) as well as for various criminal offenses.

From 1944 through 1947, the number of Ukrainians in the ITL rose by 2.4-fold, Belorussians by 2.1, Lithuanians by 7.5, Latvians by 2.9, Estonians by 3.5 and Poles by 1.8-fold. There was a significant increase also in the composition of the GULAG camp prisoners over the same period in the proportional amount of representatives of the designated nationalities: Ukrainians from 11.1 to 22.9 percent, Belorussians from 2.3 to 4.1 percent, Lithuanians from 0.3 to 1.9 percent, Latvians from 0.6 to 1.4 percent, Estonians from 0.4 to 1.3 percent, Poles from 1.3 to 2.1 percent [2].

During the same period, at the ITL there was an increase in the number of representatives of certain other nationalities (for example, Russians, Karelians and Finns), but their proportional amount in the total composition of prisoners declined due to the fact that the number of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Poles rose at a more rapid pace. For this

reason, regardless of a certain increase in the numbers, the proportional amount of Russians during 1944-1947 within the ITL prisoners declined from 60.9 to 52.2 percent, and Karelians and Finns from 0.33 to 0.29 percent [ibid.].

As for the GULAG camp prisoners of such nationality as Jews, Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Armenians, Georgians and others, their numbers declined somewhat during these years. This led to a substantial drop also in their proportional amount. Among the ITL prisoners, the proportional amount of Jews during the designated period dropped from 2.31 to 1.21 percent, Tatars from 1.8 to 1.4 percent, Kazakhs from 1.73 to 1.03 percent, Uzbeks from 1.26 to 0.61 percent, Armenians from 1.03 to 0.73 percent and Georgians from 0.83 to 0.59 percent [ibid.].

From the camp statistics, it turns out that in 1944, the number of Azeris was 1.9-fold less than the number of Georgians and 2.3-fold less than the Armenians, while in 1947, the figures, respectively, were 3.1 and 3.8-fold. In actuality, the number of Azeris was significantly greater. The data also on the number of Turks also arouse doubt. Clearly, a portion of the prisoners of Azeri and Turkish nationality for some reason were accounted for under other nationalities. In our view, the mystery can be explained by the fact that the list of nationalities mentions certain "Turks" or "Turkic-speakers," while the Azeris and Turks are Turkic-speaking peoples, and the GULAG bookkeepers clearly put a significant portion of these nationalities were included in them.

An analogous picture with the national composition of the prisoners could be also seen in the GULAG colonies. As of 1 January 1944, among the 454,675 prisoners in the ITK [information is lacking for 61,550 persons], there were 310,670 Russians, 31,832 Ukrainians, 16,958 Tatars, 11,480 Uzbeks, 9,450 Germans, 8,352 Jews, 6,668 Kazakhs, 5,635 Belorussians, 5,202 Armenians, 5,187 Georgians, 5,050 Azeris, 3,244 Kirghiz, 3,057 Poles, 2,758 Turkmen, 2,616 Bashkir, 1,547 Tajiks, 1,390 Moldavians, 1,117 Estonians, 947 Latvians, 922 Karelians and Finns, 567 Koreans, 365 Chinese, 364 Greeks, 359 Lithuanians and 18,938 others [3]. We would point out that in peacetime in third place in terms of numbers, after the Russians and the Ukrainians, there were always the Belorussians, but in 1944, this place was held by the Tatars, surpassing the Belorussians by 3-fold in numbers. The Ukrainians, although remaining in second place, were behind the Russians by almost 10-fold in terms of numbers.

According to the data for 1 January 1944, the ITL had 4,789 foreigners serving terms, including 1,470 from Romania, 944 from China, 542 from Hungary, 375 from Iran, 337 from Greece, 194 from Germany, 46 from Afghanistan, 37 from Finland, 29 from Turkey, 17 from Bulgaria, 16 from Slovakia, 10 from Japan, 5 from France, 4 from the United States, 1 from Great Britain

and 762 persons from other states. In addition, on the designated data there were 258 foreigners held in the ITK [ibid.].

The above-given statistics of the GULAG does not include the so-called special contingent of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. During the war, the significance of the term "special contingent of the NKVD" changed and by this one understood persons undergoing verification and screening in the special NKVD camps and these in February 1945 were renamed the verification-screening camps of the NKVD [PFL NKVD]. These were directed by the Department of Special Camps of the USSR NKVD, and from February 1945, the Department of Verification-Screening Camps of the USSR NKVD [OPFL NKVD SSSR]. The special contingent undergoing verification and screening in the special camps (PFL), was divided into four reporting groups: the first were prisoners of war and surrounded military personnel; the second was ordinary police, village elders and other civilians suspected of traitorous activities; the third was made up of civilians (males) of induction age who had resided on enemy-occupied territory. From the moment of organizing the NKVD special camps at the end of 1941 up to 1 October 1944, some 421,199 persons passed through them, including

354,592 in the first reporting group, 40,062 in the second and 26,545 in the third; during this time, departing from the camps were, respectively, 319,239, 3,061 and 13,187 persons [ibid.].

A document entitled "Report on the Courts Verifying the Former Surrounded Enemy and Former Prisoners of War on 1 October 1944" gives the following (we quote the entire text verbatim):

"1. For verification of the former servicemen of the Red Army captured or surrounded by the enemy, by a decision of the GOKO [State Committee] No 1069ss of 27 December 41, special camps of the NKVD have been established.

"Verification of the Red Army servicemen in the special camps are being carried out by the counterintelligence departments of SMERSh [Death to Spies] of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] at the NKVD special camps (at the moment of the decree these were special departments).

"As a total some 354,592 persons have passed through the special camps as former Red Army servicemen who have escaped from encirclement and have been released from captivity, including 50,441 officers.

"2. Out of this number, the following have been verified and turned over:	
a) to the Red Army	249,416 persons
Including:	
To troop units through the military commissariats	231,034 persons
Including officers	27,042 persons
For organizing assault battalions	18,382 persons
Including officers	16,163 persons
b) To industry under the decree of the GOKO	30,749 persons
Including officers	29 persons
c) For forming the escort troops and security of the special camps	5,924 persons
"3. Arrested by the SMERSh bodies	11,556 persons
Including enemy intelligence and counterintelligence agents	2,083 persons
Including officers (for various crimes)	1,284 persons
"4. Leaving for various reasons over the entire time for hospitals, sick bays and deceased	5,347 persons
"5. Residing in the special camps of the USSR NKVD under verification	51,601
Including officers	5,657 persons

"Out of the officers remaining in the camps of the USSR NKVD, in October they organized four assault battalions with 920 persons in each" [ibid.].

On 1 January 1945, some 71,398 persons were undergoing checks in the NKVD special camps, including 32,483 prisoners of war (1,375 officers and 31,108 rank-and-file and NCOs), 15,289 persons who had served in the German and other enemy armies, 9,796 police, 6,078 civilians in group 3 of the reporting, 3,590 village elders, 2,863 persons who had served in the punitive and administrative enemy bodies, 2,589 legionnaires, 65 Vlasovites and 20 burgomeisters [mayors]. In

addition, there were 25,019 persons for whom the check had been completed. Consequently, at that time in the NKVD special camps there were 96,417 persons (96,282 men and 135 women), of which 53,225 were in the first reporting group, 35,322 in the second and 7,840 in the third (by the end of the war, the third reporting group ceased to exist). Among the 31,585 persons who were in the special camps on 1 January 1945, there were also repatriates of which 28,518 were prisoners of war and 3,067 civilians [ibid.].

On 10 May 1945, in the PFL were 160,969 persons from the special contingent and these were used in jobs for the

people's commissariats: 90,900 persons for the coal industry, 2,650 in construction, 800 for defense, 5,000 for weapons, 6,600 for ammunition, 2,300 for mortar weapons, 5,000 in nonferrous metallurgy, 3,900 in the chemical industry, 12,600 for power stations, 955 in heavy machine building, 2,000 in medium machine building, 710 in the light industry, 950 in ferrous metallurgy, 130 in the textile industry, 359 in the pulp-paper, 400 in machine tool building, 1,100 on the railroads, 18,200 in the NKVD, 570 in the NKGB [People's Commissariat for State Security], 490 in the electrical industry, 265 in the food industry, 280 in the petroleum industry, 1,000 in the Navy, 3,800 in the other departments [ibid.].

The range of persons sent to the special camps (PFL) was extremely broad, and included Soviet scouts who had been in the enemy rear. Thus, in an explanation forwarded on 21 August 1945 over the high frequency communications by the deputy chief of the Department F of the USSR NKVD, Zapevalin, to the chief of the Administration of NKVD Troops for Protecting the Rear of the Northern Group of Soviet Troops, Rogatin, it was pointed out that the repatriates were "former operational workers of our bodies, agents and residents dropped into the enemy rear by the Red Army intelligence departments as well as participants of underground organizations in the enemy rear and these groups should be sent on to the verification-screening camps of the NKVD" [ibid.].

The Directive of the USSR NKVD of 1 August 1945 stated: "In the PFL the disabled active veterans, those ill with incurable diseases, pregnant women, women with small children and the elderly must be put in special groups and an effective check on them conducted within 20 days. In the absence of any materials showing specific crimes, the designated persons are to be sent to their place of permanent residence" [ibid.]. On 11 August 1945, a new directive of the USSR NKVD was issued and this stated: "All disabled, persons ill with incurable diseases, elderly, pregnant women and women with children are to be released from the PFL from among the special contingent of the first and second reporting groups.... The released persons are to be sent to their place of residence in observing the stipulated restrictions and they are to be issued identification for exchanging for a passport at the place of residence" [ibid.].

On 26 September 1945, the provisions of the Directive of 11 August 1945 had been extended to the special contingent kept in the GULAG camps and colonies [ibid.]. In November 1945, this directive was also extended to the severely ill and maimed regular police, Vlasovites and others who had served in enemy armies or traitorous formations but who had not participated in punitive expeditions and executions. They were to be sent from the PFL to their place of residence [ibid.].

In January 1946, the OPFL NKVD SSSR was eliminated and the camps under its charge were merged into the GULAG system. In 1946, the PFL checked some

228,000 repatriates. Of these by 1 January 1947, some 199,100 persons had been turned over to special settlements, remitted to the industrial personnel (the "worker battalions") and sent to their place of residence. The remaining 28,900 repatriates continued to undergo checks (in addition to the PFL, a portion of them was also in the ITL). On 1 September 1947, in the GULAG there were 4,727 repatriates who were undergoing state checking [ibid.].

For the number of persons held in prisons on 10 May 1945, see Table 1.

Table 1: The Number of Prisoners in USSR Prisons (on 10 May 1945)

Categories of Prisoners	Numbers
Total	269,526
Including:	
Under investigation	77,827
Including:	
a) By the bodies of the NKVD	57,283
b) By bodies of NKGB	18,438
c) By counterintelligence SMERSh	2,106
Registered with procuracy	46,229
Registered with courts	26,553
Registered with Special Conference under NKVD	6,421
Condemned (minus those sentenced to death)	105,701
Sentenced to death	1,835
Transit resettlement	4,960
Transferred out to camps and colonies from 1 through 10 May 1945	21,139
Released and departed for other reasons from 1 through 10 May 1945	6,243

At the moment of the promulgating of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 7 July 1945 "On Amnesty Related to the Victory Over Nazi Germany" in the USSR prisons there were 263,819 prisoners, including 110,555 convicted and sentenced ones. As a result of the liberation of a portion of the prisoners under the amnesty, the filling of the prisons on 1 September 1945 had declined to 188,699 persons (including 70,125 convicted and sentenced ones). From 1 September 1945 through 10 January 1946, the filling of the prisons increased by 65,830 prisoners, including 19,129 persons under investigation and 46,701 convicted and sentenced prisoners. From 1 September 1945 through 10 January 1946, some 234,368 convicted and sentenced prisoners were transferred from the prisons to camps and colonies. In July 1946, the USSR had 514 prisons, including 504 general prisons, the 2 internal

prisons of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], 3 special-purpose prisons and 5 hospital prisons [ibid.].

The average annual number of prisoners in the prisons exceeded the average monthly by several-fold. For example, on 20 January 1947, the prisons held 304,386 prisoners, and on 15 December of the same year, 288,912; as a total in 1947, some 1,761,938 persons passed through the prisons. During 1939-1951 (information is lacking for 1945), some 86,582 prisoners died in the prisons, including 7,036 in 1939; 3,277 in 1940; 7,468 in 1941; 29,788 in 1942; 20,792 in 1943; 8,252 in 1944; 2,271 in 1946; 4,142 in 1947; 1,442 in 1948; 982 in 1949; 668 in 1950 and 424 in 1951 [ibid.].

Among the factors which led to a situation where the maximum number of prisoners over the entire history of GULAG was reached at the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950, one must point to such a fact as the repeal of the death sentence in 1947 in the USSR. The contingents which previously without fail had been sentenced to the supreme punishment for their actions were now sent to the GULAG. In 1950, the death penalty was restored and this was one of the factors for the decline in the number (in truth, very insignificant) of prisoners in 1951-1953.

In the second half of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, they began to employ evermore widely the labor of prisoners in "contractual" work. According to the data, on 1 November 1947, some 353,723 GULAG prisoners were employed in them, including 22,634 at the enterprises of Glavneftgazstroy [Main Construction Administration for the Oil and Gas Industry], and in construction as follows: 51,678 persons in the construction of heavy industry, 12,122 in ferrous metallurgy, 16,301 in nonferrous, 21,907 at power plants, 22,596 at military and naval enterprises, 15,343 in fuel enterprises; 6,846 in the coal industry of the eastern regions, 9,822 in the coal industry of western regions, 22,078 in the lumber industry, 5,637 in the chemical industry, 7,615 in the motor vehicle, 12,947 in the aviation, 9,945 in the food industry, 5,175 in the textile, 2,358 in light industry, 10,874 in the building materials industry, 13,237 for the MPS [Ministry of Railroads], 7,147 in agricultural machine building, 7,876 in transport machine building, 6,161 in civil construction, and 63,424 persons within the system of the other ministries and departments [ibid.].

On 1 September 1948, the GULAG held 2,258,957 prisoners, including (not counting Dalstroy [Far Eastern Construction Administration]) 182,925 persons in the first labor category, 662,574 in the second, 763,292 in the third, 246,975 in the third category of individual labor and 194,299 in the fourth labor category. The size of the labor force provided by GULAG to the other ministries and departments was 1,218,897 persons, including the 499,994 employed in "contractual" jobs. In addition, 262,068 prisoners were employed in the system of the Main Administration of Lumber Industry Camps (GULPP), 195,792 in the Main Administration

of Mining and Metallurgical Industry Camps (GUL-GMP), 149,685 in the Glavpromstroy [Main Industrial Construction Administration] of the MVD, 255,885 in the Main Administration for Railroad Construction Camps (GULZhDS), 39,989 in the Glavspetsstvetmet [Main Administration for Special Nonferrous Metallurgy] of the MVD (the gold mining not including Dalstroy), 19,282 in the Glavgidrostroy [Main Administration for Hydraulic Engineering Construction] of the MVD and 117,359 at Dalstroy (gold mining) [ibid.].

Table 2 gives data on the nationality of the GULAG prisoners on 1 January 1951 both as a whole and individually for the camps and colonies. The proportional amount of Russians in the total number of GULAG prisoners was 55.59 percent, Ukrainians were 20.02 percent, Belorussians 3.82 percent, Tatars were 2.25 percent, Lithuanians, 1.70 percent, Germans 1.28 percent, Uzbeks, 1.19 percent, Latvians were 1.13 percent, Armenians were 1.06 percent, Kazakhs were 1.03 percent, Jews 1.01 percent, Estonians, 0.97 percent, Azeris were 0.94 percent, Georgians, 0.93 percent, Poles 0.93 percent and Moldavians, 0.90 percent. The representatives of the designated 16 nationalities comprised almost 95 percent of the GULAG prisoners. The remaining over 5 percent belonged to scores of other nationalities.

**Table 2: Nationality of GULAG Prisoners
(on 1 January 1951)**

Nationality	Total	Including	
		In Camps	In Colonies
Russians	1,405,522	805,995	599,516
Ukrainians	506,221	362,643	143,578
Belorussians	96,471	63,863	32,608
Azeris	23,704	6,703	17,001
Georgians	23,583	6,968	16,615
Armenians	26,764	12,029	14,733
Turkmen	5,343	2,257	3,086
Uzbeks	30,029	14,137	15,892
Tajiks	5,726	2,884	2,842
Kazakhs	25,906	12,554	13,352
Kirghiz	6,424	3,628	2,796
Finns and Karelians	4,294	2,369	1,925
Moldavians	22,725	16,008	6,717
Lithuanians	43,016	35,773	7,243
Latvians	28,520	21,689	6,831
Estonians	24,618	18,185	6,433
Tatars	56,928	28,532	28,396
Bashkirs	7,847	3,619	4,228
Udmurts	5,465	2,993	2,472
Jews	25,425	14,374	11,051
Germans	32,269	21,096	11,173

**Table 2: Nationality of GULAG Prisoners
(on 1 January 1951) (Continued)**

Nationality	Total	Including	
		In Camps	In Colonies
Poles	23,527	19,184	4,343
Romanians	1,639	1,318	321
Iranians	606	262	344
Afghans	131	100	31
Mongols	83	70	13
Chinese	2,039	1,781	258
Japanese	1,102	852	250
Koreans	2,512	1,692	820
Greeks	2,326	1,558	768
Turks	362	300	62
Others, including:	87,030	48,351	38,679
Indigenous nationalities of USSR	78,832	41,688	37,144
Nonindige- nous nationali- ties	8,198	6,663	1,535
TOTAL:	2,528,146	1,533,767	994,379

In 1951, the camps held 60.7 percent of the GULAG prisoners and the colonies had 39.3 percent. By nationality there was a great spread in this regard. One could notice the following pattern: the prisoners of those nationalities the territories of which had been subjected to Nazi occupation in their predominant majority were in camps. This was understandable as it was precisely from the Western regions that the basic flood had come of persons accused of complicity or bourgeois nationalistic activities and for whom due to the severity of the charges made, the camps became, naturally, the place of imprisonment. In 1951, out of the total number of Lithuanians held in the GULAG, 83.2 percent were in the ITL, some 81.5 percent of the Poles, 76.0 percent of the Latvians, 73.9 percent of the Estonians, 71.6 percent of the Ukrainians, 70.4 percent of the Moldavians, and 66.2 percent of the Belorussians. While as an average for all nationalities, the ITL had 1.5-fold more prisoners than the ITK, for the Lithuanians the figures were 4.9-fold, for the Poles 4.4, for the Latvians 3.2, for the Estonians 2.8, for the Ukrainians 2.5, for the Moldavians 2.4 and for the Belorussians 2-fold.

At the same time, for a whole series of prisoners of those nationalities the territories of which during the war had not been subjected to enemy occupation, on the contrary, one could observe a significant predominance of their numbers in the colonies in comparison with the camps. For example, in 1951, there were 2.5-fold more Azeris in the ITK than in the ITL and for the Georgians the figure was 2.4-fold. Out of the total number of Azeris held in the GULAG in 1951, only 28.3 percent of them was in the camps (the remainder in colonies), for the Georgians the figure was 29.5 percent, for the Turkmen 42.2 percent, for the Armenians 44.9 percent,

for the Bashkir, 46.1 percent, Uzbeks 47.1 percent and for the Kazakhs 48.5 percent. Their was an approximate equal distribution between the ITL and ITK for the Tatar and Tajik prisoners. Over one-half was in the camps, but less than the average ratio between the presence of prisoners of all nationalities in the ITL and ITK and prisoners who were Russians (57.3 percent), Jews (56.5 percent), Kirghiz (56.5 percent) and Udmurts (54.8 percent).

From the data on the nationality of the prisoners in the GULAG camps and colonies on 1 January 1951, one pattern follows. The prisoners who by nationality were among the deported peoples or among the nonindigenous peoples of the USSR as well as foreigners were held, as a rule, in camps and only a significantly smaller portion of them in the colonies. For example, 6.9-fold more Chinese were held in the ITL than in the ITK, while for Mongols the figure was 5.4-fold, for Turks 4.8-fold, Romanians 4.1-fold, Japanese 3.4-fold, Afghans 3.2-fold, Koreans 2.1-fold, Greeks 2.0-fold and Germans 1.9-fold.

On 1 January 1951, among the prisoners in the GULAG camps and colonies there were 12,085 foreigners, including 3,949 from Germany, 1,623 from Hungary, 1,109 from China, 997 from Poland, 752 from Iran, 652 from Japan, 531 from Romania, 227 from Czechoslovakia, 161 from Greece, 93 from Bulgaria, 84 from Yugoslavia, 68 from Finland, 67 from Turkey, 41 from Afghanistan, 34 from France, 10 from Italy, 8 from the United States, 2 from Albania, 1 from Great Britain and 1,676 from other countries [ibid.].

Table 3 gives a detailed breakdown of the prisoners by the nature of their crimes both as a whole for GULAG, as well as separately for the ITL and ITK, while Table 4 gives analogous data for the length of sentences. Of the total number of persons convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes, 82.1 percent were kept in the camps and 17.9 percent in the colonies; for criminal offenses, the figures, respectively, were 54.3 percent and 45.7 percent. In the total number of persons convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes, 57.7 percent were serving a sentence under the charges of betraying the motherland, 17.1 percent for anti-Soviet agitation, 8.0 percent for the participation in anti-Soviet conspiracies, anti-Soviet organizations and groups, 6.4 percent for counterrevolutionary sabotage, 3.2 percent for espionage, 2.2 percent for rebellion and political banditry, 1.7 percent for terror and terroristic intentions, 0.8 percent for diversionary and wrecking activities, and 0.6 percent for members of families of traitors of the motherland. The remaining 2.3 percent of the "counterrevolutionaries" were serving their sentence in the ITL and ITK under a number of other charges of a political nature. As for those serving a sentence for criminal offenses, one is struck by the fact that a majority (60 percent) has been condemned not on the grounds of the articles of the Criminal Code but on the basis of executive orders (under the Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on liability for unauthorized departure from enterprises and institutions, for flight from places of compulsory settlement and so forth).

Table 3: Composition of GULAG Prisoners by Type of Crime (as of 1 January 1951)

Crimes	Total	Including	
		In Camps	In Colonies
1	2	3	4
<i>Counterrevolutionary Crimes</i>			
Treason to the motherland (Article 58—1a, b)	334,538	285,288	49,250
Espionage (Article 58—1a, b, 6; Article 193, 24)	18,337	17,786	591
Terror (Article 58, 8)	7,515	5,099	416
Terroristic intentions	2,329	2,135	194
Sabotage (Article 58, 9)	3,250	3,185	65
Wrecking (Article 58, 7)	1,165	1,074	91
Counterrevolutionary sabotage (except for those condemned for refusing to work in the camp and escaping) (Article 58, 14)	4,494	3,523	971
Counterrevolutionary sabotage (for refusing to work in camp) (Article 58, 14)	10,160	8,724	1,436
Counterrevolutionary sabotage (for escaping from place of imprisonment) (Article 58, 14)	22,687	19,708	2,979
Participation in anti-Soviet conspiracies, anti-Soviet organizations and groups (Article 58, Point 2, 3, 4, 5, 11)	46,582	39,266	7,316
Anti-Soviet agitation (Article 58, 10, 59, 7)	99,401	61,670	37,731
Rebellion and political banditry (Article 58, Point 2; 59, Points 2, 3, 3b)	12,947	12,515	432
Family members of traitors of the motherland (Article 58, 1c)	3,256	2,824	432
Socially dangerous element	2,846	2,756	90
Other counterrevolutionary crimes	10,371	8,432	1,948
Total condemned for counterrevolutionary crimes	579,918	475,976	103,942
<i>Criminal Offenses</i>			
Theft of socialist property (Ukase of 7 Aug 32)	72,293	42,342	29,951
Under Ukase of 4 Jun 47 "On Strengthening the Security for the Personal Property of Citizens"	394,241	242,688	151,553
Under Ukase of 4 Jun 47 "On Criminal Liability for the Theft of State and Public Property"	637,055	371,390	265,665
Speculation	73,205	31,916	41,298
Banditry and armed robbery (Article 59, 3, 167) committed not in places of imprisonment	65,816	53,522	12,294
Banditry and armed robbery (Article 59, 3, 167) committed during period of serving sentence	12,047	11,026	1,021
Premeditated murder (Articles 136, 137, 138) committed not in places of imprisonment	37,808	22,950	14,858
Premeditated murder (Articles 136, 137, 138) committed in places of imprisonment	3,635	3,041	594
Illegal crossing of frontier (Article 59, 10, 84)	1,920	1,089	901
Smuggling activity (Article 59, 9, 83)	368	207	161
Cattle rustling (Article 166)	15,112	8,438	6,674
Recidivist thieves (Article 162c)	6,911	3,883	3,028
Property crimes (Article 162, 178)	61,194	35,464	25,730
Hooliganism (Article 74 and Ukase of 10 Aug 40)	93,477	32,718	60,759
Violation of law on passport possession (Article 192, a)	40,599	7,484	33,115
For escaping from places of imprisonment, exile and banishment (Article 82)	22,074	12,969	9,105
For unauthorized departure (escape) from places of obligatory settlement (Ukase of 26 Nov 48)	3,328	1,504	1,824

Table 3: Composition of GULAG Prisoners by Type of Crime (as of 1 January 1951) (Continued)

Crimes	Total	Including	
		In Camps	In Colonies
1	2	3	4
For concealment of settlers who have escaped from places of obligatory settlement or connivance	1,021	989	32
Socially harmful element	416	343	73
Dissertion (Article 193, 7)	39,129	29,457	9,672
Maiming of self (Article 193, 12)	2,131	1,527	604
Looting (Article 193, 27)	512	429	83
Remaining military crimes (Article 193, except Points 7, 12, 17, 24, 27)	19,648	13,033	6,615
Illegal possession of weapons (Article 182)	12,932	6,221	6,711
Official and economic crimes (Article 59, 3c, 109, 121, 193 Points 17, 18)	128,618	47,630	80,988
Under Ukase of 26 Jun 40 (unauthorized departure from enterprises or from institutions and absences)	26,485	881	25,604
Under Ukases of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet (in addition to those listed above)	35,518	11,921	23,597
Other criminal offenses	140,665	62,729	77,936
Total condemned for criminal offenses	1,948,228	1,057,791	890,437
TOTAL:	2,528,146	1,533,767	994,379

Table 4: Composition of GULAG Prisoners by Lengths of Sentences (on 1 January 1951)

Periods	Total		In Camps		In Colonies	
	Absolute Data, Persons	%	Absolute Data, Persons	%	Absolute Data, Persons	%
Up to 1 year	72,759	2.9	3,585	0.2	69,174	7.0
From 1 to 3 years	222,359	8.8	57,605	3.8	164,754	16.6
From 3 to 5 years	412,662	16.3	218,519	14.2	194,143	19.5
From 5 to 10 years	1,362,709	53.9	902,333	58.8	460,376	46.3
From 10 to 15 years	233,583	9.2	165,643	10.8	67,940	6.8
From 15 to 20 years	102,644	4.1	82,793	5.4	19,851	2.0
Over 20 years	121,430	4.8	103,289	6.8	18,141	1.8
TOTAL	2,528,146	100.0	1,533,767	100.0	994,379	100.0

In 1947, the GULAG camps and colonies held 14,630 children of the women prisoners and 6,779 pregnant women, and in 1948, respectively, 10,217 and 4,588; in 1949, 22,815 and 9,310; in 1950, 19,260 and 11,950; in 1951, 14,713 and 6,888; in 1952 28,219 and 11,096; 1953, 35,505 and 6,286 (the data for 1 January of each year). Calculating per thousand children, the death rate in the "youth homes" of the GULAG in 1947 was 409 children, in 1948, 309, in 1949, 200, in 1950, 159, in 1951, 109, in 1952, 81 and in 1953, 46 children [ibid.].

In the 1940s, the GULAG administration succeeded in organizing an agent-informer network among the prisoners. This network grew from 1 percent in 1940 to 8 percent in 1947. In other words, while in 1940 there were 10 "informers" per thousand prisoners, in 1947, the

figure was already 80. In July 1947, the agent-informer network numbered 138,992 GULAG prisoners, including 9,958 residents, 3,904 agents, 64,905 informers and 60,225 in the "antiescape network" [ibid.].

The imprisoned specialists and skilled workers in their majority were employed in jobs of the immediate or similar specialty. According to data on 1 January 1947, some 74.5 percent of such prisoners was used in the GULAG "in the specialty" (Table 5). Above this average level were the corresponding indicators for construction workers (88.7 percent), woodworkers (87.7 percent) and mining workers (83.2 percent). This indicator was also high among prisoners who had been engineers (86.9 percent), technicians (77.8 percent), foremen (84.4 percent), medical workers (88.2 percent) and veterinary

personnel (80 percent). The corresponding indicators were a little below the average level for metal workers (73.8 percent), the operators of power units (72 percent), fishermen (70.5 percent) and forestry specialists (73.8 percent). Under the specific conditions of GULAG production life, it was more difficult to use prisoners in their direct or approximate specialty when they had been

transport workers, communications workers, radio operators as well as agricultural specialists (agronomists and others). For the prisoners who had been water transport workers, this indicator was 49.1 percent, among motor transport workers 57.1 percent, among railroad workers 58.2 percent, among agricultural specialists 61.4 percent and among radio and communications workers 66.6 percent.

Table 5: Labor Utilization of Specialist Prisoners and Skilled Manpower in GULAG (on 1 January 1947)

	Used in Jobs				Not Working for Various Reasons	Total
	In Direct Specialty	In Close Specialty	In General Work (Counter-revolutionary Crimes)	General Work (Domestic Crimes)		
Engineers	3,814	1,535	499	187	118	6,153
Technicians	3,480	1,824	881	496	133	6,814
Operators of power units	4,364	1,325	1,036	1,012	160	7,897
Foremen	1,186	319	149	98	31	1,783
Mining workers	4,090	446	422	425	67	5,450
Woodworkers	13,223	1,972	998	750	376	17,319
Metal workers	37,994	6,810	6,954	7,762	1,173	60,693
Construction workers	32,201	2,847	1,989	1,590	867	39,494
Motor transport workers	14,880	6,197	6,531	8,427	864	36,899
Water transport workers	328	326	292	340	44	1,330
Railroad workers	3,526	1,571	1,449	1,875	325	8,746
Fishermen	993	305	263	240	39	1,840
Specialists in agriculture (agronomists, and so forth)	2,744	1,081	1,248	1,003	157	6,233
Lumbering	346	97	81	54	27	600
Veterinary personnel	1,013	149	156	113	26	1,457
Medical personnel	5,749	1,125	1,430	1,507	170	9,296
Electrical and radio workers	5,064	1,125	1,430	1,507	170	9,296
TOTAL	134,995	28,388	24,802	26,158	4,969	219,039
Same in %	61.6	12.9	11.3	11.9	2.3	100.0

A portion of the prisoners was subjected to the removal of guards but this was a significant minority. On 1 August 1947, in the GULAG there were 191,016 unguarded prisoners, or 10.8 percent of the total number [ibid.].

In accord with the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No 4293-1703ss of 20 November 1948 and No 1065-376ss of 13 March 1950, the prisoners in all the ITL and ITK were to receive for their work a wage calculated proceeding from reduced (to 30 percent) wage rates and salaries, employing the progressive piece and bonus wage systems established for workers, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel in the corresponding national economic sectors [ibid.]. In the interests of raising labor productivity and the interest of the prisoners used in defense-end jobs, in coal mining, in the building of electric plants and projects in the oil

industry, in rail construction, as well as in the lumber and coal industries, they came under a system of counts for working days which, in surpassing the output norm, were subtracted from the sentence. By April 1954, this system was in effect in the camps and colonies with a total number of 737,800 prisoners (54.2 percent of the total number of prisoners) [ibid.].

According to the data, on 1 March 1940, in the GULAG on an average per 16 prisoners there was one security man while on 1 April 1954, there was now one guard for an average of 9 prisoners. On 1 April 1954, the total number of guards in the GULAG camps and colonies was 148,049 persons, including 98,863 rank-and-file, 37,688 NCO and 11,498 officer [ibid.]. The presence of such an impressive security helped to reduce the number of prisoner escapes, as well as to strengthen discipline and order in the camps and colonies. However, as

practice indicated, the security was far from always capable of protecting those prisoners whom the other inmates silently sentenced to death. Just in January-March 1954, in the ITL and ITK 129 murders were committed for reasons of revenge, settling of personal scores and so forth [ibid.].

In 1953 and the first quarter of 1954, 589,366 new prisoners arrived in the GULAG camps and colonies and during the same period 1,701,310 persons left, with 1,201,738 being released beforehand under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 27 March 1953 "On Amnesty" adopted upon the initiative of L.P. Beriia. On 1 April 1954, the GULAG held 1,360,303 prisoners (897,051 in camps and 463,252 in colonies), including 448,344 for counterrevolutionary crimes, 190,301 for banditry, robbery and premeditated murder, 490,503 for robbery, embezzlement and other particularly dangerous criminal offenses, 95,425 for hooliganism, and 135,730 for official, economic and other crimes. Among the prisoners held on 1 April 1954 in the GULAG, there were 1,182,759 men (87 percent) and 177,544 women (13 percent); there were 383,243 persons under the age of 25 [ibid.].

At the beginning of 1954, the average living space per prisoner was 2 km². However, in certain places (in the camps of Dalstroy, the Norilsk and Vorkuta-Pechora combines and the lumber camps of the MVD), because of the insufficient amount of space, the average available living area was 1-1.5 m² [2].

In April 1954, among the GULAG prisoners, 55.6 percent were fit for physical labor, 32.7 percent had limited fitness and 11.7 percent were disabled and elderly. The prisoners capable of work were used on jobs in the following sectors of the national economy: 182,000 persons in nonferrous metallurgy, 96,000 in the oil industry, 95,000 in the coal industry, 60,000 in the construction of power plants; 51,000 in railroad construction; 229,000 in the lumbering camps of the MVD, 93,000 in the construction of Glavpromstroy and Glavspetsstroy [Main Special Construction Administration] of the USSR MVD, 45,000 in the agricultural camps of the MVD, and 46,000 in other industrial and construction projects. The labor utilization of the remaining prisoners was organized at the place of their incarceration in the colonies and camp subunits and these were industrial and agricultural enterprises which with the forces of the prisoners carried out the established state plan and operated on full cost accounting [ibid.].

In the ITL, three categories of conditions for keeping the prisoners had been established: strict, increased and general. Held under *strict conditions* were persons convicted for banditry, armed robbery, premeditated murder, escaping from places of incarceration and incorrigible recidivist criminals. They were under a strong guard and supervision, they could not be left without guards, and they were used predominantly in heavy physical work, and the strictest punitive measures were applied against them for failure to work or for violating

the camp conditions. Held under *increased conditions* were persons convicted for theft and other dangerous crimes and other recidivist thieves. These prisoners were also not allowed to move about without guards and were used chiefly in general jobs. The remaining prisoners in the ITL as well as all those in the ITK were held under *general conditions*. They were permitted to move without guards, they could be employed in low-level administrative and economic work on the staff of the camp subdivisions and at the ITK and were also involved in guard and escort services in guarding the prisoners.

According to the Ukase of 27 March 1953, all the banished (the category of "banished" ceased to exist) and a portion of the exiles was also released ahead of time. At the moment of the issuing of this Ukase, there were 13,952 registered exiles and banished, with 8,042 persons being released under the amnesty and 5,910 exiles remaining under supervision [ibid.].

For the end of the summer and autumn of 1953, they planned to carry out a large-scale release of the special settlers. In April-May 1953, the USSR MVD carried out the corresponding preparatory work, and drafts were worked out for an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the release of the special settlers. From the correspondence studied by us between the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, S.N. Kruglov, and L.P. Beriia for April-June 1953, it is clear that in August they intended to submit the designated drafts for approval to the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers. That these ukases and the decree would be passed they did not doubt. Prior to the end of 1953, they planned to release around 1.7 million special settlers and temporarily, for a period of 1 or 2 years, leave 1.1 million persons in the special settlements, having eased their conditions [ibid.]. However, due to the arrest of L.P. Beriia, no large-scale release of the special settlers followed in 1953. Moreover, such intentions were judged to be wrecking, as their implementation would lead to the movement of large masses of people and this would tell negatively upon the carrying out of the national economic tasks. In truth, later in 1954-1958, life forced N.S. Khrushchev and his circle to gradually implement the Beriia plan to liberate the special settlers.

In the mid-1950s, in GULAG there was a rapid decline in the number of political prisoners ("counterrevolutionaries"). According to the Ukase of 27 March 1953, persons convicted for political reasons for a period of up to 5 years inclusively were to be released ahead of time. Chiefly, due to this, the number of political prisoners in the ITL and ITK declined from around 580,000 in 1950-1951 to approximately 480,000 in the autumn of 1953. The reduction in the number of political prisoners in the GULAG in 1954-1955 occurred predominantly due to their release upon serving their sentences and to a lesser degree due to early release on the basis of a review of the cases and under the amnesty. In 1954-1955, some 88,278 political prisoners were released ahead of time

from the camps and colonies, including 32,798 on the basis of a review of the cases and 55,480 under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 17 September 1955 "On the Amnesty for Soviet Citizens Who Collaborated With the Occupiers During the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." After the 20th CPSU Congress (1956), the process of early release of political prisoners on the basis of a review of

the cases was accelerated. While on 1 January 1955, 309,088 prisoners were held in the camps and colonies for counterrevolutionary crimes, on 1 January 1956, the figure was 113,735 and on 1 April 1959, just 11,027 persons [ibid.]. Over the period from 1 April 1954 through 1 April 1959, the number of political prisoners in GULAG declined by 40.7-fold and their proportional amount in all the prisoners dropped from 33.0 percent to 1.2 percent (Table 6).

Table 6: Prisoners in Camps and Colonies of MVD (on 1 January 1959)

Nature of Crimes	Number, Persons	Proportional Amount, %
Counterrevolutionary crimes	11,027	1.2
Under Ukase of 4 Jun 47 "On Criminal Liability for Theft of State and Public Property"	211,006	22.2
Under Ukase of 10 Jan 55 "On Criminal Liability for Petty Theft of State and Public Property"	8,311	0.9
Under Ukase of 4 Jun 47 "On Strengthening Security for Personal Property of Citizens"	296,138	31.3
Under Ukase of 4 Jan 49 "On Strengthening Criminal Liability for Rape"	33,160	3.5
Banditry	21,384	2.3
Premeditated murder	38,055	4.0
Premeditated severe bodily injury	31,004	3.3
Hooliganism	184,023	19.4
Violation of passport registration rules	6,842	0.7
Military crimes	7,676	0.8
Other crimes	99,821	10.5
TOTAL	948,447	100.0

The leadership in power in the mid-1950s consisting of N.S. Khrushchev, G.M. Malenkov, K.Ye. Voroshilov, V.M. Molotov and others, in being responsible along with the deceased "leader of the peoples" for the previous mass repressions, was involved in an undertaking which was completely unnatural for them, in releasing in mass numbers the political prisoners and even rehabilitating a portion of them (basically among those repressed in 1937-1938). This was in no way a manifestation of goodwill or atonement. They proceeded from the following premise: at the given stage only a policy of liberalization (it was also a policy of self-preservation) could serve as a guarantee for preserving the regime and the stability of their own position as a ruling elite, and this policy included various measures to improve the moral and psychological climate in the nation, the abolishment of the extrajudicial bodies and rather major steps toward a state under the law and public distancing from "Stalinism."

An essential component of liberalization (self-preservation of the totalitarian system) was also a criticism of the previous repressive policy and its actual confirmation by the mass liberation and rehabilitation of the repressed. Here official propaganda was able to shape public opinion in believing that, supposedly, the mass repressions of innocent persons had occurred only in 1937-1938, while in other periods they virtually had not existed. N.S. Khrushchev and his circle safely heaped all

responsibility for the repressions on the deceased in the person of I.V. Stalin, N.I. Yezhov and L.P. Beriia.

In the process of the retreat in the mid-1950s from a repressive policy, the personality factor played a subsidiary role, as circumstances were stronger than the will and desires of individuals. We are convinced that if Stalin has been alive then, he would have headed a policy of liberalization. Only in this instance, the rehabilitated would be called not "victims of the cult of personality of Stalin" but most probably "the victims of the enemy of the people Yezhov."

The rehabilitated communists, including a few surviving Old Bolsheviks with prerevolutionary experience were not permitted to come anywhere near even the inferior levels of party and state power. The party and state on all levels continued to be controlled completely by people who to one degree or another had participated in the previous policy as direct or indirect butchers of their "supporters."

There was a strict selectivity in the process of the posthumous rehabilitation of party and state leaders, military leaders, scientists and others. Among the other criteria there was the one: a) only those who had been condemned by internal court or extrajudicial bodies of the USSR were to be rehabilitated; b) those who had also been condemned in the Comintern were not to be

rehabilitated. This was done in the aim of not putting the world communist movement in an awkward situation. For this reason there could be no question of the posthumous rehabilitation of persons (primarily the annihilated closest associates of V.I. Lenin) when the Comintern was involved in their condemnation. It was easier with the case of the posthumous rehabilitation of military leaders (M.N. Tukhachevskiy, V.K. Blyukher, I.E. Yakir and others) as the Comintern had not been involved in their condemnation.

From the mid-1950s, toward the persons convicted of "sedition," those in power began to show a certain condescension which consisted in the fact, for example, that while previously a person would without fail receive up to 10 years in the camps for an antikolkhoz story or joke, now he was not even arrested for this. However, this condescension had definite limits and dissidence as before was not forgiven. The GULAG became the destination for a new wave of political prisoners who were fighters against totalitarianism and for human rights.

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Is a New Paradigm of Sociological Knowledge Possible?

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[Article by Zhan Terentyevich Toshchenko, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and director of the Institute of Sociological Research under the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. He is a permanent author on our journal]

[Text] During its short but dramatically rich history, Soviet sociology has experienced several debates concerning self-definition as a sovereign science. The disputes "over the object and subject" have been useful, regardless of the facts that the scientists in no way could agree on overcoming the still surviving discord of the macro- and microapproaches [1], and had not learned to fully take into account the aggregate of sociological information which had been tortuously and difficultly acquired in various areas of social knowledge. The conceptual and procedural instrumentarium of our science some 30 years after its semiofficial recognition is far

from perfect and this is reflected in its cognitive possibilities for adequately reflecting the society in which we live.

At present, we are again confronted with the necessity of carrying out reflexive work and methodological expert evaluation. This has been caused basically by two circumstances: by the particular features of modern social development which have confronted sociology with the task of elaborating fundamentally new approaches; by the development of sociology as an independent science and which requires from it an analysis of the actual renewal of Soviet society and a decisive abandonment of the dogmas and compromises which accompanied its development in the 1960s and 1980s.

In evaluating the real place of sociology in the life of society as well as the conclusions and lessons of previous discussions, let us endeavor to analyze certain important questions concerning the growth of sociological knowledge.

On the Object of Sociology

For a long time, this question was not specially discussed. In principle, a majority of the sociologists shared the opinion that the object of their study is society, since it in various aspects is studied by all social and humanitarian sciences and for this reason there is no need to define the specific features of the object in terms of each of them. Correspondingly, there was no need to distinguish the object and the subject of sociology. The timid attempts all the same to analyze the questions concerning the object of our science [2] were ignored, as their weak side was the circumstance that they lacked a definition of the qualitative specific features of society which could become precisely the object of sociological research.

Undoubtedly, any social science has as its object not all society as such but rather its individual facets or forms of manifestation including historical, economic, legal and so forth.

We propose that **civil society** is such (a little-studied) facet which also comprises the object of sociology as a sovereign science. Both domestic sociologists and foreign ones [3] have to one degree or another already turned to this idea, however it has not been given systematic elaboration.

First of all, it should be emphasized that a civil society arose only at a definite stage in the development of human civilization. Although its elements and immature forms have existed during all times, as an independent, self-sufficing phenomenon it came into being in that concrete historical period when man in real life began to demonstrate fundamentally new traits of his conscience and conduct and his way of life. This was tied to the process of the development of the capitalist method of

production, when man gained the opportunity to act as an independent social force the reserves of which now depended upon the level of awareness and creativity in the participants of the real historical process. In contrast to the slave-owning and feudal societies, man in mass numbers became a value, a free and responsible subject [principal] of economic, political and spiritual life, that is, a citizen. Precisely with the appearance of civil society, people began acting as an historical force which influenced the social processes to no lesser degree than the social groups and strata, their political and other associations and organizations.

No social science arises before a social need. Sociology is no exception here. Its appearance was preceded by the formation in the life of society of a special mechanism linked to the development of a completely definite type of social relations, when man was put forward into a fundamentally new social position both in relationships with the social institutions as well as in an awareness of his own personal self-value.

Research on the common human principles of organizing social life in no way can replace an analysis of the specific forms of human activity in various socioeconomic systems. However, the latter is only a particular form for the manifestation of the common human. This must be emphasized since in a large number of scientific works concerned with a comparison of the life of people in capitalist and socialist societies, it has been precisely the hyperbolization of the socioclass approach which has served as the starting point for a vulgarized analysis of the socioeconomic formations, and the absolute contrasting of the basic provisions of "bourgeois" and Soviet sociological thought. As practice has shown, the intellectual limitations have led to nothing more than a blind alley, stagnation and the loss of historical future. The logic of social development indicates the necessity of a constant comparison in the activities of social groups and strata not only within a historically specific society but also between their various types.

This cognitive impulse—the finding and comparison of different types of activity considering the specific features of each country—can characterize the contribution of sociology to resolving both global and specific problems which concern all of mankind or its individual strata and groups.

Sociology at the very first stages of its development drew attention to the common principles and bases characteristic of any civil society regardless of the specific socioeconomic and political forms of its embodiment. It proceeded from the view that the disclosing of the specific features of one or another society should be preceded by research on the common and persistent characteristics of any society which would explain the essence of the human community independently of the specific forms of its manifestation. For the sake of justice, it must be said that precisely the spread of such an approach in the sociology of the 1920s and 1930s

served as a basis for its harsh criticism for the "sociologized" and "abstract" schemes, for abandoning the adherence to class-ideological views, and for its adherence to searching for the "abstractly common" and isolating as a subject of analysis, in using the contemporary political language, "the priority of common human values." This desire of the sociologists to analyze the problems of civil society was the basis for the unjustly harsh criticism in the 1970s which proceeded from the view that, according to the scientific data, the indicators of labor activity, the way of life, the development of culture and education showed many common features in the life of the Soviet people with the life of other countries and this ran contrary to the ideological dogmas.

On the Subject of Sociological Science

Without taking up the entire range of the genesis of ideas concerning the subject of sociology, we would merely like to recall those basic turning points which mark the path of development of this science under the conditions of our society.

The first mentioning of sociology as a reborn scientific discipline dates to 1955, when Academician V.S. Nemchinov described it as one of the areas of philosophical knowledge, the subject of which is the development of society [4]. Subsequently, this viewpoint was concretized: "Sociology is a science dealing with the laws and driving forces in the development of society" [5]. This approach naturally completely identified sociology with historical materialism and it is no accident that such ambiguity could not satisfy the scientists for long as in fact it was impossible to "multiply essences."

The next attempt to define the place of sociology in the system of social sciences was linked to the well-known Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 1969 which set the task of developing "historical materialism as a common sociological theory" [6]. A complete interpretation of this position was reflected in the review article of the journal *KOMMUNIST* and which asserted that Marxist sociology, on equal footing with historical materialism, as a common sociological theory, includes research on the laws of the functioning of different social communities, the aggregate of special sociological theories for the different level of community and, finally, concrete sociological research [7]. In principle this was a support for the viewpoint advanced at one of the first debates on the structure of sociological science (MGU [Moscow State University], 1968), when D.M. Ugri-novich along with a description of historical materialism as a common sociological theory, proposed the setting apart of particular sociological theories [8]. "Level methodology" was worked out during this period by many scientists [9] and, in essence, predominated until the beginning of the 1980s.

However, the identifying of general sociology with historical materialism was little constructive, as it could not

justify the existence of the actively developing independent directions in sociological research. This position implicitly, in a covert form, denied the independence of sociology as a science and for this reason could not satisfy many researchers. Under these conditions, numerous attempts appeared to find a compromise variation between the proper and the real.

Among these, the greatest renown came for the definition given by Yu.A. Levada: "Sociology is an empirical social discipline studying social systems in their functioning and development" [10]. This was a compromise between the various interpretations of the dialectics of the "empirical and the theoretical" in sociology. In relying on the experience of applied research, the author attempted to construct his own understanding of the structure of sociological knowledge. However, this approach was criticized, chiefly, from the position of the impossibility of the existence of sociology as an independent science. The approach which became the "encyclopedic truth" was the one which viewed sociology as "a science dealing with the patterns and driving forces in the development and functioning of social systems, both global (society as a whole) and particular (social groups, institutions and processes)" [11].

This did not stop the scientists. Their constant pressure, the concept of "applied sociology" was given legitimate status and methodological work was done to bring out the subject of the given science. In our view, the results of this were embodied most fully in the definition of V.P. Davidyuk who felt that "Marxist applied sociology is a science dealing with the specific laws of the genesis, development and functioning of concrete social systems, processes, structures, organizations and their elements" [12]. The diversity of viewpoints also gave rise to nihilism in regard to sociology as a science. "Up to now," asserted V.Ya. Yelmeyev in 1986, "no necessity had arisen (and it would scarcely appear) for general sociology as a science on equal footing with historical materialism as this is a synonym for the science of sociology" [13].

Such an indefinite, unnatural state could not last long. For this reason in the scientific literature from the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, an attempt was made to reach a more concrete interpretation of the subject area of sociology with many beginning to link this to the development of the social sphere.

Such a focus was quite natural, as by this time society had grown up to a comprehension of the importance and extreme significance of social processes and their impact on all aspects of human activity without exception. An ignoring of the social aspects of development involved major mistakes and losses due to the shortsightedness of numerous economic and political decisions. As the answer was hard to find for the question of what science would respond to the challenge of the times, the enticement appeared of entrusting this mission to the sociologists. The most consistent justification of this viewpoint was provided by V.N. Ivanov who focused attention on

disclosing the essence of social relations, their specific features, role and place in social life [14].

Here social relations were interpreted by him as a cross section or aspect of societal relations. In our view, such an approach brings close together or even identifies the social fact, process and phenomenon with the societal fact, process and phenomena. Analogous or similar assertions concerning other aspects of the social (the social structure, groups and communities, processes) are to be found in the works of A.G. Zdravomyslov, A.G. Kharchev and the early works of V.A. Yadov. To one degree or another these have a good deal in common, in reflecting the actually existing situation in this stage of the development of sociology as a science.

We feel that the incompleteness and one-sidedness of these viewpoints are manifested in the following: a) here the social is often interpreted as the societal, that is, in the broad sense of this word, while in a majority of instances this is viewed as being on the same order as the economic, political and spiritual; b) practice indicates that sociologists do not restrict themselves to an analysis of just social processes, in investigating problems also in the sphere of the economy, politics, culture, international life and so forth; c) before turning to the social structures, strata, groups and societies, sociology is interested in man himself, his conscience and conduct as these mediate all his social functions.

Thus, life itself suggests that sociology cannot restrict itself to studying just the social sphere. An analysis of the history of our science indicates that, in the first place, research on economic life (the problems of labor, labor conditions, organization and incentives, the problems of labor collectives and regions, the ecological and demographic situation and so forth) have already become a reality. Secondly, sociology, undoubtedly, is actively interested in the social processes themselves (the problems of the social structure, the organization of distribution relations, social status, the way of life, national and interethnic relations and so forth). Thirdly, the research is turning more and more to disclosing the essence of the political processes and phenomena related to the development of democracy, the solution to the problems of power, the involvement of workers in management, the activities of social organizations and so forth. Finally, sociology profoundly studies the spiritual life of society with a broad range of problems relating to education, culture, science, art and religion becoming the subject of its research.

This makes it possible to conclude that the subject of sociology cannot be restricted to a sphere of social life, for the area of its interests involves all problems of human existence without exception.

A clarification of the subject of sociology does not end with these variations. Comparatively recently a new page in the discussion was opened up and this involved the attempt to isolate a grid of basic categories which would provide the core of the subject area of sociology as a

particular science dealing with society. V.A. Yadov proposed viewing the "social community" as the basic category. In his opinion, this approach makes it possible to successfully reconcile the macro- and microsociological approaches and takes into account the subjective-action component and the universal forms of social organization [1].

Simultaneously another proposal was formulated. The concept of the "social structure" was introduced as the basic category and, respectively, the subject of sociology and this, in the opinion of A.V. Kabyscha, is simultaneously applicable to society, the social group and the individual [15].

Without denying the significance of these interpretations of the subject area of sociology, it must be pointed out that all of them are limited to an important but not exhaustive—just one—aspect of society's activity.

In proceeding from the view that the central problem of civil society—the object of sociology—is the process of the generation, formation and liberation of the essential forces of man, we propose that its subject is the specific form of the manifestation of man as an individual and this is tied above all to an analysis of his conscience and activity.

In analyzing the actually existing practice of research work in sociology, we conclude that the scientists have always put man and his conscience (knowledge, opinions, judgments, value orientations) at the center of their attention as well as man's response to social changes and his activities, but not so much as an individual as rather a member of a certain social group, stratum or institution. Of enormous significance for sociology is an analysis of the motives of conduct of people in a certain situation in life, their needs, interests and orientations. In other words, it studies social conscience by means of analyzing individual and group conscience as well as the forms and methods of its objectivization in activity (conduct) under the conditions of definite socioeconomic and political relations and under the influence of the material and physical environment. This is all the more important as before being included in social communities, groups or strata a person begins with an awareness of surrounding reality, and with attempts to turn the latter into real actions under the conditions of a certain macro- and microenvironment. This is why even the use of statistics for sociology is important not as information on the quantitative processes generally but rather as a description which must be correlated with the inner world of people.

In his subject activities, a sociologist encounters primarily not the structures and forms of social organization but rather the conscience and activities of a person and through which a person emerges on the institutional, stratification, management and other levels in the organization of social life.

Let us take up this in greater detail.

"Real" Conscience and Behavior as the Subject of Sociology

Usually two levels—the everyday and the theoretical—are established in the structure of social conscience. Here the most widespread is the viewpoint which places one in opposition to the other, in describing ordinary conscience as the inferior, underdeveloped and so forth level of social conscience. All of this to a certain degree is justified as long as a gnoseological analysis of this phenomenon is being made. But, as life shows, in a pure form neither one or the other exists. The sociological approach forces us to take a different look at this problem, in introducing the category of the "real" (practical) conscience.

First of all, it is essential to point out that real conscience of actual individuals, in being intertwined in the social process of their activity, is not separable from social reproduction of their life and reflects not only random, spontaneous ties and relations but also is capable of capturing (even in an imperfect form) certain permanent patterns and trends.

Real conscience not only does not exclude common sense and the possibility of understanding profound essential processes, but presupposes its constant enrichment and use in the practical life of man. Real conscience is not the result of some specialized activity (political, aesthetic, moral and so forth). It is produced by all types of human activity, it permeates each of them and in accord with the maturity of this activity reflects the degree of development (scientificity or nonscientificity) in understanding surrounding reality. Since any type of activity contains principled, essential aspects of social activity, it can be said that the conscience engendered by it reflects certain prominently existing trends and objective patterns of development. The fact that this conscience operates using the "primary mental forms" in no way means that the sphere of real, practical conscience is restricted to just the "minor" questions of existence. Precisely this contradiction—the reflecting of direct reality immediately and the possibility of a profound and not a superficial depiction of reality—also characterizes the present state of real conscience, and correspondingly, the behavior of people. Furthermore, real conscience and behavior in their content represent a combination of the rational and emotional, the intertwining of ideological elements, established traditional views and habits with their emotional forms. And if the emotional component of real conscience and behavior in its essence is guided more by the direct impression, the action of the moment, the rational component is capable to a greater degree of integrating previous experience and the lessons of not only personal but also social life, and capture the social and the sociopolitical echo of many occurring events. This discloses that moment which unites the individual elements of the practical perception of reality with scientific, theoretical conscience. The gravitation and frequently the predominance of the emotional in real conscience and behavior to no degree eliminates the importance and significance of the

rational, and does not exclude the possibility that this ultimately determines the direction and maturity of social conscience and social activity.

In addition, real conscience and behavior are inherent not only to an individual or random, accidental groups of people. These are the product of collective creativity characteristic both for the entire society as well as the socioclass groups, strata and detachments. In arising as a response to the direct perception of reality, as a reflection of the empirical conditions of existence, they acquire an independent role, in being expressed in public opinion, the attitudes of people. The results of human activity, "including also their mistakes have a reverse impact on all social development, even the economic" [16]. Although real conscience and behavior develop out of the immediate experience of individual persons, nevertheless in its social embodiment it forms an unique phenomenon the creator of which is the class, nation, social group or social stratum. Thus, each person works out his own notions of the occurring political events both within the nation and abroad. However, real conscience and behavior are not an assembly or mechanical generalization of these views and actions; they form a new specific essence which manifests permanent trends and objectively depicting both the state of conscience as well as the depth of its analysis of social life

Finally, real conscience and behavior in terms of their character and content reflect numerous social contradictions, they are full of daily collisions and in their essence are often very close to ordinary conscience. "Taken...as an aggregate of daily experience, all those joys and sadnesses, hopes and disappointments from which daily life is formed, this ordinary conscience ends up a complete anxiety, in comparison with which scientific and philosophical conscience appear as something like the ataraxia among the thinkers of the age of Hellenism [17].

Real, live conscience and conduct are the "richest" social phenomena in their essence. In fact, they reflect on an empirical level the state of social conscience and social activity as a whole in all its diversity, contradictoriness, randomness and necessity. Precisely they operate as a sensitive indicator of the state and trends in the development and functioning of social processes. For this reason, their study and research represent an important tool of management and are an indispensable means for taking scientifically sound decisions in all spheres of social life without exception, from the economic to the spiritual.

In speaking about real conscience, we would like to draw attention to its closeness but not identicalness with the concept of "mass conscience" and which has gained great dissemination in the philosophical and sociological literature. Mass conscience embodies that social phenomenon which is described by the concept of "mass individuals" and "mass communities" and this defines not only its social nature but also boundaries. With all the importance of mass conscience and even considering its profound differentiation, the question still remains

open of "where one should put conscience which is not mass and reflects the positions of small and even insignificant groups and strata and individual persons?" Will it not happen that there will be the conscious ignoring of the forms of manifestation of the conscience of those who do not fall under the concept of "mass"? This is all the more important as we have the lamentable experience of ignoring (in political life) that conscience which in actuality did not reflect the opinion of the masses but which could have been capable of predicting and defining the process of understanding social life.

This discrepancy between mass conscience and the real in practical terms is manifested not only in the instance of the outstripping of the conscience of individual persons or individual groups of people. Such a positing of the question also relates to other instances of the discrepancy of conscience and behavior (including on the negative level) to mass conscience, when values, attitudes and views characterize a particular position, a particular way of life and a particular perception of reality. In our view, the conscience of an innovative artist, writer or composer never falls under the concept of "mass conscience," although for a number of indicators this differs little from the views of life of a majority of the people. Also not falling under mass conscience are the views and opinions of those groups of people who, because of historical and ethnogeographic factors, have not come into complete contact with world civilization and maintain their adherence to their own way of life.

We must also take up the phenomenon when the exaggeration of the role of mass conscience in the recent past was grounds for ignoring or even persecuting those who did not fit within its framework and who "dropped out" of the customary, the sanctioned, the officially approved.

For this reason, in recognizing the great importance of such a phenomenon as mass conscience, it is still better to view the real, practically functioning social conscience in all its complexity, contradictoriness and conflict, without removing from it the conscience of not only individual social communities but also individuals. This is particularly important as the process of turning social conscience into a material force is of equal importance for sociology. The real, living conscience and behavior are a specific state of social life which is much richer in content and which weave together both the scientifically based knowledge, judgments and speculations as well as the spontaneous practical experience, the immediate perception of reality and the appropriate activity. Precisely such an approach makes it possible to imagine real conscience and behavior in all their complexity and contradictoriness, without dooming them to be viewed as something not always worthy of attention and scientific analysis. In other words, living, practical conscience and conduct are really functioning—on the subjective level—social life in the entire complex interweaving of both the natural patterns and relations as well as the random, the solitary views, ideas and notions which at times also are contradictory to social progress. Precisely such an approach to real conscience and behavior as a

living social phenomenon which is full of contradictions and drama and which functions under the conditions of direct practical experience, and is capable of anticipating (or incorporating) theoretical conscience, makes it possible to explain in the language of sociology many processes and to isolate the common which is inherent to them not only in all spheres of social life but even under the conditions of different socioeconomic systems.

Thus, the subject of sociology, as a science, includes the following: real social conscience in all its contradictory development; the activities and actual conduct of people which act as the subject embodiment (in form and content) of the knowledge, attitudes, value orientations, needs and interests fixed in real conscience; the conditions under which the real conscience and activities and the actual behavior of people develop and are realized.

Real, living conscience and behavior on an empirical level reflect all the diversity, contradictoriness, randomness and necessity in the life of man as a social being. Precisely they in all manifestations operate as a sensitive indicator of the state and trends of development and functioning of social processes.

Such an approach, in our view, makes it possible to surmount the gap between the macro- and microsociology and focus attention on an analysis and elucidation of the natural ties and trends on the basis of studying existing reality and hence clarify, apply and transform our notions about the entire social organism, avoiding those speculative constructs which have often beset the macrosociological level of analysis.

Thus, we are enriching the humanistic direction in sociology and its empirical research and are defining more precisely and specifically its place in the system of scientific knowledge.

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On the Subject of Sociological Science: Three Methodological Questions

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[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Rutkevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] Our position on the subject, structure and the functions of sociology has been set out clearly more than 10 years ago in the book "Dialektika i sotsiologiya"

[Dialectics and Sociology] [1]. In the ensuing articles (one of which was written with the coauthorship of N.V. Pilipenko), this position was clarified and concretized [2-3]. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds for returning to the designated problems. The question of the subject of sociology is again being discussed actively not only in the special literature but also that designed for the mass reader, including in textbooks and dictionaries [4-6], in pamphlets and articles devoted to the role of sociology in perestroika [7-8]. Finally, the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA has initiated a discussion of the subject of sociology as a science [9-11].

The reason for the heightened interest in the given question are understandable. Under the conditions of the social and spiritual crisis, there has been an accelerated process of the liberation of social sciences from the dogmatic notions which have prevailed over the conscience of scientists for the decades, and the spectrum of voiced opinions has been broadened, including on the fundamental questions. This generally positive process has not been without losses, including attempts to deny the succession in the development of society and a departure from the Marxist tradition in social sciences. The question of the subject of sociology has naturally been at the crossroads of opinions and frequently the polemics has gone beyond the limits of a scientific dispute, assuming the traits of a "game without rules." However, personal attacks and the attaching of labels cannot eliminate the arguments. Scientific polemics should serve just one goal of bringing out the truth. An essential condition for approaching this, in our view, is the employment of *dialectical thinking* and based here on a *materialistic comprehension* of social life. In turning to the subject of a science, this is essential because the relationship of the subject of a science to the science itself is a particular instance of the subject-object relationship. Furthermore, the elucidation of the place of the given science in their general structure presupposes a *systems approach* which for consistent execution requires reliance on dialectics as the most general philosophical teaching dealing with relationships and development. A systems approach considering the teachings elaborated by gnoseology on the relationship of the levels of cognition is essential for comprehending the structure of any science, including sociology. The conceptual apparatus of science requires correlating with a system of categories of a higher level, primarily philosophical ones. Finally, it is sufficiently obvious that the development of notions about the subject of a science has as its deep-seated driving force the historical development of the science itself in its relationship to social practice.

This theoretical introduction—and we will return repeatedly to the stated theses—is essential because the goal of the article is to examine three important methodological questions.

A Science Dealing With Social Processes?

Recently, the most popular has been a definition of the subject of sociology which is enticing in its seeming simplicity and is based on the "consonance" of terms. In a literal translation from the Latin (and a majority of the European languages) into Russian, the social means the societal ["obshchestvennyy"] and sociology is the science dealing with science and hence a science dealing with social processes. Let us give several examples. In one instance the given definition is simply extended into a title: "Social Relations as the Object of Study of Sociology" [13, p 11], and no attention is given to the difference between the subject of the science and its object. In other instances, it is even simpler: "Sociology Studies the Social" [5, p 11]. But in examining the essence of the matter, this definition is overgrown by various additions which would concretize precisely what is studied by sociology in the "social." Let us give one of the extended definitions of this sort: "Sociology is a science dealing with the general and specific **social** laws and patterns in the development and functioning of the **social** systems, the science dealing with the mechanisms of action and forms of manifestation of these laws and patterns in the activities of individuals, **social** groups, communities, classes and peoples" [4, p 25] (emphasis ours.—M.R.). The question of the essence of the social is not eliminated by the fact that the word "social" has been repeated thrice while the processes have been deciphered as laws and forms of their manifestation, mechanisms of action and so forth.

It is perfectly obvious that the sense of such definitions depends directly and immediately upon what content is invested in the initial concept. Let us leave aside instances when authors do not trouble themselves with an analysis of the concepts. With a more balanced approach it is explained to the reader that this key concept in the sociological (and not only) literature is interpreted in a broad and narrower, special sense. The first of these was mentioned above. With the etymological approach, as well as in comparing society and nature, the societal (social) and the biological in man, this is irreproachable. In turning to society as such, the given definition goes back to A. Comte and give sociology—in one way or another—the status of the most general, dominant social science. There is a grain of truth to this as we will take up below. But the "piquancy" of the situation is that the authors of such definitions, as a rule, proceed from a narrower, special meaning of this term which corresponds to the Marxist tradition.

Precisely in the given sense the concept of the "social" has become firmly rooted in the Soviet political and social science literature because of the elaboration starting in the 1960s of social development plans for the enterprise collectives as well as cities and other territories with a most active role for the sociologists. Since these plans which were voluntarily adopted by the leadership of the collectives operated as a supplement to the economic development plans approved by the state bodies, it was essential to more clearly delimit the

concepts of the "economic" and "social." This problem became even more acute when the state plans began to be named "economic and social development plans." This "and" impelled the dogmatically oriented notion of searching out the "social sphere" as supposedly existing along with the "economic sphere," although undoubtedly in a relationship to it. Here is the hidden meaning of the attempts to view the specific features of sociological science in the fact that it (and only it) is concerned with studying the social sphere of society's life, the social processes, relations and laws in the same manner that economic science studies economic processes, laws and so forth. The proclaiming of the *primacy* of social goals, during the years of perestroika in the official documents has helped to strengthen the designated viewpoint of the subject of sociology as the one and only "perestroika" science. Precisely in such a context there have begun to appear articles and pamphlets titled "The Sociology of Perestroika and Perestroika [Restructuring] of Sociology," "The Sociology of Perestroika" and so forth [7, 8].

However, the actual increased role of sociology in the incipient period of the breaking up of social relations with the growth of the crisis situation cannot serve as grounds for such speculation as the growth of the importance of sociology is a consequence of moving the tasks of social development into the forefront and for this reason sociology must be styled a science concerned with social processes.

What should one understand as "social processes," "relationships" and so forth in the narrow sense? In the "Foreword" to the work "On a Critique of Political Economy," it is asserted that "the method of production of material life" (that is, the economic process) "determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life generally" [12]. From this, it follows that by social relationships one understands the relationships between classes and other social groups and that these must not be considered as "of equal rank" with the economic (the base), the political and spiritual (superstructure) relations, but an important essential aspect or side of both of these, as relations between classes and social groups "permeate" the entire system of social relations in the course of history, beginning with the breakdown of primitive society. At present, when a transition has begun to market relations in the USSR and the Eastern European countries, and when the process of social differentiation has been accelerated and deepened, there can scarcely be any doubt that in our nation the social relations in the designated sense, in arising primarily in the economy, are gaining an ever-clearer expression in the political and ideological positions of the newly arisen (and arising) parties and social movements. The recognition of social relations as intergroup relations has gradually made progress. But the recognition of them in this sense as a subject of sociology entails three characteristic errors. The first and main one is that with such an understanding of the "social" and maintaining a definition of sociology as *a science concerned with social processes and relations* and so forth, a number of authors

does not wish or cannot note the obvious discrepancy: one loses the *differentia specifica*, that is the specific difference of the given science from others. In actuality, in fact are not economic relations between communities, for example, the relationships of ownership and distribution not the subject of political economy and other economic sciences while political relations between them are the subject of political science? With equal success one can ask the question of the demarcation line with legal sciences, social psychology and so forth. Either these "unpleasant" questions are merely avoided, as if not noticing them, or an unsatisfactory reply is given considering logic and common sense.

The second error arises in an attempt to deal with the above-described difficulty. For example, V.N. Ivanov, having accepted the above-given definition of social relations as well as that they "are present in all other varieties of social relations," subsequently rejects the term "aspect," accusing those who employ it of one-sidedness. All of this is done in order to then proclaim the thesis "of the well-known *primacy* of the social" [13, p 12]. The social is "a category that is more fundamental and basic and manifested in all spheres of social activity, and not merely an aspect of other categories" [ibid.]. Thus, the author "unnoticed" and "in the order of a clarification" has departed from the specific significance of the given concept adopted by him as the basis of the argument and moving to the first, broader and hence to a definition of sociology as a fundamental science dealing with society and not the particular "social sphere."

The third error appears in the attempt to put sociology in the rank of the sciences studying relations between groups; this is encountered among those who endeavor to find the specific features of sociology in a particular approach to the relationship of the subjective and objective. In arguing that it is essential "to preserve and develop a Marxist, dialectical historical approach as a sociophilosophical orientation of sociological theory" (and with which we fully agree), V.A. Yadov has established "the area of the **subject** as the central concept and key sociological category. In other words, sociology today is a science dealing with social communities, the mechanisms of their rise, functioning and development [7, p 188] (emphasis ours.—M.R.). The given definition in a fuller form is also to be found in the article which marked the beginning to debate in our journal [9, p 14], where the author's inclination to understand sociology as a "behavior" science appears rather clearly, regardless of certain hedges.

On the order of criticism, it must be pointed out that leaning toward the subject does not resolve the difficulty, as it does not provide a demarcation line with social psychology, with the study of legal awareness by the legal sciences, or economic policy by economic sciences and so forth. But here a fundamentally new moment is introduced, namely the view of social groups solely or predominantly as the subjects of the historical process, and sociology as a science dealing with the conscious

activities of people. It is no surprise that in an extensive definition of the subject of sociology, the same author also found room for such features of the dialectical approach as the interrelation, interaction, functioning, development and so forth, but did not find room for the interrelation of social conscience (and thereby the cognitive activity of people) and social existence, for a relationship of the subjective and objective aspects of the life of society. This is not a random error, but a conviction. In another place in this same article we read: "The basic concepts of macrosociological theory, in contrast to the philosophical categories, are **not** matter and conscience, **but** the social structure and social institutions, culture and social organization...." [9, p 11] (emphasis ours.—M.R.). In the given case, it would be more correct to speak not about the matter and conscience generally, but the material and spiritual aspects of the life of society, *about social existence and social conscience*. But, having made this comment, we have moved on to the second most important question of the current debates over the subject of sociology.

Does Sociology Study the Relationship of Social Conscience and Social Life?

Here it is essential to examine two interrelated questions: 1) Should sociology, in studying the activities (behavior) of social groups, small groups and individuals be interested solely in the spiritual motives (thoughts, emotions, judgments and so forth) of this activity or also the conditions of their existence which directly, immediately or via a chain of mediations (far from always clearly recognized and sometimes interpreted in a distorted manner by the subject) determine the designated motives of action? 2) Which of the two aspects should be the decisive in this interaction?

For an answer to the first question, one has merely to turn to the practice of sociological research from whatever theoretical positions—Marxist or non-Marxist—this has been carried out. In actuality, if one follows even the simplest, unidimensional variations of the theory of social stratification, for example, if one divides society into strata solely according to the level of annual income (we would point out that such a classification is no way useless and for collecting taxes is simply indispensable), then one must compare the material situation of the individuals and families with their self-identification, and with the correlation of the family and its members to the one specific and no other group of the population (living below the poverty level, poor, average well-off, well-off, rich, millionaires and so forth).

In the serious theories which follow a *multidimensional* scale, for example, that of M. Weber, it is a question of the relationship of such criteria as income, power, and prestige, in other words, the interaction of definite material and spiritual factors. This in principle is how things stand in Marxist theory. Only complete ignorance or an evilly-intended distortion have led certain modern authors to an interpretation of Lenin's well-known definition of classes [14] (and this applies to any groups

making up the socioclass structure) as proof that Lenin and the Marxists generally adhered to "economic determinism." In actuality, this definition gives in an aggregate, in a system the economic, that is, the objective features of class and group differences. But for each Marxist, and equally for a competent critic of Marxism, there can be no doubt that economic inequality and contradictions are reflected and continued in political inequality and contradictions, in ideological views, and both of these have a reverse influence on the economic situation of the participants of the interaction, that is, the subjects of social activity.

For this same reason, the public opinion polls on socioeconomic problems have real value when they are compared with the real situation of the polled population groups or with expected changes in this situation with possible assumed changes asked in the interview concerning economic (increased inflation), political (the replacing of ruling parties or persons) and other conditions. We would particularly emphasize that in conducting the polls, it is essential to take into account the social structure of society and its dividing into classes, groups and strata. With a nationwide express poll, this requirement is reflected in the representativeness of the sample; in a mixed-composition society, this also relates to considering the ethnic and sometimes the confessional, racial and other groups. With a more profound study, these groups can and should become an object of analysis. A comparison of the poll data with the socioeconomic and political conditions of their existence and with the growing needs and interests is an obligatory condition for the scientific objectivity and practical significance of the obtained results.

If the relationship and interaction of social conscience and social existence permeate all social life, including relations between the social groups and their activity, including the activity of individuals, it is no surprise that these have been the central categories of sociology and any attempts to define the subject of this science which might skirt the given question must be considered as one-sided. But after this statement the position of Marxist sociology remains to be established. This consists, undoubtedly, not in the recognition or nonrecognition of the interaction of material and spiritual factors, but rather in a completely definite answer to the question of the *nature of their interaction*.

In the situation of the deepening social and spiritual crisis which has afflicted our nation over the last 2 or 3 years, it has become fashionable to abuse Marxism. And a very common procedure is to put the blame for all the errors and setbacks of Soviet power over the more than 70 years, including the crimes of Stalinism, on the main point of the philosophy of Marxism.

It is worth pointing out that while some are willing to place the blame for the crisis situation on the neglecting of spiritual values and on the "strictly materialistic" policy of the powers, others, on the contrary, do the same for the "ideologization" of the economy, the violating of

its laws, and the utopianism of political ideas. Certainly in various periods both of these have been present. But is it possible to consider the basic thesis of the philosophy of Marxism to be at blame for this? And does it help to escape from the crisis by discarding this thesis as well as the policy based upon a sober consideration of economic realities and return to a religious philosophy, as some have proposed, or to the "values of liberalism," as others ceaselessly repeat? In our view, it does not. Both of these converge, as often happens with extreme viewpoints, since they evoke primarily and chiefly a change in the conscience and psychology of people. These appeals can be sincere since the following of them should "help our grandchildren escape from the aggression and mistrust, from the evil and hate" [15]. But moral preachings have never been able to replace a realistic policy.

It is impossible to make claims against persons whose ideas were formed long ago, although others have every right not to concur with this position. The situation is different for those scientists and writers who have changed their viewpoint under the effect of external factors. Very indicative in this regard were the arguments of V.D. Popov in the discussion article published in the magazine DIALOG [6]. The author is completely right when he asserts that "we must speak not about the crisis of Marxism in general but rather the crisis of its application and development in the USSR" [16, p 23], and "the particular conclusions of Marxism...are actually out of date. And it is not worth clinging to them" [16, p 22].

However, in further reading it is discovered that the category of the "particular conclusions" includes...the basic thesis of historical materialism, that is, the general theoretical sociology of Marxism. This is done in the following way. The relationship of social conscience to social existence is declared to be the "third aspect" in the main question of the philosophy on the relationship between conscience and matter. This aspect is termed the "sociological or functional aspect" and it is asserted that here "another parity relationship" has occurred, that is, that conscience is "functionally primary." The "functional primacy" must be understood as is apparent from the explanations of V.D. Popov, as the preceding of the thought or the emotional-volitional impulse over action.

The purposefulness of human activity, as is known, had been interpreted by all philosophy which preceded Marx, including materialistic philosophy, as the decisive roll of social conscience in its interaction with the material conditions of human existence. Historical service of Marx was that he persuasively showed the reverse. The references given in the aims of repatriating Marxism concerning the erroneousness of the proclaimed political goals (and our history provides more than enough such examples), including the collapse of the actions organized by the party and state on the part of millions of people for the sake of building the bases of communism over 20 years, like the failure of the policy which proclaimed as its goal a simultaneous acceleration in the

growth of production and a resolution to the social problems which had built up over the decades cannot serve as grounds for a revision of the fundamental thesis of Marxism. This thesis can also not be considered among the "particulars." The reasons for the failures are to be found in the erroneous nature of the set political and economic goals which were wrongly concealed within Marxist phraseology. Moreover, the failure to achieve the voluntaristic goals serves as an additional argument in favor of recognizing the supposed "stubbornness" of the objective laws of society's development, and thereby the primacy of social existence.

We should particularly draw attention to the fact that current critics of Marxism as well as our colleagues who favor its creative development but who have put in question its basic provisions are inclined to depict historical materialism as "economic materialism" which does not take into account the *dialectics of interaction* between the economic factors and the political, legal and ideological factors. Such "simplification" makes Marxism easy game for criticism. In having in mind such arguments, Marx at one time pointed out that in such an instance he was not a Marxist. But the struggle against Marxism conceived of in such a one-sided manner is gaining strength in our nation, in the countries of the former socialist camp and, of course, in the West.

In modern Western sociology, the spiritual factors which are depicted in varying ways are considered to be the crucial factor in the designated interaction. As before, there is a strong influence from the views of M. Weber who viewed religion and morality as the basis of the economic activities of people. According to Weber, the Protestant ethic with its self-restriction for the sake of accumulation determined the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the turning of the *burgertum* into the bourgeoisie. That may well be the case. But how is it possible to explain "according to Weber" that at present in West Germany the "Catholic" lands in the south of the country such as Bavaria and Baden Wurtemberg have forged ahead in the areas of new technology while "Shinto-Buddhist" Japan has outstripped all the "Christian" countries of the West?

There has also been a rebirth in sociological and philosophical-historical concepts which in an incomparably more open manner proclaim the primacy of the spiritual factor. Thus, the article by F. Fukuyama "The End of History" which has recently caused such a storm directly goes back to the ideas found in Hegel's "The Phenomenology of the Spirit." Fukuyama formulates the reasons for the "complete and final" victory of capitalism on an universal scale, and the very "end of history" in the following manner: "the sphere of conscience ultimately without fail is apparent in the material world and actually creates the material world in its own image and likeness" [17, p 42].

A reader of our journal knows the basic works of the founders of Marxism and in particular the letters of F. Engels from the 1890s. Nevertheless, we will permit

ourselves to quote one of his statements on the given question: "The situation is not quite that only the economic situation is the *cause*, that *only* it is the *active* and all the rest is merely the passive consequence. No, here there is an interaction on the basis of economic necessity which *ultimately* always makes headway" [18].

As an attempt to "skirt" the question of the nature of the interaction of the spiritual and material factors in the activities of people one might point to the arguments of Zh.T. Toshchenko in the article published above where he defines "real" conscience and behavior as the subject of sociology" (p 22). Conscience evidently with just cause ends up in first place in this connection. In a previous full definition of the subject of sociology, the author has written: "It studies social conscience by means of analyzing individual and group conscience as well as the forms and methods of its objectification in activity (behavior) under the conditions of definite socioeconomic and political relations and under the influence of the material-physical environment" (ibid., p 21; emphasis ours.—M.R.). Thus, the above-given deciphering of the general formula leaves no doubt that for the author (and for sociology in his understanding of it) the spiritual aspect operates as the decisive one in the interaction.

How Are the Levels of Scientific Cognition Related?

The sufficiently widespread notion of the "three-tiered" structure of sociological knowledge including the general theoretical sociology, the particular (special) sociological sciences (theories) and the empirical (concrete, applied) sociological research at present is being subjected, and from different viewpoints, to criticism. At times, this notion is viewed as an unique "compromise" aimed at reconciling the polar viewpoints of sociology either as *just* historical materialism or *just* an area of concrete research. There is a certain grain of truth in this, but only a grain, for the issue does not come down to any "deal" between the clearly one-sided views. Such has been the overall evolution of views in the scientific milieu which belatedly has gained official recognition, for example, in the renaming of the head academy institute: initially the IKSI (Institute of Concrete Social Research), then the ISI (Institute of Sociological Research), and, finally, the IS (Sociology Institute); the latter corresponds to the status of a fully recognized science. Just how difficult this process was can be judged from the very fact that the leadership of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the person of its vice president P.N. Fedoseyev who was in charge of social sciences, even in the first half of the 1980s defended the extremely simplified approach and correspondingly set up personnel, financial and other policy. In our journal, contrary to the opinion of the editor-in-chief A.G. Kharchev, there then appeared a "editorial" which gave the following analogy: "Political economy and historical materialism are theoretical disciplines, they elaborate the fundamental, methodological principles for the concrete areas of economic and social cognition and they generalize its results. Consequently (!), sociology (as the economics of the national economy

in its area) should study concrete situations, structures and processes in the various 'planes,' dimensions and scales" [19]. The basis for this "logic" was the circumstance that historical materialism was "located" at Volkhonka, and sociology at Cheremushki, and as there was a definite administrative divide, the classification of sciences "should" follow this.

The viability of the opposing of historical materialism to sociology can also be seen from the article which marked a new step in the debate over the subject of the science in our journal. According to V.A. Yadov, historical materialism, as the philosophy of history, studies the historical development of society and its "subject is primarily research on the ongoing development of human civilization on the scale of a world historical process" [9, p 11]. Macrosociological theory, on the contrary, views society as a system consisting of social communities of various sorts as elements, and as a consequence of this its main concepts are the following: the social structure, social institutions, social organization, culture, the individual, social interactions and so forth [9, p 14]. The term "development" ultimately is incorporated in the definition of sociology, but only in terms of the designated communities; this is merely a concession to common sense.

There can be no doubt that the development of social communities, be these classes, settlement communities, the family and so forth, the disappearance and the appearance of others cannot be understood outside the general context of the history of "human civilization." This is the contradiction in which the author ends up. It is possible to eliminate it if from the very outset one recognizes sociology as a science equally concerned with relationships, ties and the structure of society generally and at each given stage of history and a science dealing with the historical development of this structure and hence, society, as such.

We cannot overlook one other "support" for the vulgar views of the subject of sociology in the form of the notions which have become widespread in society and the mass press that the basic task of scientists in this area is to conduct public opinion polls. The latter in the age of glasnost quite naturally have assumed an importance previously unknown in Soviet society. The new sociological institutes, centers, services and laboratories which are being organized under the central departments and public organizations as well as in the republics and oblasts are to study and interpret the results of research on public opinion and these are being employed immediately in the mass information media for a definite impact and at times for outright manipulation. The public opinion services which have been established at certain newspapers and magazines, for example, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY as well as in the radio and TV editorial staffs have succumbed to the enticement of selfishly using the materials in our superpoliticized society [20-22]. Healthy competition between such services in the West minimizes the possibility of similar

distortions, as this would involve a loss of authority and, correspondingly, orders and profits.

For this reason, the notion of a "three-tiered" structure of sociology has been not only a "compromise," but also a step forward in overcoming the very persistent and still not fully surmounted and completely wrong views of the subject of science. From this it does not follow, of course, that this does not require explanation, clarification and concretization.

For now let us leave on the side the question of historical materialism and let us turn to the general considerations concerning the structure of science, in illustrating them from the example of physics. The multiple stages of scientific theoretical knowledge is caused ultimately by the *multiple stages of the essence* in the real world. The concern of science is laws and laws are nothing more than relations between essences, essential relations. V.I. Lenin, in outlining Hegel, described in a "materialistic" language the essence of the historical development of science in the following manner "an infinite process of the deepening of man's knowledge of things, phenomena and processes and so forth, from the phenomena to the essence and from the less profound to the more profound essence" [23].

In each given period of a science's development, its structure is determined by the relationship of the fundamental theory (or several ones, if the science is a broad one) with the less profound theories which are also "organized in a rank," right down to the empirical level. It is important to point out, in the first place, that the definition of a science is given from the "higher" level, that is, from the fundamental theory (theories), which at present means the limit achieved in penetrating into the essence of the phenomena studied by it. Secondly, the "middle level" theories only very tentatively can be viewed as one (of the three) stages of scientific cognition. Ordinarily this is an entire series of stages coming one after the other. It is possible to imagine them in one stage in the sense in which the particular figures in the triad of the general—particular—individual. Thus, if the living world is taken as the general, then follow animals, vertebrates, mammals, the order of carnivores, the family of felines, domestic cats, a certain breed and so forth until we reach the individual, our tabby with the features and habits inherent to it alone. The multistaged nature of the individual is obvious. Thirdly, the "move" from the theory of the higher level, in other words, from the fundamental theory to an empirical understanding can be not only indirect, through all the intermediate stages, but also direct. Random observations often provide food for bold hypotheses and discoveries in science and serve as the source of the new in theory. But a directed search and particularly an experiment can serve as an immediate proof (or refutation) of hypotheses of the most fundamental nature.

Let us illustrate what has been said by an example from physics. In a prestigious publication (BSE [Great Soviet Encyclopedia]), a respected author (Academician A.M.

Prokhorov) provides the following definition of the subject of physics: "Physics is the science studying the simplest and at the same time the most general patterns in the phenomena of nature, the properties and structure of matter and the laws of its motion" [24]. Then the fundamental theories of physics are given in the chronological order of their creation: from the classic mechanics of Newton in the 17th Century to the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics in the first third of the 20th Century and so forth up to the quantum field theory which arose on the basis of the latter and so forth. Precisely the fundamental theories provide the right to accept the above-given definition of physics. Let us point out that each new stage in the development of the fundamental theory does not repudiate the old but is based on it and "incorporates" it as a simplified approach, a limit case and so forth. As a "middle level" theory one could take any area of modern physics which studies a definite natural environment or a particular object. Thus, solid state physics is based on mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetic theory, quantum mechanics and so forth since in this specific object (as in atmospheric physics, plasma physics and so forth) the mechanical, thermal, electromagnetic, nuclear and other processes are "interwoven" and "overlapped" in a specific manner. Metals physics is a certain area of solid state physics since in metals (in contrast, for instance, to semiconductors) there is a multiplicity of particular properties. Both instances here are "middle level" theories but they are in a definite cosubordination. We can discover the same thing in biology: zoology is divided into vertebrate and invertebrate zoology, while entomology, as a science concerned with insects, is a particular variety of the latter and so forth. This is so apparent that any physicist (or any biologist) would find it simply inconvenient to view the path from the general theory to the empirical as a single "step."

The famous experiment of A. Michelson (1881) who showed that velocities do not arise "according to Galileo," was conceived of as a testing of the validity of the very important principle of classical mechanics and served as the grounds (a quarter of a century later) for the special theory of relativity. In modern physics, an experiment is "set up," as a rule, on the basis of the most recent achievements of theory (of both the higher as well as the "middle" level) and should enrich it; this also applies to instrument observation, for example, in astrophysics.

This extended digression of a philosophical and general scientific nature is completely essential, as in sociology we are involved with a science in the social area that has a particularly high degree of communality. Regardless of which general theory (and more about this subsequently) modern sociologists adhere to, they recognize the presence of "middle level" theories. For Marxist sociology it is perfectly obvious that such typical middle-level theories as, for example, family sociology, proceed from a recognition of material and spiritual factors which are generally common to all aspects of social life including

the economic, political, social, ethical, aesthetic and so forth and taken in their specific interaction in the given basic cell of society. This theory should also adhere to a historical approach to the family and this is particularly important in our times, when certain countries are confronted with the need to move from a large family and bringing together three (if not more) generations to a nuclear child with one or two children, while many developed nations in the West are confronted with the need of strengthening the family and increasing the number of children up to two (with fractions), depending upon the level of age mortality (as a consequence of the danger of depopulation over the long run). This means the use of a development principle. It is equally obvious that the given middle-level theory can include also a study of the particular types of family both on the historical level and in our times. The empirical research in this area, if the scientist wants to achieve any significant result at all, in compiling the program, determining the sample and generalizing the results, should proceed from the various theoretical notions and prove (or refute) a definite hypothesis, thesis or idea either of a general sort or concerning a certain hitherto unstudied variety of family relations. The lack of room does not allow us to give similar arguments in terms of such particular sociological theories which study not social groups but rather social institutions, for example, education sociology.

Thus, in terms of sociology from what has been said it follows, in the first place, that one must speak about the "three-tiered" concept with a certain degree of conditionality; it is more complete and more accurate to describe sociological theory as "multilevel" having a hierarchical structure. Furthermore, it is essential to define the subject of sociology using the highest theoretical level achieved at present or, what is the same thing from the most profound essence of the given area of phenomena disclosed by the science. Secondly, R. Merton is scarcely correct in proclaiming the "connectability of a certain 'middle level' theory with any general sociological theory" [25]. We also cannot agree with V.A. Yadov when he writes that "particular sociological models (for example, of the family) are not Marxist or non-Marxist [8]. And, thirdly, that empirical sociological research (incidentally, also having its own theory which generalizes the methods and techniques) is linked with the "middle" and "higher" level of sociological theory both indirectly and directly. For this reason, one can scarcely agree with the author when he asserts that "the area of applied research only through multiple mediation is linked to the theoretical and philosophical views of the sociologists" [8].

Here we have reached the most disputed and confused question involving the relationship of the philosophy of history and macrosociology, or, in the Marxist understanding, about historical materialism which, in our view (with certain explanations concerning the content of the concepts) is simultaneously one or the other. Above it was emphasized that the interpretation of the

theory of historical materialism as a theory of historical development which excludes from its subject the ordering or structure of society in no way corresponds to the views of Marx and Engels for whom the notion of development included an understanding of structure and dynamics—statics. The concluding chapter of the work by F. Engels entitled "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy" was completely devoted to examining the interaction of all aspects of the society, beginning with the economy and ending with the areas of spiritual life which were most distant from this base, for example, religion [26].

We assume that the confusion which has existed up to now in our social science literature on this question is basically caused by dogmatic inertia. The critique of Stalin and Stalinism is in full swing and certain knots tied in the section "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in the "Concise Course of the History of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]" have still not been untied, including the extremely vulgar interpretation of historical materialism. The press has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that historical materialism should not be viewed as the "extension" of dialectical materialism to society. This, on the one hand, has fostered the notion that dialectical materialism was supposedly created without such a central point as a dialectical materialistic understanding of society. On the other hand, historical materialism has been positioned "next to" dialectical materialism; it has turned out that there are two component parts of the philosophy of Marxism. This formula as it seems would put beyond the limits of philosophy such questions as ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, political philosophy, the philosophical problems of natural sciences and so forth, and leaves no room at all for sociology.

After the 20th Party Congress, these areas of philosophical knowledge gradually, one after the other, began to be worked out and then incorporated in the VUZ courses. But the notion of the structure of philosophical knowledge has still not escaped fully from the influence of the Stalinist scheme. This is a separate question. Here we must be concerned with it as the textbooks for the VUZes in philosophy until recently appear to be a total of two components: the first part includes dialectical materialism and the second part is historical materialism [see, for example, 27]. The other philosophical sciences end up outside this scheme while general theoretical sociology is depicted simply as a component part of philosophy, although here it is a question of classes and nations, science and art, morality and religion as phenomena in social life. The reason is a simple one: in not being satisfied by the notorious "three particular features of production" which figured in Stalin's works, the authors of the textbooks and monographs devoted to historical materialism have begun to move step by step in the direction of a systematic exposition of a general theory of society, and on two levels: 1) bringing out the *interrelation* of all areas and aspects of its life; 2) historical *development* of each of them as a component part of

the natural history of society, including the transition from certain formations to others, starting with the primitive society and ending with socialism.

We are far from any realization of these textbooks and monographs, they have born the imprint of their times, and the logical linkage in the exposition of scientific problems has often been violated in tribute to fashionable whims, while the general approach has suffered from dogmatism and so forth. But one cannot help but note that since the end of the 1950s, with zigzags and digressions there has gradually been a positive process of broadening the content of science called "historical materialism" in the direction of general sociological theory. This process is not yet over, as can be clearly seen from one of the discussion articles in our journal in 1990. The author of this article in a very unique manner criticized the designated formula, proposing to "improve" it by switching the words "historical and dialectical materialism" [10].

The time has come, in our view, to overcome one other prejudice stemming from the Stalinist formula that the philosophy of history and general theoretical sociology contradict one another, that sociology must finally be "freed" from the "philosophical servitude," and its complete "sovereignty" must be proclaimed as a science and so forth. Either one or the other—is how many authors presently are arguing. In our view, instead of the "or" we should put a "and." The problem is that philosophy, as a science dealing with the universal laws of relationship and development, inevitably partially overlaps the general theoretical problems of other sciences (and is even superimposed on them). This is felt particularly in the interaction of philosophy with the other forms of social conscience, and for this reason for philosophical science with those areas of social science which study them. Thus, the philosophy of politics is inseparable from the most general problems of political science, the philosophy of law is closely linked to the same in jurisprudence, the philosophy of history with the general problems of historical science and all the more of sociology.

In summarizing what has been said, one can offer as a point of departure for discussion the following definition of sociology as a science concerned with society as a system which is in development. But any brief definition needs explanations. Sociology, in being a science concerned with society as a system, should be viewed in two "sections": a) about structures linking various areas, aspects and spheres of society as the system; b) about structures linking different character communities of peoples (socioclass, territorial, professional, ethnic, demographic, confessional and so forth) and the relations between them. In both instances it is a question of structure as an *natural link* between the elements of the system. In this area one can basically agree with the definition given in the textbook by N. Smelser entitled "Sociology," where sociology is briefly defined as "a science dealing with society and social relations" [28, p 7]. But society and social relations should be examined

in development; sociology should be understood as the teaching about *social patterns in the development* of society. It is not hard to notice that the above-given definition relates to general theoretical sociology in the same manner as all definitions of the subject of sciences which are sufficiently general (physics, biology, astronomy and so forth) contain in a "stopped" implicit form definitions of the particular sociological theories of varying rank.

Here we have finally reached the point where a fundamental distinction must be drawn between sociology and physics, biology and so forth. Whatever has been said on the "deideologization" of social sciences, they can proceed from various general theoretical concepts. For this reason, in relying on the above-given definition of the subject of sociology as a science, we must turn to the specific features of Marxist ("Marxist oriented" and so forth) sociology, since all the authors of the discussion articles in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA are concerned primarily with this. In our view, the general sociological theory of Marxism (and simultaneously the Marxist philosophy of history) is the theory of historical materialism in the sense described above but not the truncated, vulgarized sense including the Stalinist one. In other words, the theory of historical materialism must be viewed as a *philosophical-sociological* theory which must be developed and rethought on the basis of generalizing new historical reality.

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The Sociopolitical Process and Civil Ethos: The Phenomenon of Coevolution

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[Article by Vladimir Iosifovich Bakshtanovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and deputy director of the Institute for the Problems of the Development of the North Under the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time he appears in our journal. Yuriy Vaganovich Sogomonov is a doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and head of the Sociology Chair at the Vladimir Polytechnical Institute. He

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[Text] The current situation in the nation is striking in its paradoxicalness. Many ideological pulpits have ponderously declared the need for moving to a civil society and a state under the law. On the one hand, in the mass and even the specialized scientific theoretical mind up to now there has not yet formed an ethically assimilated, a spiritually and morally accepted image of either one or the other. What is particularly important, there is no clear notion of their intercausality or permeating interaction.

Behind these images of a civil society and a state under the law which are already becoming crystallized, there is, alas, a long trail of notions concerning the incompatibility of human freedom and social justice, individualism and collectivism, a market economy and moral purity, entrepreneurship and order.

For this reason, there must be special research work on the ideological analysis of the pending changes and for studying the inseparably linked ethics of a civil society and the ethics of political activity: without their dialectical combination all the economic and political-organizational efforts threaten to end up as another "fata morgana."

Just what are these given ethics and how can we interpret their linkage?

By political ethics, we mean a certain aggregate of values and standards, rules and etiquettes which orient and govern the actions of politicians and generally all those persons who—voluntarily or involuntarily—end up involved in the political sphere as active individuals. In trying in a single stroke to provide a portrait for the entire system of these values and standards, let us point out that the morally justified are only those political deeds and actions where the decisions taken reflect the will of the majority, however the majority is acting here not only in its own interests but also for the sake of the minority which, in turn, recognizes the decisions of the former as its own, in maintaining the right "to be heard." When the principle of tolerance applies not only to a multiplicity of types of the "majority" or "minority," but also to individuals and not according to the rule of the high priest Kayafa who recognized the sacrificing of one person for the sake of the good of the people as morally justified, but rather according to the maxim of A. Platonov who assumed that "without me the people is not complete." When the principle of delegating power from the bottom up and its sharing is consistently carried out, a standard is realized according to which laws merely limit political activity but do not predetermine its content and so forth.

If one bears in mind precisely these standards and rules of political ethics, they acquire actuality only in the historical sense with the participational type of political culture. The latter arises and takes root gradually in precisely a civil society.

Such a society, according to Hegel, appears "midway" between the family and the state. In contrast to the tribe, community, the association of estates or other natural social communities, the civil society is a product of the New Age and developing industrial-urbanistic civilization. It forms a sphere of private relations and interests of people as independent producers and consumers. Clearly, those researchers are correct who—in following A. Gramsci—interpret a civil society primarily as an area of nonpolitical relations.

The ethics of such a society, correspondingly, occupies those niches of social morality which are "not occupied" either by political ethics or the ethics of family-domestic relations, educational activity and so forth. That is, where the individuals act as citizens and not as subjects and act in defining their own strategies in life independently: be yourself and respect others!

In the described system of value coordinates, the motivating rules of ethics protect the primacy of personal interest which is not reduced as a caricature to elementary selfishness over the social but rather the restricting rules of ethics protect the moral equality of all individuals, their voluntary associations and organizations.

Naturally, in the ethics of a civil society, various aspects of the ethos of entrepreneurial activity emerge in the forefront. Here a particular place is assumed by labor and professional morality, the ethics of consumption and leisure. These are all based on the fundamental value of civil society in the same manner that political ethics in a state under the law is based on the freedom of the individual, including the freedom of his moral choice. The subject [principal] in the ethics of this society has developed historically to such a level of responsibility which makes it possible for society, in speaking conditionally, to grant him the right to an independent search in the confused maze of the world of values, to grant him the independent choice between good and evil, with the subsequent assumption of duty and the working of conscience as the core mechanism of self-control.

In the categorical grid of entrepreneurial and labor morality, the relationship of the good and useful emerges in the forefront along with the freedom of the setting of goals and the value of the goals themselves, on the one hand, and the rationality and effectiveness of human activity, on the other. Here, of course, is also found a theoretical reflection of the specific categorical rank which includes the standards of honesty in professional dealings, industriousness, an orientation to success in life, a taste for competition and so forth.

Possibly, precisely this categorical rank has provoked an identifying of the entire normative-value system of civil society with so-called business ethics in which supposedly the principle of gain has been elevated to an unconditional Absolute.

Possibly, it is precisely from this that there comes the trivial perception of the ethics of civil society with its seeming focus solely on the motives of selfishness, the

idea of gain and socioeconomic effectiveness which supposedly exclude nobility, unselfishness, charity, compassion, self-sacrifice and moral development. However, the principle of benefit or gain in the ethics of the given society (let us again draw the parallel essential for our subject with political ethics) is capable of turning from a regulator of narrowly pragmatic activities into a method of rationalizing spiritual life as a whole. In this context it is important to emphasize the classic distinction in goal-rational and value-rational activities. The latter accumulates the meaning-of-life functions for the ethics of a civil society.

In the ethics of success, a person acquires a true awareness of his social mission and a spirit of serving supraindividual principles. This applies equally to actually economic and political activities.

Let us turn to certain important problems which are crucial to an understanding of the coevolution of the phenomena of the ethics of a civil society and the ethics of political activity. In the first place, these phenomena did not form in a vacuum, in the form of rules of economic competition and political play established by someone but rather in the process of reworking diverse spiritual "material." This was first of all the class-based aristocratic and bureaucratic ethoses of governing in absolute monarchies, the Protestant ethic of economic calling as well as the theoretized ethics of utilitarianism, romanticism, sentimentalism and dandyism. The state kept the function of preserving the so-called ethical bases of society and organic conservatism with a view of supporting solidarity and national patriotism.

Both designated phenomena have been, in the second place, permeated with a spirit of individualism. Is this good or bad? In our public mind, its image has been reinforced in clearly negative tones with the merciless right of the strong, the pitiable plight of the loser, indifference to others, "a war all against all," "each man for himself" and so forth. The image of individualism has been correlated to a picture of life which follows the "laws of the jungle." At the same time, as an ideology and behavioral principle, individualism affirms the self-value of the individual, and articulates the uniqueness of each person as such. It not only brings man out of various local communities with their blind group selfishness, indifference to the whole, but can also become a striking counterbalance to integrating bureaucracy, statism, various forms of alienation from property and from power. Individualism, of course, is capable of being oriented at collectively organized programs of action and it is in no way obligatory to always interpret it in a rigoristic key as antipopular, anarchic conscience and action.

Furthermore, one must recognize the historical service of liberalism within which the prototypes of the standards and values formed for both the ethics of civil society as well as political ethics. In the grid of values, freedom had priority over equality, or more precisely, equality before the law which often was termed formal

but this was in no way similar to the meaningless equality of the bureaucratic stripe. Political liberalism developed in parallel with economic. The ethics of liberalism by moral means justifies the conflict of interests, the legitimate methods of struggling to come to power and hold it, as well as the principles of the sharing of power and its balancing. This necessitated the self-limitation of power and defined the rules for conflict behavior at the various levels of the interaction of the powers and institutions, the individuals and their associations. This ethic—it is not to be excluded—played a similar role in strengthening representative democracy as did double-entry bookkeeping created by Luca Paciolo in establishing a market economy. There began to arise a corps of standards relating to human rights, to parliamentary and nonparliamentary collaboration and rivalry, standards of party activity, labor and professional ethics as well as all other norms and rules in the sphere of the interaction between the state and civil society.

However, the further course of social development more and more disclosed the limited abilities of economic and political liberalism. Freedoms based on a formal equality, on the restricting and expelling of the masses from the sphere of social administration ended up largely as a zealously defended new privilege of the ruling elites. The entire previous and in part the current century have marched under the banner of the growth of democratic rights and a struggle against the liberal establishment. Correspondingly there has also been a shift in the values of social morality toward the ideal of social justice and the positions of the social protection of the masses and resisting the exploitation of hired labor.

Without going into the historical concrete aspects for understandable reasons, we have every right to offer the following conclusion on the question of the value bases in the coevolution of the two examined normative systems: as a result of the clash between liberal and democratic values there gradually arose a value and extremely mobile symbiosis and this formed the nucleus of the modern ethics of civil society and the ethics of political activity. The ideals of freedom and liberty—naturally propelled in a direction of common human values saturated with a humanistic content—within the symbiosis complement one another in such a manner that simultaneously they also limit one another. There is no question of working under conditions, so to speak, of "half-speed" or the squandering of the orientation potentials of these ideals. The point is that any protracted and strong tilting toward the former of them in the process of realization is fraught with the growth of social tension, while a tilt in the opposite direction would be restrained by the needs of economic efficiency and intellectual freedom. The modern ethics of civil society and the ethics of political activity are the end product of an extended historical process and, as we feel, are at the same time an essential and relatively independent factor in the evolution of modern societies.

The general movement of civilization along this path was certainly not uniformly directed along the vector of unstoppable progress like the course of time. Along this tortuous and long path there were periods of both stagnation, restraining crisis situations, backward steps and zigzags of inconceivable complexity. But the 20th Century outdid all of this in its unsurpassed "models" of involutions trends with the common cause of these being totalitarianism.

In Russia at the start of the century, a civil society had just begun to emerge from the class society, while parliamentarianism and democratic liberties were just born. Naturally the standards of values of either of the ethics examined by us had not been able to put down roots into the soil and subsoil of popular life. The revolution swept away virtually everything that had been born. Some of the still not very strong elements of the given ethical phenomena for a certain time out of inertia continued to eke out their almost spectral existence. For a time, they were unchecked in the period of the brief flourishing of economic liberalism under the NEP [New Economic Policy]. The thawing civil society immediately required—and it could not be otherwise!—a state under the law and political pluralism. This demand, as is known, was not properly satisfied and soon thereafter was easily eliminated along with the civil society itself. The mentioned elements of the given ethics amazingly quickly began to disappear within the barracks economy and that political culture of unending "mobilization subordination" which least of all needed "some sort of ethics." Ethics was damned as an epiphenomenon of "harmful" economic and political pluralism. It was assigned a place only on the "faculty of unnecessary things" next to "abstract humanism" and "human rights."

Let us point out that a culture of permanent "mobilization subordination" assumed the fraternization of the authorities and the people, but only on the basis of a general aggressiveness, inflamed hate for the "enemies" and intolerance of them (everything is permitted and no conventional prohibitions). This sanctimonious unity was embodied in the identification of the individual with the state in the words "the state is us!" The relationships of the authorities and "the man from the people" were organized on hierarchical principles, when the duty of unchallenged obedience of all the commands "along the vertical" was the leading virtue. There is nothing unexpected in the fact that the duty "along the horizontal" to families, colleagues, partners in market relations, professional communities and so forth, lost that importance which it possessed not only in a civil society but even in a traditional one. Under totalitarianism, certainly, there are certain ordering and guiding standards of economic and political conduct but not all such standards are moral regulators. Those which derive as givens from a justification of the most monstrous policy and absolute control over man and society—by definition—cannot even by forcing things be considered in the sphere of the ethical.

A clear example of involution is the particular ethos of economic management created by the administrative-command system. On the one hand, the given ethos is based upon indifferent execution and, on the other, on the dispersion of not only legal but also moral responsibility. Such an ethos engenders in the agents of economic activity an amazing range of "virtues" which infect and poison public morality: a following of the "golden mean" ("don't stand out"), a spirit of extensive development, the replacing of social duty by pandering up the vertical, a willingness to manipulate the persons being controlled, an infatuation with all sorts of prohibitions and so forth. In words, at large and quite officially, the standards of this ethos would seemingly work toward a creative activeness, initiative and antiparasitism. In fact, they in organizational and moral terms limit initiative, they censure activeness, they impel prestige consumption and form a dependent person. Although the given ethos in its own way was rational, it however contributed to a drop in economic efficiency, to social backwardness and even managerial absurdity. On the other hand, it fitted quite smoothly into the barracks-like technological ideology, the bureaucratic dogmatism and in the "morality" of society's distorted state.

Certainly, the complete collapse of the standards and principles of labor morality would still be outside the involutionary process? In actuality, the clear lack of economic incentives in the system of state socialism forced a wagering on forced labor, making up for this lack by ideological and psychological pressure. It required the "truncating" of collective and personal interests of the producers by the means of not only administrative interdiction but also moral.

The fate of party ethics as a variety of the ethics of political activity can also serve as another example of such involution. The problem is that the organizational standards for party activity justified the absolutizing of centralism to the detriment of democracy, they considered as the order of things the suppressing of the will of the minority by the decisions of the majority, they forced the acceptance as proper of the inequality between the party masses and the party nomenklatura (the "inner party" according to G. Orwell), and insisted on the suppression of dissidence. Within the party there flourished those same "bureaucratic virtues" which were slightly concealed by pseudodemocratic procedures, as we have already detected in economic activity.

All that has been said above concerning the fate of party ethics under the conditions of totalitarianism understandably had only an official normative sense and might not coincide with the empirically recorded motives and actions of various party members, not to mention the various forms of resistance to the political amorality, centers of which existed within the ruling party which only from a great distance seemed monolithic and they also played an important role in the subsequent evolution of the power structures.

Thus, when there is a radical break with all the achievements of the ethics of a civil society, there is an ignoring of its inseparable link with political ethics and both of these are slighted for their "criminal" tie to their own particular bourgeois origin, and precisely then both the economy and politics, in precisely the same manner as culture and morality, become the victim of a total ideologization.

At present, certainly one can already speak about a resumption of the process of coevolution in the ethics of civil society and political ethics within the freedoms which are being restored. For example, there is the "reminding" of professional ethics at those points of its application which directly or indirectly are linked with economic and political freedom. The bureaucratic management ethos is being replaced by the first sprouts of an entrepreneurial ethos, this basic nerve in the ethics of a civil society. Here high regard is given to the "antipodes" of the bureaucratic managerial ethos: efficiency, dynamism, independence of opinions, judgments, decisions and actions, a readiness to take a risk and to accept responsibility for initiative and so forth. This makes it possible to include the standards of the nascent entrepreneurial code into the spiritual culture of our people. At the same time, the question arises of removing party ethics from the "social pledge" and recognize its rights.

But the main thing is that out of the multiplicity of diverse "we's" the autonomous individual is being reborn as a true subject of civil society and a state under the law and the ethics of these is not the embodiment of a moribund and impotent obligation because it recognizes the moral validity of personal interest as a motive of activity along with an orientation to social interest. Without now taking up the question of the methods of combining the "economic man" with the "moral man," we would merely point out that—contrary to the still strong resistance to the biases on this score which are natural for the period of totalitarianism—it is erroneous to assume that one side in the mechanism of the moral regulation of activity possesses some "higher" almost "sacred" motivation while the second is "inferior," and in any event at least somewhat dubious. With an established system for resolving contradictions between the parties of the regulatory mechanism—and we still have very far to go on this level—there should not be persistent and extended conflicts of interests and values, the public, professional-group and personal good.

But the authoritarian traditions with all their might are impeding such a harmonization of interests and values and the forming of a civil society in the nation where even the mentioning of this was taboo. Instead of the ethics of independent individuals or associated producers and consumers, persons who are not dependent and are responsible for their fate, who are securely protected against ideological pressure and the caprices of variable political weather, and freed, finally, from the rigoristic suspicion of a "excessive" affection for personal and group interests, instead of all of this, the ethics of social patronage has been encouraged to develop. This

reflected the fact of the turning of political power into the only principal of production relations, not to mention any sociopolitical activeness.

Ultimately, however, the authoritarian systems of power also default. They fall into a situation of a "zugzwang," when any next political move is doomed for such regimes to a lamentable outcome. The question, of course, is not one of the instantaneous collapse of such regimes which, incidentally, is also not to be excluded, but rather yet another transitional form on the hard path to the developed types of civil society and democracy. This can be termed the authoritarian-democratic form of power.

With such a form of power, how is the incubation process continued for the accumulating of the values of the ethics of a civil society and political activity, their standards and etiquettes and the mechanisms of control over their execution? Above all, on the basis of the rise of groups and associations independent of power, and the restoring, for now with numerous flaws, glasnost and independent public opinion. There must be a resumption of the dialogue of power with the "informals" and a multiplicity of parties. Already visible is the end of the mythology of the deification of the state; not only is its seductive force growing weaker, but also the sacred trembling before its might as mechanisms—albeit very fragile—of spiritual self-defense are arising. There is underway a legalizing of conflicts in the political institutions, and a normative-legal basis is being developed for free political activities and for the establishing of independent mass information media.

How is the process going on in the economic area? Here the process of the establishing of the ethics of a civil society is occurring together, although not always at the same moment, with the process of introducing market relations with denationalization, privatization, a multiplicity of ownership forms, the development of the market infrastructure and so forth. However, the transition to a market economy which should lead to establishing the standards of an entrepreneurial ethic and to the recreation of labor morality, has been extremely difficult primarily because it has collided with a multiplicity of moral prejudices. The latter have deep roots in the past of the state, on the one hand, and on the other, are the result of profound deformations in public morality. So it happens that the transition to a market on the level of a political decision is declared to be as if already recognized, but at the same time it has not yet become an act of free moral choice or a significant part of the public. A preliminary diagnosis of public conscience in its attitude toward a market economy provides value judgments which are characteristic of modern speechifiers and involve two polar positions which we arbitrarily might term "marketophilia" and "marketophobia."

The value judgments of the latter emphasize that the principle of utility destroys conscience, it dries up the moral feelings of a man and eliminates a desire for the

ideal and a gravitation toward the eternal. In this instance, the "ideal" is the amount of "income" only just "moderate and tidy." From this viewpoint, private ownership ties a person to it in such a manner that it separates him from others. It undermines the bases of human solidarity and hence the constraining of the economic freedom of a private owner, his just as morally justified as the measures aimed against social destruction. The "heroes" of the market are the entrepreneur, the businessman, the trader and not the ordinary worker. The aim of the first three is wealth and their methods are a "game without rules," and a moral permissiveness in terms of means. A market with its deification of economic freedom is incompatible, from the described viewpoint, with true equality and for this reason the entire market society at its essence is both anti-democratic and antipopular. At the same time, popular morality always expresses the interests of the workers, that is, not those who obtain a profit by entrepreneurial or commercial adroitness but rather those who honestly live on their earnings. The key argument in the position of the "marketophobes" is based on the fact that the treasured essence of morality is the freedom of the good deed, unlimited goodness and not market freedom which is based solely on the equality of equivalent exchange and its calculated "honesty." In a market society people relate to one another (and, incidentally, to themselves) solely as means or functions, thereby violating the golden rule of morality, the categorical imperative, which demand that man be viewed solely as the goal.

How does the value portrait for the position of "marketophilia" appear? Here the dominant conviction is that the main trend in human history demonstrates not merely the harmfulness but also the archaicism of the very notion of an alternative to the choice between the good and the gain (although in individual instances one must resort precisely to such a choice). The invective against the market was partially justified only in terms of the period of "savage" initial accumulation of capital and the early industrial civilization. But modern history shows that precisely the "unselfishness implanted by barracks socialism above all stifles initiative, it kills the soul of man, giving rise to a multiplicity of forms of sham, falsified and simply forced unselfishness. With civilized market relations, the seeming incompatibility of the "interest" and the "ideal," the material abundance and spirituality is overcome. Also eliminated is the fascination with sacrifice, aestheticism, the stilted "heroic enthusiasm" and at the same time there is greater importance for daily, albeit not always irreproachable existence and the indisputable merit of private life. As for privatized property, precisely this makes a person independent and serves as a dependable guarantee of his liberty. The real "Passionaries" of the market are in no way the mafiosos, not speculators, not the "shadow economy" people or corrupters. The demands of the market affirm unbreakable standards of honesty, order and trust as essential conditions for the effectiveness of business relations and this as a whole tells beneficially on the state of morals in all spheres of

society's life. Yes, competition is truly a harsh thing, but this is a struggle according to the rules the observance of which is closely monitored by public opinion and is combined with various types of collaboration. On the other hand, the heart of democracy is primarily in freedom—economic, political and intellectual. Equality in poverty inevitably leads to a crisis in public morality, giving rise to all sorts of failings on a mass scale. There must be the moral rehabilitation of profit (which must not be confused with gain) as a product of very complex, responsible labor, and wealth acquired according to the laws of a state under the law. Poverty, there is no doubt about it, requires social protection (as does, incidentally, the entire sphere of culture, public health, fundamental science and so forth), but moral and legal protection is also needed for prestige and the status of the "strong" against the suspicion of greed, against dependence from triumphant mediocrity and from bureaucratic zeal. Finally, in a developed civil society there is a multiplicity of standards which limit the functional, role relations between people and this makes it possible to offset the tendency toward alienation.

Clearly, the above presented two portrait aggregates of value judgments are far from being complete but, we feel, they do provide an opportunity to confirm the thesis of the moral schism in the public mind. Not so apparent is the method of relating to one or another position and in the current mass understanding this is often reduced solely to confrontation. But without the surmounting of such a schism, the coevolutionary process of forming both the ethics of a civil society and the ethics of political activity is inconceivable. Conflict, undoubtedly, is an attribute characteristic of the designated ethical phenomena, including within the normative-value system related to a market economy. Above we have already mentioned the contradiction between freedom and responsibility, individualism and solidarity, the orientation to profit and the orientation to charity, subordination to the codes of organizations and private initiative and so forth. At present, the question is one of conflicts related to returning to the bosom of civilized existence with the overcoming of the designated splits in the moral conscience of society. It is essential to discharge the atmosphere of intolerance and mutual irritation, to institute a dialogue of the opposing sides, to overcome the antimarket "phobias" and the reticence of the warped moral awareness to accept a civil society as a whole. It is essential to overcome the inflated expectations and market euphoria which can lead to a moral ideologization of business and civil society as such.

In such a situation, ethical science should least of all exacerbate and deepen the opposition between the "Westerners" and the "home-grown," the "innovators" and the "traditionalists." It is difficult to persuade either of the sides particularly if one considers itself to be the only "depository" and disposer of higher moral values. The task of ethics is to encourage the fundamental ideological and value establishing of the idea and practice of a civil society, relying on the method which frees

the participants in the opposition from exhausting stubbornness and the thirst for an unconditional victory. We consider the notion of consensus, considering the values of civil consensus and the ethics of nonviolence, to be an effective method for such a solution of the problem.

To what degree is the given concept of consensus (and not just between the "marketophiles" and "marketophobes") not just a good intention but rather capable of being embodied under the conditions of the deepening crisis in society which is working for a consistent democracy? We feel that this will depend upon a number of circumstances.

In the first place, upon the pace and thoroughness of freeing civil society from the tenets of state control over the sources of the life support of people and the depoliticization and individualization of the nationalized property. The specific forms for the emergence of the ethics of a civil society and political ethics based on this have not been predetermined, even in their main characteristics, let alone in the spirit of an "inexorable" Laplacean determinism. For instance, democratization is strengthening the role of the regional-national political subcultures. Their existence previously had been concealed behind a finally polished facade of uniformity in official political life. But certainly such cultural and anthropological aspects without fail are felt on the particular features of the shaping of political ethics! They will also depend upon the outcome of the changing hierarchy of the higher values of society and this, in turn, is dictated not merely by the unity of the people but also by the nature of this unity and by what forms are used to realize a combination of liberty, social equality and justice, in what proportions the various economic systems are developed in the economy and how the public assimilates the still little familiar market and political cultures understood here as a free market of ideas, programs and motivations.

Secondly, coevolution will operate fully as a mechanism for establishing the ethics of a civil society and political activity depending upon the degree of advancing along the path which leads to a deeper autonomization of the individual. Interests, views, moral preferences and the "repertory" of free choice are determined here not so much by the high degree of the merging of the individual with groups or by the forced, imposed group (production, professional, territorial, generational, ethnonational, party and so forth) affiliation as by the breadth of his mental viewpoint, level of knowledge and uniqueness. Precisely these characterize the individual as a universal being (identification with man, a universal orientation of conduct) as a pluralistic being (identification with a multiplicity of groups and associations) and as a member of the newly established postindustrial or global civilization.

Thirdly, coevolution will become a reality if it is possible to rely on progress along the path of synthesizing the liberal and democratic values being transformed, that is, on a combination of the principle of social protection.

social support with the principle of economic and political freedom and the diversity of personal self-realization. Such a combination will make it possible for an independent public opinion and the bodies of "mediatized power" to establish a permanent dialogue for all the coexisting forces following the standards of the ethics. To put it figuratively, it is essential to create High Technologies of economic, political and spiritual activity which, on the one hand, are saturated with the ethical standards extracted as it were from the state of a long stay in the pawn shop of history and, on the other, taken from the entire treasuretrove of common human values.

Fourthly, coevolution in its essence means the application of public morality to the sphere of civil society and politics. For this reason, its effectiveness depends upon the reorientation and purging of this morality of any traces of subordination to the ideologized myths and which has made it possible to hold the sphere of morality for so long under the control of official policy, and to justify the replacement of clear keeping within the law and the supremacy of the law by considerations of current socioclass purpose. At the same time, we continue without any grounds to describe public morality as "communist morality." In looking at things in plain daylight, it is discovered without any difficulty that in fact it is a question of a value-normative conglomerate, an axiological Babylon, and in the forefront is a subsystem constructed on the "morality" of leftist communist extremism and sociocultural utopianism. This sanctifies revolutionariness and negativity in terms of our own generic ethics and the cultural-moral heritage of the people and justifies the absolutizing of political domination. This "morality" of the declassé has implanted a spirit of messianism, the idea of "world leadership," sociopolitical narcissism, and a sensation of omnipotence with the right to experiment with nature as such, with the nature of society and not least of all the much-suffering nature of man. Such "morality" imposed a primitive stark scheme of good and evil with an equally oversimplified mechanism for a patchwork application of it to various sectors of human activity. It encouraged a consumer attitude toward man as the instrument of moving society forward, the exploitation of revolutionary enthusiasm and gave a moral and political carte blanche to paternalistic power.

But it must not be forgotten that this same orientation to a "bright future" offered also the past unprecedented testings for strength, fidelity to the ideals of justice and order, the unrealized dream, and to the initial socialist choice as a surprisingly vital force for resisting evil and as one of the levers for the incipient purgative changes.

It is not hard to realize that the emancipation of social morality from ideologized politics cannot occur according to a given formula or according to some schedule approved higher up. It is completely incorrect to blame the alienated morality, as it has been able to develop its own morals and to affirm the flagging norms, these justifying norms. For this reason, whatever is written there, "something else" is still "granted" and

there is the possibility of an autocratic depression. The actual elimination of moral alienation, like the alienation from property and from power, is possible only within the channel of a general spiritual purging of our society.

Although our society has just begun to free itself from the severe malaise of flagging spirits and is only half-heartedly ready to accept the very first indications of recovery as a complete cure, nevertheless even the gloomiest forecasters agree that gradually the credit of trust will be spent by the virtues in the form of "cock-eyed" collectivism, and the thrill of obedience which replaces the work of one's own conscience. Social morality which is being transformed, in beginning evermore boldly and independently to judge political actions, declarations, platforms, managerial decisions and actions, makes it possible to free civil principles from the deformation of demagoguery and intriguing hypocrisy. Only such morality can be "applied" to human activity in a proper manner, directing it to the development of democratic processes and broadening freedom in protecting consensus on fundamental values and the principles of nonviolent methods of social evolution.

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Pseudotechnocratism in Soviet Society: A Sociophilosophical Analysis

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[Article by Larisa Grigoryevna Titarenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent on the Sociology Chair at Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin. Our journal has published her article "Technological Determinism as a Theoretical Basis of Modern Bourgeois Social Futurology" (No 2, 1978)]

[Text] Every age has its own particular subjects. Ours is marked by fundamental shifts occurring in all spheres of Soviet society. These changes require a substantial reassessment in the established system of values, in bidding farewell to illusions and ideological myths which functioned successfully in the previous years.

Also underway is a rapid rethinking of the general sociological paradigm and a change in the predominant forms of social thinking. The process involves not only Marxist social sciences but also other modern social theories a significant portion of which previously were viewed by us as "bourgeois." Among the latter, a prominent place is held by the technocratic notion according to which the stable functioning of a highly industrial society under the conditions of a technogenic civilization can be provided only by the rational rule of a group of professionals or scientific-technical specialists [1, p 106].

This far from simple notion in our scientific literature has been described as utopian, anticommunist and unscientific, while during the years of perestroika, many disasters in the economy, politics and the social sphere of Soviet society have begun to be linked precisely to technocratic distortions. Here technocracy has directly or indirectly been placed into opposition to humanism and is conceived of as something alien to it, as a hindrance to progressive development: "the predominance of technocratic friends has acted as a real obstacle for the normal emergence of our society from the existing crisis situation" [2]. The project grandiose in its absurdity and economic inefficiency of shifting the northern rivers to the south and financing culture according to the "residual principle," the dictating of the partyocracy and the military-industrial complex, the failures in ideological work—these and other negative realities of Soviet life and primarily the absurd spending economy are explained in the sociophilosophical literature and writing in the terms of a "manifestation of technocracy."

However, it is well known that in the West in the 1950s and 1960s, the use of the principles of technocracy contributed to the achieving of high economic results, to the rapid introduction of scientific and technical innovations into production and to lifting the prosperity of the broad strata of the population. Regardless of the fact that at present the halo of technocracy has grown somewhat dull, in the social conscience of the West as before the "myth of technology" is functioning and a major place is held by values related to "technological dominance" [3]. Why then are our results directly the opposite?

It is essential to conduct a scientific analysis of the essence of technocracy in order to understand this paradox and realize what is actually rational in the given theory and what real (and not imaginary) shortcomings it possesses. It is important to make clear whether technocracy was inherent to Soviet society during the years of stagnation and for this reason does it make sense to now run it down, under the conditions of converting to a market economy and to political pluralism.

In this article we will endeavor to show, in the first place, that it is incorrect to employ the term "technocracy" in relation to the history of Soviet society; secondly, that Soviet reality in certain aspects has had an external formal similarity with the technocratic model for the functioning of the social environment and this has served as the objective basis for forming a myth on the technocracy in Soviet society (what we term "pseudotechnocracy"); thirdly, that the transitional nature of the present age requires a dialectical synthesis of certain truly technocratic ideals (scientific rationality, professionalism and competence of management, a scientific organization, expert assessments based on objective knowledge and the development of scientific and technical progress) with humanistic values and the adequate needs of renewing socialism.

What is technocracy? On the philosophical-sociological level this is a model of society constructed on rational principles, where all socially significant decisions are taken by experts and specialists on a strictly scientific basis.

The technocratic concept has definite similarity to the Marxist one, as both are related to a common sociological paradigm, the model of a so-called labor society. In actuality, characteristic of them is a recognition of the fundamental importance of labor and the production sphere, while the activities of society and the individual are described and explained in terms of benefit, interest and rational goals [4]. Both these concepts are active reality ones and are alien to contemplation, and are aimed not only at understanding the objective laws of the world, but also its rational transformation, and the social idea is derived from scientific notions of the theorists of Marxism and technocracy concerning the social system. At the same time, on a number of crucial questions, technocracy differs from Marxism. It can be said that they are similar in their declared goals but differ in the understanding of the content of the transformations and their results.

As for real Soviet society, it in a striking way differs largely not only from technocracy but also the Marxist theoretical model of socialism. Let us endeavor to examine this question in detail, in turning to the work of the American political scientist, Thomas Springers, who has provided an extensive description of technocratic policy and ideology, paying basic attention to it [5, p 128]. In his opinion, political theory and ideology can be termed technocratic to the degree to which they embody the following.

1) An analytical division of society into two classes which differ radically in relation to the method of production and consumption of knowledge: those who "possess knowledge" (free, rationally acting principal bearers of "true knowledge") and those who "do not possess knowledge" (from the outset doomed to a functional existence).

There is an opposition between the two sharply differing social groups: the elites of technocrats and scientific-technical specialists who represent the embodiment of technical and organizational rationality and the very spirit of progress, and the controlled majority which serves as the "cogs" in the complex social mechanism and does not possess access to scientific knowledge. The "knowledge elite" has a privileged position in society and in representing the "brain of the industrial system" [6, p 41], holds key positions in production, in the corporations and the representative institutions.

2) A tendency to view politics as an atavistic form of social organization which should give way to administrative regulation based on scientific principles.

This does not mean that politics as such is to disappear in society. On the contrary, its role is to grow. But the very content of the political processes is to change

fundamentally. "The goal of politics is to rationalize society by the strategic application of scientific knowledge" and this turns politics into a precise science similar to natural science. In the opinion of the technocrats, the "rationalization of the social order should be carried out not through democratic persuasion and adaptation but rather through expert social management" [5, p 126].

Thus, progress in politics, like success in production activity, "depends upon true knowledge. Competence, moral wisdom and technical know-how—all of this is important for successful politics...." [5, p 391].

3) A doctrine of power in which social power is legitimized rather through the achievements of science than by political delegation and this extends to the justifying of the "creation" or "transformation" of the very nature of those controlled.

As Spragens emphasizes, "the technocratic ruler is like God the Creator." He possesses a power of a new radical sort. For this reason, the technocrat "shapes the will of other people" and "imposes order and form on the chaos of human nature" [5, p 115].

4) A tendency to minimize or completely eliminate the existence of transcendent or moral boundaries for the legislator as the right and liberty of the individual and to seek out in their stead naturalistic and therapeutic standards. Instead of a traditional political program, the technocrats offer a "social preventive medicine" while the technocratic legislator is the "curer of the body politic" [5, p 126].

5) A doctrine of the human capacity for improvement which is not based upon divine charity or on individual effort but is based upon the beneficial interference into the process of establishing "rational powers."

The technocrats have taken over from Descartes and Locke the notion of man as a tabula rasa and from whence logically has stemmed the assertion that man can be made happy through science. The role of education is radicalized as the educator himself becomes a creator who can "shape" the mind of those being educated and he creates their personality according to his own will and on the basis of scientific knowledge [5, pp 101, 116].

To what degree did Marxist political theory and the political practice of the Soviet state which prevailed in our society meet these demands?

1. A fundamental tenet of Marxism is the class division of society and at the basis of which lie property relations. Clearly, the technocratic stratification differs fundamentally from the Marxist one where the "creators of knowledge," the scientists and other detachments of the intelligentsia have never been recognized as an independent class. The leading positions, theoretically, have been ascribed to the working class, but there were few who believed this myth since instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat under Stalin a dictatorship was formed of the

party-state bureaucracy and this opposed all the remaining social communities. Only the critics of Soviet society, sovietologists and revisionists for a long time felt it more adequate to isolate in its social structure the ruling elite and the ruled masses [7], but the elite quite reasonably was perceived by them as a particular layer of the partocracy, as the upper clique in the administrative-command system and not as scientists. For this reason, similarity with a technocratic structure, if such a thing does exist, is purely external.

2. In Soviet society politics was never considered an atavism. On the contrary, it was axiomatic that there was a priority of politics over all other spheres of activity. The dictating of political interests and the mockery of economic laws were based upon references to the well-known Leninist thesis: "Politics cannot help but be supreme over economics. To argue otherwise means to forget the principles of Marxism" [8, p 278]. The experience of the Soviet state has shown just what catastrophic economic results may occur from the unchallenged following of this political thesis. The overall trend of production in Soviet society was predetermined not by economic laws but rather by the "volitional actions of those in power." Under these conditions the aim and criterion for assessing the results of economic activity could never be economic efficiency, for the main political goal—the reproduction and expansion of one's power—dominated in both the political, the economic and spiritual spheres of Soviet society [9, p 55].

3. In Marxist theory, proletarian power was based upon the objective social position of the working class. Although the thesis was affirmed of the unity of the scientificness and fundamental interests of the proletariat as the leading class which in its revolutionary activities embodied the objective needs of social progress, all of this was secondary in relation to the main thing, that is, the teachings on the inevitability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The practice of the Soviet state, as we have already pointed out, rather corresponded to autocracy than to socialism and the ruling elite merely concealed its unchallenged rule behind the old Marxist slogan.

4. The "proletariat" did not recognize eternal moral truths and for it a class implacable morality was always higher than common human values. At this point there is a definite similarity to technocratic morality which also operated on its own moral standards. However, the latter has put under these standards natural biological and natural scientific bases and this is completely alien to the official morality in Soviet society according to which "morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and unite all the workers around the proletariat and create a society of communists" [10, p 311]. In practice, as is known, there was a dual morality, a double standard of behavior and the above-mentioned truths departed sharply from the real notions of morality.

5. Finally, the problem of the education of a man. Here there is the greatest similarity between technocracy and the theory of communist education. Both concepts considered it possible to impose on the individual their own goals solely because the latter [the goals] supposedly corresponded to the objective needs of society's development. In Marxism, the interests of the proletariat identified with the interests of society are put higher than the interests of the individual; the educator as the principal of activity, in essence, is opposed to the person being educated. The latter is to absorb, like a sponge, those ideas which are instilled in him externally by ideological and nonideological means (in practical life this was the ideas of strengthening the Soviet state, its political system, and in theory the ideals of Marxism). They permitted a manipulating of the conscience and behavior of the masses for the sake of achieving the goal, that is, it was permitted that a noble goal could justify the means. This method of "making man happy" and improving his nature contrary to his will and desires reduced the individual to the role of a cog or bolt in an enormous mechanism. The educators were turned into intelligent "social engineers" and real "doctors of morality" who spun these cogs and bolts as they saw fit. The individual—only if he did not belong to the elite—was viewed as clay in the hands of the potter and as a means for which the right to individuality and independence of desires and actions were not recognized.

Thus, the greatest similarity of technocracy with Marxist theory and Soviet practice consists in the functional approach to man. Undoubtedly, this is a crucial aspect and we do not have the right to disregard it. However, the list of theories which are characterized by the same approach is far from exhausted by Marxism and technocracy. It is also important to emphasize that Soviet practice differed substantially from the theory of Marx concerning the all-round and free development of the individual in a future communist society.

In our view, the stated aspect of similarity is not sufficient to ascribe the concrete manifestations of the inhumane attitude toward man in Soviet society to technocracy. At the same time, the created myth concerning the technocracy of Soviet society has been based largely precisely on this similarity. In our opinion, it would be more correct to term this pseudotechnocracy as the Soviet phenomenon on the key questions of the economy, politics and culture differed substantially from Western technocracy.

Where did the technocratic myth arise in Soviet society? For whom was it advantageous to support this? The answer must be sought out in analyzing the system of power which came into being in the 1920s and 1930s. The real sources of the antihumanism in the Stalinist political system are to be found in the fact that its social base were the privileged circles of the party bureaucracy, the upper clique of a hierarchical system of power, the so-called nomenklatura, divorced not only from the working masses but also from the regular party members. This party-state elite disposed of social wealth in the

name of the entire people, portraying itself as their "faithful servant." In actuality, the real focus was the own group and corporative interests with the main one being strengthening their own power by all available means. The entire might of the administrative-command system served this and for this same purpose a number of ideological myths was created. Mythological reality was to conceal actual reality from the basic mass of the workers. One such myth which should have concealed the essence of power relations was the myth of the technocracy of Soviet society. With the aid of this myth the real principal of power—the party and state bureaucracy—was in fact removed from the field of criticism and its place was taken by a supposed principal, the technocracy, and in the ordinary mind the activities of this technocracy was linked with the manifestations of antihumanism, antidemocracy, the alienation of the masses from control, the low level of humanitarian culture in the nation and so forth. The pseudotechnocracy of Soviet society was an ideological cover for the administrative-command system.

The technocratic myth was also aimed at concealing the inability of the administrative-command bureaucratic apparatus to effectively manage the nation, as well as its bankruptcy and the reticence to allow the masses to control. This myth was dangerous because behind a certain external similarity between technocracy and the system of power which existed in Soviet society it was possible to camouflage their fundamental differences and thereby block off the search for the optimum way to overcome the administrative-command system and the ways to lead society out of the existing crisis situation.

Certainly it is no secret that the Western countries with a technocratized policy and economy without any particular difficulty were able to achieve a dependable success in technology and in material production and they provided for the increased prosperity of the masses and, in the 1970s and 1980s, used the acquired scientific and technical potential for moving on to an information society. Here they abandoned the most odious technocratic attributes, having kept the most important characteristics: the admiration of scientific and technical progress (the more rapid development of science and modern technology) and the privileged position of the scientific and technical specialists in society (a high social and material assessment of their qualifications and knowledge and high-quality training in the educational system). If the technocratic elite did not become the actual "ruling elite," it did substantially alter the facade of power and updated the content of the decision taking process.

These technocratic principles in the West were combined with general democratic political principles, and to a significant degree this made it possible to soften the traditional technocratic notions of the desired state of society and the means for achieving this state. For example, in the notion of the information society proposed by the Japanese futurologist Y. Masuda, along

with the priorities of technology, an essential place is assigned to the development of man as the chief element in the production process, spiritual values are placed higher than material ones while the protection of the environment is an inseparable component in the normal functioning of the economy [11].

In placing the blame for the failures in the economy and social sphere on the technocracy, the administrative system in a way justified the need for the decisive measures taken against technocracy. This was expressed in the fact that in arguing in words for scientific and technical progress, the partyocracy did everything possible to impede it. Concern for science and technology degenerated into a hollow formality. This meant that the nation lacked any interest in developing and utilizing modern technology, introducing new equipment or reducing the real expenditures of human labor in creating a product. As for the engineering and technical personnel, the scientists and other workers in mental labor, the administrative-command system intentionally prevented their real social development, not wanting this "technocratic elite" to occupy a place in the system of social administration which would suit its knowledge and professional competence. On the contrary, in the era of stagnation an absolute majority of leading managerial personnel was recruited using principles far removed from professionalism: ideological maturity, political conviction, efficiency, dependability, loyalty to the superiors and so forth. A "clean" questionnaire was much more important than specific professional knowledge for one or another applicant to a leading position. The very belonging to the structures of power, to the nomenklatura, became the crucial thing for advancement up the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Everything said here makes it possible to explain why the "technocratization of Soviet society" in the 1950s and 1970s and which is frequently mentioned, in desiring to prove the reality of Soviet technocracy at present, turned the managerial personnel into semiprofessionals and semibureaucrats who were not able to efficiently lead and did not know the modern economy. Precisely the low level of management on the superior level of leadership personnel brought the Soviet economy to the lamentable state while it made the management sphere a refuge of irrationalism and incompetence. All of this in no way conforms to the principles of technocratic management which are based, as we have shown, on "a combination of knowledge, organization and practical activities by scientists and technical specialists to whom have been given the reins of government" [12, p 138].

Clearly, the way out of our society from the crisis consists not in repudiating the values of scientific rationality and economic efficiency concentrated in technocratic management but rather in giving these a "human dimension," in combining the technocratic and democratic rationalization of society, and in the priority of humanitarian guidelines even under the conditions of a technogenic civilization. We must have a preliminary

scientific assessment of any socially significant management decision, the choice of the optimum variation from a set of possible decisions, since the most acceptable of these in the social and ecological sense may not be the simplest on the technical level. To a significant degree all of this has already been embodied in the practice of real technocratic management of the economy and comprises its basis.

Thus, we have shown that technocracy has been organically alien to both the Soviet economy and the system of political power in the USSR. And similar to a myth, reality was reflected in it in the fairy book mirror. The social value of this myth and the reason for its relative widespread in social conscience are to be explained by the ability to satisfy the fundamental interests of the administrative-command system, that is, to remove it from deserved criticism and maintain the bases of the existing power system untouched.

Let us sum up. All accumulated civilized experience favors in the development of the economy of an industrially developed state the elements of qualified expert (technocratic) management combined with the processes of extensive democratization of social life (with a smoothly functioning mechanism for controlling the experts through the broad public, periodic reporting and the removability of personnel with their high personal responsibility for the proposed decisions).

This, in a way, is a combination of humanistic values to which democracy, moral and ecological imperatives belong, with the achievements of rationalism and scientific and technical progress, the core of a modern technogenic civilization.

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Does an Applied Science Require Total Cost Accounting?

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[Article by Lyudmila Petrovna Martynova, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate on the Sociological Faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The process of converting the sectorial NII [scientific research institute] into a principal of market relations is fraught with the loss of scientific potential. The large sectorial NII which are subordinate directly to the ministries have ended up on the brink of collapse, as they are oriented at producing scientific documentation and not equipment and not "turnkey" equipment and technology. Equally dangerous is the warping of relationships in the scientific milieu caused by the imposing on science of forms of the organization of labor and wages not inherent to it.

Proof of this destructive process can be observed even now. The number of publications has declined, seminars are held, as a rule, only within small groups of researchers linked by both scientific and financial interests. At the meetings indifference reigns, while criticism and intolerance of incompetent statements are a thing of the past. Relations between leading co-workers at times are almost hostile. The reason for this is the struggle for financing. The number of graduate students and seekers of higher degrees has declined and there are more frequent instances of leaving graduate studies. The members of the scientific councils have pointed out that the number of dissertations being defended has been reduced by 5-10-fold. The authority of co-workers who are able to attract money to the collective is growing while the prestige of the "generators of ideas" is declining. So this is the picture.

For explaining the reasons for what is happening, let us endeavor to analyze the organization of labor and wages in science in recent decades as well as establish those possible innovations which, in our view, could rectify the situation, at least, during the period of the transition of sectorial science to market relations.

We have conducted expert polls in three scientific-engineering firms: Gosniikhlorproyekt [state scientific research and design institute for the chlorine industry], the Istra Division of the VNIEM [All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Electromechanics], and the AKB [?Architectural Design Bureau], Kristall, as well as among the members of specialized councils representing various NII, a total of 81 persons. All of them are specialists of higher qualification, including candidates and doctors of sciences; heads of departments, laboratories and sectors; senior, leading and main science associates.

In the sectorial NII for many years the only way to increase one's wages ran, as is known, through the defense of dissertations. Thus, a junior science associate with a salary of 110 rubles or an acting senior science associate with a salary of 130 rubles, having defended a dissertation, became a science associate with a salary of 250-300 rubles, depending upon length of employment. A doctor of sciences received 400 rubles. In scientific administrative positions, the wage was analogous: approximately 220-240 rubles in the absence of an academic degree, 300-400 rubles with it, and 400-500 rubles for doctors of sciences.

The amounts of bonuses were linked to wages. Permission to combine jobs was given usually to the leaders. The remainder were permitted teaching work with an hourly wage.

Thus, increased income occurred exclusively along the vertical, that is, as one rose in position and acquired academic degrees. We would also point out that with the appearance of new candidates and doctors of sciences, the funds were automatically increased, that is, an increase in the wages of an associate did not involve the interests of the remainder.

Among the drawbacks of work under such conditions, the persons questioned put the infinite meetings, the complicated bureaucratic procedures, difficulties in obtaining the necessary equipment, the impossibility of maintaining contacts with foreign colleagues and much else. Nevertheless, they did not consider this period to be one of stagnation for them. The youth tried to get into graduate studies, conferences and seminars were held with great activity, serious systematic research was carried out and preparations for publication were made. Close collaboration with industry was also maintained although, as a rule, by administrative methods; new production, devices and instruments were introduced. To study, to develop, to introduce and to publish were an obligatory condition for growth along the vertical.

The experts considered a serious failing to be also the expressed tendency for the monitoring of the certification process by individual groups and clans of the scientific "generalcy." Here monopoly led to the hypertrophy of individual scientific areas and to the suppression of competitors. The principles of the certification

system are being criticized at present. The rather cumbersome torturous course of the certification process for the researchers was noted. In defending a candidate dissertation, the candidate is away from normal scientific work for approximately a year and in defending a doctoral one for several years. In subsequent years, the dependence of wages upon an academic degree more and more often led to the devaluation of the skill level. Certainly to keep young science associates with an extremely low wage, the leaders had literally to drag them into candidacies.

In 1985-1987, finally, changes were made in the existing system. Five positions were introduced: junior, science, senior, leading and head associate. The first three did not require an academic degree, although it gave advantages. Here the "spread" of salaries was 135-350 rubles. The position of a head associate with a salary up to 400 rubles could be held only by a candidate or doctor, and a head (up to 450 rubles) only by a doctor.

In essence, this was an improved vertical system. While it did not resolve it still significantly eased the problem of payment for young co-workers and experienced specialists who for various reasons were unable to defend their dissertations. In parallel an opportunity was provided to work in a second profession, for example, as consultants at industrial enterprises, that is, an opportunity was provided for increased wages along the horizontal. An incentive was maintained for carrying out dissertation projects. However, the innovation was introduced painfully and led to the complicating of the sociopsychological climate in the scientific collectives. The reason was that the transition was to be made within the previous wage fund, that is, any increase meant that someone would lose his job, someone else would be retired early and so forth.

It was proposed that recertification of the scientific personnel be made the mechanism of redistribution. In many instances this was turned into a purge and the eliminating of unwanted persons. The honored older specialists were shocked by the need to prove their competence to the commissions the membership of which included predominantly administrative workers and representatives of the public organizations. Certification also hit the scientific elite. Thus, many doctor of sciences who were senior science associates remained in their former positions and lost 50 rubles.

The new system was not in effect long and this makes it hard to assess its effectiveness. The opinions of the respondents were diametrically opposite. Some felt that such a wage was better in comparison with the previous one while others felt that the effectiveness of the work done by the scientific collectives and individual scientists not only did not rise but had even declined during the period of action of the improved system. To this it must be added that to no lesser degree than for the young, it opened the way to jobs for bureaucrats who were being let go from the ministries and were far removed from scientific work.

The next changes occurred in 1987. The sectorial institutes converted to external and internal cost accounting and in wages the dominant principle was a change in actual earning along the horizontal. Here the wages in a low position due to various payments could surpass the salary of an associate in a higher level. This was so-called internal cost accounting which understood that the financial assets acquired from without would be redistributed on contractual principles between the departments, laboratories, subdivisions and members of the collective.

External cost accounting assumes that a scientific research organization has the same relations with its customers (plants, ministries) as does any enterprise [1].

Cost accounting relations are being introduced into the sectorial NII with enviable conviction. Their positive and negative aspects are already becoming clear. On the one hand, empty and unnecessary subjects have been disclosed and the attitude toward idlers has hardened. The institutes have begun to go beyond the confines of the departmental themes, and seek out applications for their forces beyond this. However, there has also been a definite deformation of scientific activity. In the past the duties of collectives included the performing of the functions of scientific engineering firms, that is, the carrying out of research which provided new knowledge on the patterns of the technological processes, the improving of existing technologies and the development of new ones. At present, there has been an abrupt tilt toward purely engineer activity.

Very indicative for an illustration of what has been said is the article by L. Averyanov and V. Baronin [2]. In analyzing data on the designated problem, the authors assert that 67 percent of the "generals of science" find cost accounting not advantageous: "What good can come from cost accounting in science for a person who has nothing except a dissertation?" The article expressed another viewpoint: "...Cost accounting in science is a powerful means of its inhibition." As for the forms of scientific activity which could be switched to cost accounting, the replies were distributed in the following manner: 60 percent for the technical elaboration of the idea, 62 percent for creating prototypes, 57 percent for testing new machines and technologies and 71 percent for introduction. However, here it is a question of the consumption of scientific ideas but from whence will they appear? Will not the awareness of the fact that cost accounting can be hostile to promising research put the scientific personnel with higher skills in opposition to it?

The leadership of the institutes has been unable to provide their collectives with major problems which would employ a significant portion of the co-workers. They force the scientific workers to "beat the sidewalk" in the search for any subjects as long as these bring orders, or collect an amount which will make it possible to pay wages and in a favorable situation, also a bonus. Here lies a fundamental distinction in the situation of our scientists from that in the West. In a majority of

instances a scientist at a Western firm is provided with both a job and orders. But our firms force the scientists to run out and search for orders. Or, as it was put by one of the questioned experts: "If our Western colleagues are viewed by capitalists as cows which provide more milk the better they are looked after (and these conditions would include calmness and confidence in one's position), the attitude toward us can be characterized as run off, find yourself some grass and then we will milk you. Why has this happened? In the first place, in the West there are comparatively few scientific firms similar to our sectorial NII. Usually, the scientific subdivisions are part of large industrial companies which support them. A number of companies develops and sells new technologies, but, as a rule, this is not just documentation but also the corresponding production lines delivered as "turn-key." Our sectorial NII were, in essence, the hyperdepartments of the ministerial hypercompanies. With all the shortcomings of the administrative system, the ministries all the same were concerned for their NII and while flooding them with demands still supported their existence. On the basis of the scientific documentation produced by the institutes subordinate to the ministry, the organizations and plants carried out the plans, they manufactured the equipment and created and developed production. At present, a majority of the NII, having become independent under the conditions of cost accounting, can offer as an end product only scientific documentation and this, as a rule, does not satisfy their chief customer, the plants. In the struggle to survive the various NII are endeavoring to join forces with industrial enterprises, to broaden their experimental production but, in judging from the materials of the polls and interviews, the process of destroying the sectorial NII and the individual scientific collectives is growing.

We propose to a group of experts that they chose one of the following wage models.

1. Wages would depend upon position, academic degree and partially upon experience. A bonus would be paid, sometimes equal to the total of several monthly salaries, for a completed project for introducing the results into industry. This was the previous system.

2. The collective of scientific associates operated on full cost accounting. Relations with the customer were defined solely by agreements and contracts. The collective purchased or paid for rented space and equipment and funds were provided for business trips, including scientific conferences, and taxes were paid. The amount of the wage was not limited and it was distributed depending upon an agreement between the collective members.

3. A fixed wage depended upon the position, academic degree and scientific skill. This was paid for carrying out certain obligatory work. In addition, the collective or its individual members on a contractual basis could carry out additional orders and obtain additional wages. The volume of financing under the contract was not restricted but wages were limited.

The experts were to assess all three models of wages using a ten-point system, in being guided by the following criteria:

- The effectiveness of the long-term systematic research, the obtained new scientific results as well as publications;
- The effectiveness of concrete applied research, the elaboration of the bases of technological processes and technical decisions for formulating them;
- The effectiveness of the created technologies and technical devices in industrial development.

Table 1: Expert Evaluation of Effectiveness of Three Wage Models (Points)

Criteria of Effectiveness	Wage Model for Scientific Workers		
	1	2	3
a	8	2	6
b	5	4	6
c	2	9	6

As is seen in Table 1, preference was given to the third model. The poll results showed that the scientific workers at the sectorial NII have the psychology of hired workers. This is natural. The areas of abilities and inclinations which are inherent to a scientist, production worker and businessman overlap but do not coincide. Consequently, the applied NII should have a boss in the form of the state, industrial firm or association or commercial bank. This assumption usually causes sharp arguments from the administrators and bureaucrats taken up in a belief in the market: "Over there (that is, in the developed capitalist countries) everything is based on your second model." Primitive notions of how things are "over there" are a rather widespread illness based on ignorance.

Let us turn to the information published in the American journal RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT in March 1989 (Table 2). Wages were divided into two components—the basic wage which depends upon skill, academic degree, length of employment and age and additional earnings tied to consultation, developer honoraria and bonuses.

Table 2: Wages of U.S. Scientific Workers Specialized in the Area of Chemical Technology (Thousand Dollars a Year)

Age (Years)	Academic Degree		
	Bachelors	Masters	PhD
To 30	31.1	32.65	—
30-39	35.0	37.2	60.0
40-49	44.5	47.4	57.0
50-59	56.0	55.6	64.0
60-65	52.2	60.0	61.6
Over 65	50.0	49.5	60.0

In the opinion of the Americans, the three main parameters relating to technical education should be reflected in the basic wage: the level of education, length of employment and professional skill. It is interesting that although average earnings tend to rise with age, this does not apply to the PhDs for whom wages remain virtually unchanged from 30 to 65 years of age. From Table 2 it can also be seen that among the American scientific workers there are also serious incentives for promotion [3].

In the United States, the average wage of a scientist of even higher qualification is significantly lower than the wage of a manager, a marketing specialist and so forth but it is sufficient to devote oneself to creative work. It must be pointed out that our surveys of the flourishing sectorial NII show that with the most inflexible wage system the co-workers work responsibly if the earnings are sufficiently high. This conforms to the opinion of R. Waterman: "If labor is paid for insufficiently, interest in the job declines. But if the wage is high, among a majority of people the interest in the job is linked to completely different things and the monetary interest holds a very meager place" [4].

Monotony, standardization and a routine approach to science are always harmful. There should exist the most different wage systems and freedom of choice. The viable ones will be those which are acceptable both for the scientists and for the employers. Certainly if the state in the form of the ministries or other associations remains the boss of the sectorial NII until they fall into good hands. In our view, during this transitional period the wage system close to the third model is preferential.

We see the main obstacle to constructive efforts to maintain the nation's scientific and technical potential in the popular postulate that there are excessively many scientists, twice the number as in the United States. This is said by both the philistines and the state officials. This confusion has been provoked by a number of publications in the second half of the 1980s when they gave the number of scientific workers in the United States as 0.7 million and the USSR 1.5 million [5]. In actuality, in order to be considered as scientific workers in the United States, it is essential to confirm this with academic degrees, publications and so forth. We have approximately 500,000 candidates of sciences and 50,000 doctors of sciences [6]. Judging from a selective survey, the number of specialists equal in skills but not having defended their dissertation is not more than 20 percent of the number having degrees. In other words, we do not have more than 0.7 million scientists. Let us add to this that in analyzing the bulletin of the USSR Higher Certification Commission, where the subjects of doctoral dissertations are published in the various areas of knowledge, one can note that the doctors of technical sciences are approximately 15 percent. Thus, there is every reason to be concerned with maintaining the scientific potential of the sectorial NII. "Total cost accounting" would demand from them purely market relations with industry before industry had sufficiently strong incentives to acquire scientific products.

Internal cost accounting has deformed the generally accepted relations in the scientific milieu, and has upset the established ties between the subdivisions, collectives and specialists. As a result, the incentives are being lost for careful and diverse scientific research, particularly exploratory. The prestige of co-workers involved in scientific work is dropping and leadership is moving to the "go-getters." The consequences to which the existing situation can lead are well known, although they will not become apparent so soon.

It can be expected that the optimum forms for the organization of labor and wages for applied scientists will arise naturally after completing the formation of the new structures which bring together the NII and the industrial enterprises. But in the transitional period it is advisable to follow the third wage model which encourages increased skills along the vertical and the search along the horizontal for specific applications of the research results. Clearly, this requires an increased share of financing for the NII through state orders.

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Solving Regional Problems by Game Methods

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[Article by Vyacheslav Sergeyevich Dudchenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and director of the Consulting Firm Management Service. Our journal has published his article "Game Methods in Sociology" (No 12,

1990). Igor Konstantinovich Masalkov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and science associate on the Sociology Faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. Our journal has published informational material (No 7, 1990, co-author)

[Text] In recent years, all contradictions have been extraordinarily exacerbated in the life of such a convoluted system as a region. The existing administrative and organizational structures, where vertical ties prevail and horizontal ones are weak, are not capable of clearly perceiving the naturally existing social processes, maintaining and developing them. Along with the introduction of various innovations, the action of bureaucratic and other conservative mechanisms has grown stronger.

For solving these problems, a need has arisen for means capable of "working" under such conditions. It is a matter of methods which would help neutralize alienation and the disintegration of the traditionally operating and newly appeared social principals considering the instability and underdevelopment of the open forms of contact, traditions and the skills of multilateral debates. This demand has arisen under the conditions of the political and economic crisis being experienced by the nation. Precisely at present, a social imperative has appeared of viewing from the position of modern science a region as a complex sociopolitical and economic reality, where a number of social partners interact.

The listed demands are largely met by the game method which is a particular form of the joint activity of people in solving various types of problems including regional, production organizational and personal.

The game movement in the USSR as a sociocultural phenomenon is gaining strength. The typology of the games existing in the nation is complex, and basic attention is given to organizational activities and the innovation result. In the games known to us, there has been specialization in solving the problems of the city and region including the organization of leisure, the opening of a cultural and sports center and the forming of self-administration in the microrayon [1]. However, the desire to form and develop a new type of social principal on the given territory remains the main thing.

An innovation game provides three types of results:

- A new content, new information (ideas, detailed projects, strategic programs and so forth which are worked out by the participants);
- A new group or community (a consolidated collective of participating carriers of new information, the new content and the new skills of work and life);
- A renewed man (as a result of the discovery of stereotypes and work with them, the development of productive professional and personal skills and abilities, a new heightened awareness of oneself in the world, on the job, with others and with oneself).

In scientific circles particular hopes are being placed on the game form of activity. The practices of the last two decades show that sociologists, as incidentally, the representatives of other social sciences, have often provided the bases for political and management decisions which were taken without their participation. At present, sociology not only penetrates the object being studied but also is becoming a principal of social action. The imperative is not only one of the sociological accompanying of innovations but also their intensification. Many sociopolitical forces (associations, unions, deputy groups and so forth) and the enterprises employing the new forms of management are becoming clients.

The innovation seminar described below was conducted by the Management Service Firm in December 1989 employing the method of an innovation game.¹ It was devoted to the problems of development in one of the suburban Moscow regions. The seminar was held over a period of 6 days in a boarding house remote from population points and where the workers and living quarters were nearby. This made it possible to increase the nongame contact of the 40 participants. The first half of the day involved work in small groups (7-9 persons). Under highly intense conditions they solved real problems, in being engaged in analyzing the situation, taking decisions, designing, sociopsychological and organizational training, as well as reflexive analysis of the productiveness of the individual and group actions. In the evening intergroup discussions were held and during these the participants defended the produced ideas, they fought for recognition, they criticized the obtained results, they conducted competitions of plans and so forth. Here they quickly and effectively learned the elements of systems analysis and found new methods of interaction and mental activity. In addition to removing various sorts of tension and stress, the seminar participants also improved themselves on the personal level.

A number of procedures was directed at bringing out, actualizing and developing the reserve capabilities of each participant and each group. Profound immersion in the content of the problems being solved contributed to this. Work in the groups started at 0900 hours and ended at 2300 hours, with two hour-long breaks for lunch and dinner. New expert information was introduced. As is known, the reserve capabilities of a person are activated after overcoming the logical and intuitive barrier to superlarge amounts of information. In the game the amount of information was increased by introducing knowledge which each participant possessed as well as that of the organizers and invited experts [2].

The solving of problems was achieved by a system of procedural methods. The approaches of a group solution to problems and the system of special techniques for mental work are considered in theological-technical means [3]. For organizing intensive group dynamics, including the formation of new, situational structures in the groups and between them, sociotechnical means were employed. Psychotechnical means were assigned to aid

the participants in detecting and overcoming their own limitations and for disclosing new capabilities and abilities.

An important feature of an innovation game (INI) is its representative character in contrast to the simulation principle employed in simulation games. The INI reproduces the real features in the activities of the participants as carried out by them in their organizations. This makes it possible to experiment with the customary and new means of activity, without fearing negative consequences for practical work, to monitor the occurring changes and realize the principle of their reversibility which is not possible in real social experiments.

The described characteristics of the INI conform to the particular features and demands of the contemporary situation. The use of the principles and methods of action research makes it possible to overcome the boundary between the research, instruction and solving the problem of the given region.

The described seminar outlined the possible scenarios for the development of democratization processes in one of the regions of the Greater Moscow Area. What was achieved at the seminar in 6 days in real time could take 1 or 2 years. The ideas, models and programs for the interaction of the involved sides as worked out at the seminar are turned into reality. The difficulties disclosed in the course of the seminar are now beginning to assume the nature of common important problems in the life of the region and the nation.

The methods of reaching consensus between various social groups residing on the given territory with the use of innovation games have aroused interest both among specialists as well as among the broad public interested in deepening the processes of democratization and accelerating socioeconomic development. The innovation seminar described here was organized on the negation of customary stereotypes and forms of interaction between the sectorial, regional and party bodies.

For the sociologists who prepared and conducted the seminar, the subject "The Elaboration of the Basic Principles and Directions for the Socioeconomic Development of the City and Region" came down, chiefly, to forming a particular self-awareness and for the self-determination of the main social forces in the region as this is a condition for initiating more complex processes. In addition to this, the task was set of communicating interesting information and scientific knowledge in order to introduce new intellectual and scientific potential into the management of the region.

A few words on the participants of the innovation seminar. Among them were deputies of the soviets of the territory headed by the mayor of the city which was the administrative center of the rayon; representatives of the executive committees of the soviets; workers from the city party committee; leaders of state enterprises and organizations.

The representatives of the first three groups embodied the real power in the region, and they were the clients for holding the seminar. Most likely for this reason, the leaders of informal groups were not invited to the game, however their demands could be felt. Each participant was hoping to obtain answers to his range of questions. At the same time, the organizers were aware that a portion of those attending the seminar had come out of official duty.

In the stage of preparing for the seminar, the sociologists, after an analysis of the objective information and conducting interviews, ascertained the preferences and orientation of the various groups of participants according to various lines: affiliation with the deputy corps, the party apparatus, the industrial sectors and attitude toward the perestroika processes.

Due to the ambiguity of the situation, the participants endeavored to work out at least a short-term strategy. Among the soviet and party workers, there was particular concern over the approaching elections to the local soviets. Many of them were preparing to participate in the election campaign and they were endeavoring to hammer out their programs at the seminar. The directors and other enterprise leaders expressed other interests: for them the region under the conditions of the economic decline also meant the problems of social policy, ecology and greater production efficiency. Many were aware of the fact that the enterprises functioned in a social milieu. In this context one could understand the interest in setting up a new mechanism of interaction with the soviets, the informal groups and other social forces.

The First Day. In the morning, the seminar was opened at the general assembly of participants. The scientific leader explained the tasks and the rules and the work conditions. All the participants were divided into five groups in such a manner that in each of them there were representatives of the territorial soviets, the enterprise administration and the party apparatus.

Further work for 4 hours was carried out in small groups. This began with introducing oneself. Then each group drew up a forecast for the development of the region assuming that all the current trends would remain. In compiling the forecasts, they fixed the following aspects of a political, economic and social nature:

1. In the forthcoming elections to the local soviets, the informal groups which did not have political experience in management would become a real force. Conflicts would arise within the soviets. The prestige of the CPSU would decline. Sociopolitical tension would become exacerbated and strikes would become real. The authority and rights of the soviets would be low.

2. The monopoly of the ministries and the enterprises belonging to them would be maintained. Even in shifting to self-financing and emerging from under the subordination to the ministries, these enterprises would have little interest in realizing the social and ecological programs of the region. The budget deficit would increase.

There would be the ongoing departure of manpower and skilled personnel to the enterprises and cooperatives of Moscow, where working and wage conditions were better. Because of this, the fulfillment of plans would be harder.

3. There would be further stratification of the population into poor and rich. The problems of the lack of social protection for certain categories (the youth, women with young children and pensioners) would grow more acute as the enterprises endeavored to free themselves of them. Crime would grow.

4. The restructuring of the awareness of a majority of the population in the region would be slow, as for many years the people had not been involved in government. The most enterprising would begin feverishly to skim the cream in taking what was immediately available in high earnings. There would be no awareness of the linkage of the personal well-being of each with the prosperity of the town and rayon. Missing was an elementary need for realizing a broad spectrum of social prosperity and its expanded reproduction.

Then each group of participants was instructed to formulate the problem which they were prepared to work on during the seminar. The decision-taking process for the assignment was not simple, as in the group each participant formulated his own personal task and in the general problem field a common problem could be formulated only by extended talks and consideration of personal interests. For our reality this is extremely important as people are accustomed to sharing and approving a position proposed by someone instead of working out a common one proceeding from personal interests. The final formulation of the tasks for the groups appeared as follows:

1) The elaboration of a mechanism for the interaction of the enterprises and organizations with the soviets in solving socioeconomic problems (as an element of the new economic mechanism);

2) The elaboration of a management structure with the transition of the region to conditions of territorial cost accounting;

3) The transition of the region to self-financing and self-management and the elaboration of a rational management structure;

4) The elaboration of ways to reinforce the power of the soviets (economic and political) as the organizer of the region's socioeconomic development.

5) The founding of a service for the socioeconomic development of the region and an architectural-construction trust.

At the evening general session which was attended by all participants, each group gave its report and presented diagrams made on large sheets of paper. Acute debates broke out over whether the reasons for the crisis were to be found solely outside the territory. At the end of the

first day there was a definite skepticism among the participants in terms of the success of the commenced work. For certain ones the assignment of compiling forecast scenarios contradicted their habitual experience of problem solving.

The Second Day. All participants were instructed to analyze the situation in the region and isolate the key problems. Up to 1700 hours, the work was carried out in small groups. The results were presented at the general evening discussion.

Group I considered the main obstacles on the path to the socioeconomic development of the region to be: the subordination of the region's enterprises and organizations to the various ministries and departments located outside the region in Moscow; the poor competence and backward psychology of the managerial personnel; the poor physical plant; a lack of initiative among the population; the resistance of individual groups in solving social questions.

Group II mentioned the following as the key problem: the city soviet and its executive committee at present were the boss deprived of rights but burdened with responsibility; the region lacked a fully empowered boss.

Group III set out the main components of the region as a complex system and the particular features of interaction between them. A model of the ideal situation was described in accord with which a strategic development center was to function in the region. The key problems were considered to be the following: the presence of surplus levels in management; the lack of real power for the soviets; the absence of a boss on the spot.

Group IV examined the items of expenditure and income for the region's budget for the municipal economy, trade, transport, domestic services, culture, communications, industrial and agricultural production. The basic problems were: the imperfection of legislation dealing with the soviets; the low level of initiative and competence among the deputies.

Group V mentioned as key problems: the absence of real power for the soviets; the low efficiency of the economic mechanism operating in the region.

The Third Day. The participants were instructed to work out a strategy for the region's development. The strategy assumed the establishment of three levels:

1. A mission as a purpose in the world, in the nation and oblast; 2. a development concept which among other things answered the question of "in what manner can the chosen mission be realized?"; 3. the "product" ultimately obtained and its social importance.

The differences between the groups in working out the strategy were not significant. As the region's mission the following were recognized: 1. cultural-historical and ameliorative; 2. the supplier of labor resources for Moscow; 3. the supplier of agricultural product; 4. the

lungs of Moscow; 5. a scientific research center for the development of the countryside.

In a final form the link of the concept and the product with each mission appeared as follows:

1. Historical-culture and ameliorative.

The investment of capital into the construction of hotels, camping areas and the restoring of historical and cultural monuments. The creation of a leisure industry, the opening of a folk medicine center, the construction of a Russian village for the lodging of foreign tourists and the development of folk trades. The result would be a spiritually enriched person and earned money, including foreign exchange.

2. The supplier of labor resources for Moscow.

The construction of comfortable homes. The sale of plots for individual construction. The introduction of standards for payment for land and manpower. Converting the service sphere to evening hours. The result would be a well-rested person, an efficient worker and additional income.

3. The supplier of agricultural products.

An increase in production and processing. A broadening of the number of small highly productive farms. The result: ecologically clean farm products.

4. The lungs of Moscow.

The elaboration of a mechanism for the interaction of the city soviet with the enterprises to monitor the state of the environment. The construction of a ring road for transit transport. The result: clean air, water and high labor productivity.

5. A scientific research center for the development of the countryside.

Result: powerful intellectual potential for the sectorial institutes working on orders, including state ones.

The Fourth Day. Each group was to propose its way for solving the problems confronting the region.

Group I was involved in working out a mechanism which would provide high efficiency and mutual interest in the interaction of the enterprises and the city soviet. The enterprise was the place where a person worked and the territory was the place where he lived, underwent medical treatment, recovered his strength, engaged in politics and so forth. The task of the soviet was to free the enterprises from activities not inherent to them and create conditions for more efficient operations. In this manner the soviets would gain a legitimate right of a portion of the enterprise profit. The loss of a portion of income by the enterprise should not lead to its collapse. The soviet could offer to the enterprise and organizations located on its territory: the providing of land (until recently this was received and used gratis); the supply of raw materials, energy and water resources; the providing

of labor resources with payment depending upon the intellectual potential and skills; providing of communications; creating in the region residential and recreational zones; providing amenities for roads and territories adjacent to the enterprises; organizing the construction of housing and sociocultural projects; providing places in preschool institutions; providing aid in opening cooperatives; giving priority in solving questions of the enterprises engaged in strategic tasks upon assignment from the soviet; help in protecting the territories.

In addition, on the territory of the soviet a differential wage would be introduced for each newly created job.² Thus, prerequisites would arise for holding talks and for establishing contacts between the enterprises and the territories and where each side would assume definite obligations. The preparations for the talks would require that each side work out its own strategy.

Group II concentrated its attention on the region's social problems. It proposed creating the following: services for forecasting and innovative consulting, an association for the production of consumer goods and a recreational and tourism industry.

The decisions of Group III involve: *public health* in creating a unified health center based on traditional and nontraditional medicines based on the departmental polyclinics, hospitals and sanatoria; *food supply* in providing the region with a base for storing agricultural products. For this purpose, new capacity was to be built and adapted space belonging to the troop units would be turned over. The opening of family-based bread stores and bakeries; *consumer goods* with the organizing of a consortium, with the attracting of Soviet firms, foreign capital, joint and defense enterprises. On the basis of the region's construction organizations, an architectural and construction trust would be opened; *intellectual potential* with the opening of a school for managers and a center for the strategic development of the region. Centers would be needed for the respecialization of workers and the training of highly skilled personnel for the service sphere, including foreign tourists; *the leisure and tourism industry* with the forming of a leisure industry in the form of a consortium where the controlling share would belong to the soviet (in the form of the strategic development center).

The Fifth Day. All the groups were engaged in a program for implementing their own decisions and working out the techniques for realizing them. The organizers requested that attention be paid to possible negative consequences from one or another decision and to the attitude from the various structures and individuals. Also to be worked out were the questions of organizing a core of initiative groups after returning from the seminar as well as personal obligations for the participants.

Each group member drew up an individual plan of action and then these were generalized. A packet of a standard

agreement (contract) was worked out between the enterprise and the territory. In order to overcome the alienation which would greet the results of the work of the group and the seminar as a whole, a program was prepared for refining the proposed model by its subsequent mathematical and statistical processing by economists as well as a number of measures of a propaganda nature.

Group II worked out a program for the commission for the social protection of youth, pensioners, unemployed and the disabled on the regional level. Action programs were formulated for promoting deputy candidates and organizing a deputy school.

Group III worked out in detail a program for establishing the region's strategic development center. A scenario was prepared for forecasting the development of the nation as a whole and variations for the strategy of such a center. They examined the attitude toward the center on the part of significant social groups including the party apparatus, the executive committee of the soviets, the informal groups and cooperative members. Possible forms of resistance were determined on the part of individual forces.

Group IV devoted chief attention to the quality of the deputies. The proposed candidates should represent the interests of certain social groups and for a study of these the participants analyzed the situation in the region. The specific features of possible election platforms were determined.

Group V devoted its basic place to working out the techniques for lessening tension and preventing a social explosion. The socioeconomic problems of the region were considered first of all: the absence of real power for the soviets; the low effectiveness of the economic mechanism.

The work results of Group V can be viewed as the first steps along the path for creating a socioeconomic development service. The tasks of this service include: 1) obtaining the required sociological, economic, ecological and other types of information, 2) analysis and diagnostics of the situation, 3) the elaboration of the paths of development (socioeconomic); 4) the elaboration of recommendations for establishing mutually advantageous relations between the enterprises, organizations and soviets.

While all existing administrative structures are aimed chiefly at meeting the demands of the current moment, the newly created one has been designed for effective change. The enterprising participants in the seminar who are endeavoring to solve the problems of the region's socioeconomic development will be involved in working on the service. The service cannot carry out the task set for it due to the insufficient competence of the co-workers. The group defined the measures for seeking out a financial base and quarters for the service, for working out its organizational structure and legal status. Each

member of the group assumed specific obligations in implementing the first initiatives.

Thus, the fifth day ended with the elaboration of a specific plan of action for all seminar participants. On the following day, the work results were summed up. The organizers and participants assessed the effectiveness of the obtained decisions.

Certainly, it will not be possible to reproduce under real conditions all the new structures and relations outlined at the seminar. However, it is extremely important that due to the seminar, little known or even unknown persons recognized their role in the region's aktiv. The innovation seminar was a social accelerator for awakening the conscience of the participants both in terms of the state and in terms of the territory.

The local press described the seminar results. Thus, the mass information media became involved in shaping public opinion on the processes reviewed by the participants. On the Union level, a number of laws has been passed and these orient the local enterprises to observe the interest of the territories and to contribute to the local budget.

As for the long-term results of the described innovation seminar, here:

1. The innovation potential of the region was activated. A territorial intersectoral association was established and is currently functioning for providing the region's market with goods and services.

2. The innovative potential of the seminar participants was increased. A portion of them has actively joined the election campaign, using programs, connections and new opportunities developed at the seminar. Only two failed to be elected and the remainder moved into key posts in the new rayon power.

3. Almost one-half of the participants changed their former way of life. Many found a different, more creative job.

4. In returning to their jobs, the participants felt that they again were surrounded by former routine and organizational restrictions. A majority of them recognized the necessity of substantially changing their former way of life, beginning with the use of the permanent elements of self-development gained during the seminar up to the point of changing their job. Here, as the participants pointed out, there was greater value not in the plans worked out at the seminar as the knowledge and skills acquired. The seminar forced them to revise and change the approaches and value orientations which had previously seemed fixed.

Footnotes

1. The experience of conducting such games has not been properly taken up in the sociological literature.

2. In the estimates of specialists, in the Soviet economy at the end of the 1980s almost 10 million jobs were superfluous [4].

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Sociology and Marketing

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[Article by Yevgeniy Ivanovich Morozov, candidate of philosophical sciences, chief specialist for sociological research at the Ulyanovsk Microelectronics Center. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The economic difficulties being experienced by the nation can have a positive impact on the development of sociological research. This is related first of all to the fact that as we convert to the market, the question of survival arises starkly. This applies to both the long existing enterprises as well as the newly arising ones. The basic problem is financial and the solution to it at present is possible only in the case of the successful sale by them of their services and products. Of course, for individual organizations with a universal deficit this may not be acute but such a situation is scarcely likely to last sufficiently long in a situation of liberalization. Even a local surplus of goods forces each producer to seek out new markets or forms of obtaining profit and consequently be concerned with what under the conditions of a market economy is called marketing.

Judging from the literature published in our country recently on this question [1, 2], it is possible to conclude that 90 percent of the marketing research is nothing more than sociological research. What is the similarity?

In the first place, any marketing research is based upon the methods of collecting and processing information on the interests of a potential consumer, his values, attitudes and particular features and this is also a problem for sociological studies. Secondly, the demands on the content and stages of research work survive almost fully:

determining its problems and goals, working out a program, analysis of the obtained data, and their presentation for decision taking [1]. Thirdly, the methodological principles and specific methods coincide almost completely: observation, the most diverse types of questioning and the experiment.

In maintaining the general methodological approaches of sociological research, in marketing research there is a significant change in the sense and purpose of the research procedures. While in the former different-level tasks are set more often, the latter has a more applied nature and its results are directly aimed at transforming and achieving the necessary changes.

On the one hand, marketing has a great impact on production. In keeping as the main goal the obtaining of a profit (and which is also the aim of ensuring production efficiency per se), marketing introduces as an obligatory condition the conforming of the produced product to the needs of the individual consumer and hence all society. Incessant monitoring of the level of achieving the goal necessitates also constant production improvement. Marketing contributes to defining the direction of the given development and serves as the basis for internal firm planning and management.

On the other hand, marketing research also influences the quality of life and the consumption structure, in shaping them and tuning them to the demands of production and its interests. Marketing makes it possible for the consumers to be more informed, selective and efficient [2]. It stimulates the firms and organizations to produce better goods and services at prices which the people will agree to pay. In this prospect the tasks of marketing are closely interlinked with the tasks of advertising which is effective only in the instance that it knows what the consumer requires.

If we view the process of the functioning of a society as the constant recreation of itself on the level of the production, distribution and consumption of the product necessary to it (and the forming of the production relations and man in this area), then marketing operates as an instrument for the optimizing of this process. It adapts production to consumption and vice versa.

Recently, marketing aimed at working out programs to develop a positive image of the organizations and their adaptation to the conditions and requirements of the surrounding environment has become very urgent. This has been brought about by the complexities of relationships with the local population which often acts against existing or possible violations of the ecological and social balance and arising from the activities of one or another enterprise. The situation has become particularly acute in line with the construction and operation of hydro, thermal and certainly nuclear power plants. The "Chernobyl" syndrome exists and has objectively involved large masses of people. In truth, the government has taken certain measures, which, in its view, should soften

the prejudices against nuclear plants. But, in all probability, the efforts newly initiated on the level of "common sense" will not provide the corresponding result even with significant expenditures, as they have not been coordinated with the specific locality and do not take its specific features into account. The elaboration of a marketing program for shaping public opinion is essential in each specific instance long before the start of the project's construction.

We must also point out the increased role for social marketing, that is, the marketing of ideas which can be important for society as a whole. It is a question first of all of the broad basing, implementation and monitoring of the fulfillment of programs in the aim of the acceptance of a certain social idea or practice by a particular group or society [1]. For obtaining a maximum effect, market segmentation is employed, the consumers are studied, and means of information impact are worked out. A characteristic example of the neglect of social marketing has been the obvious collapse of the antialcohol campaign and the attempt to form the "reasonable demands" of the Soviet people on its basis. Alas, even now the state endeavors to carry out many social ideas which are important for our society by prohibitive or punitive methods. The consequences of such actions are often far from the expected.

In a word, marketing must be viewed as a definite practical sphere for realizing the tasks of sociology. It is a modern system for managing the production and marketing activities of the enterprise and is based upon comprehensive market analysis. Sociology and marketing overlap on the level of marketing research and, partially, on the advertising level.

The growing need for marketing research undoubtedly will lead to a greater demand for specialists capable of carrying this out. At present, on the methodological level only the sociologists and social psychologists are trained in and actively employ the procedures and methods of collecting and processing information essential for marketing analysis. (Unfortunately, a predominant majority of the economists is satisfied with official statistics and is very little concerned with the interests and value orientations as problem areas.) One can predict a growing need for a sound methodological instrumentarium, complete software and so forth. In turn, any information, even applied, requires analysis and explanation, including on the theoretical level.

What has been set out above has been dictated in no way by abstract considerations. Regardless of the political situation, it would be hard to foresee a return to the previously existing mechanism for the centralized distribution of the product produced in society. With an increased number of cooperative, small and private enterprises and with the development of the market undoubtedly there will be a greater need for services which support their viability. This is why it is important now to draw the attention of social scientists to the fact

that in the near future the need for marketing and marketing research will expand significantly.

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Dangerous Girls (on Juvenile Criminals)

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[Text] More and more frequently, lawyers, psychologists, pedagogues and, of course, sociologists are turning to the problem of juvenile crime. This is understandable as its level rather precisely reflects the state of social morality, the effective functioning of social institutions and the well-being or problems of society as a whole.

In this context particular attention has been given to the juvenile female lawbreakers the tender age of whom we find it difficult to associate with crimes all the more severe ones, a dissolute way of life and a stay in prison walls. This is why, for instance, the response was so acute by viewers to the documentary television film shown last year devoted to girls serving sentences in the Melitopol Corrective Labor Colony (VTK). Those who viewed the film were terrified by the fact that juveniles, almost little girls, were in prison, they marched in order, were clothed in unaesthetic prisoner garb, that the fences surrounding the colony were tall and gloomy, the gates were closed with heavy bars and the representatives of the administration seemed uninvolved.... Yes, to see behind bars such young beings was truly hard and they inevitably would evoke sympathy even regardless of for what sins they had been so severely punished.

There can be no doubt that the relative development of our female juvenile crime is a dependable indicator of very serious social problems and profound conflicts. At present, as never before, we are the witnesses of the lack of social protection for the coming generations, the crisis phenomena in the family and family education, the insufficient return from the schools and other institutions which should work with the youth and the absence of state programs designed specially for them.

Presently, there are fewer adolescent female criminals in the corrective labor institutions and this has been brought about directly by the changes in the criminal legislative policy in the nation and by a definite restriction for the sphere of employing imprisonment. Most rarely this is permitted for women and juveniles and young girls in particular. Certainly, this does not cause any argument, but the transgressing young people who remain at liberty should not be left to themselves, effective control must be established over them and at the same time they must be given the required help.

Regardless of the increase in the crime rate of juveniles noted since 1982, the number of juveniles condemned since then to imprisonment has been reduced by 60.9 percent. The reduction in the share of such sentences could not help but be felt in the qualitative characteristics of the composition of persons serving in the VTK. The most serious criminals of both sexes began to be concentrated there and naturally the atmosphere deteriorated significantly.

We should point out that beginning with 1985, there has been a broadening of the range of young female criminals condemned for relatively long sentences. While among them over the previous period, the number of persons sentenced for a term of less than a year has declined by 4-fold, those receiving over 3 years has risen to 25 percent. Here it is essential to remember that the degree of penalty depends upon the nature of the crime, the severity of the ensuing circumstances and the personality of the guilty party.

We would also point to the circumstance that according to the data of a number of the USSR population censuses (1970, 1979 and 1989), the proportional amount of representatives of the female sex in the total aggregate of persons who have not yet reached the age of 18 has remained approximately on the same level, comprising 50 percent. At the same time, a predominant majority of those serving terms in the VTK is male juveniles, while the overall crime rate for girls forms a steady smaller amount. However, their share in the total contingent of juvenile criminals from 1976 through 1990 has almost doubled and in absolute terms is over 2,000 persons.

The structure of the crime rate of female juvenile delinquents is rather constant and this shows the stability of the factors giving rise to it. The most widespread are thefts of the personal property of citizens, the embezzlement of state or public property and hooliganism. It is essential to make clear that the property harm caused by their selfish actions is usually slight and most often these actions are carried out in a group. If this is a group of pilferers, then often the girls, to put it coarsely, are simply substitutes for the adult perpetrators who make use of their inexperience. Such things happen in stores and enterprises of the light and food industry and in public dining. Predominantly they commit the hooliganistic excesses in an inebriated state and under the influence of their friends.

Our junior compatriots who have "strayed from the true path" not so rarely are judged to be guilty of violent and mercenary-violent (robbery and theft) crimes. Incidentally, the latter in the crime of any country always hold a smaller place but, on the other hand, they carry serious social danger. We are convinced that even the isolated murders or severe bodily injury caused by young girls should be viewed as extraordinary incidents. In truth, the number of murders committed by them is dropping in contrast to theft the number of which is increasing. But they have begun to kill with particular cruelty and the aggressive actions are beginning to be marked by greater boldness and cynicism and there has been the perpetrating of criminal actions by groups of disorderly young women without the involvement of men. Such groups carry out violent attacks using knives and other articles which can be dangerous even in weak female hands.

Masculinization, that is, the acquiring of male traits, is completely inherent to female crime. A clear reflection of this is the involvement of women in rapes, a crime that is strictly male. The number of juvenile girls involved in this, according to our selective data, is slight, but over the last 3 years this has increased by 4-fold. Here is not merely a desire to help their friends in sexual violence but also an attempt to solve subjective, personal problems, to increase, so to speak, their sociopsychological status in the group. Moreover, and this is very crucial, in humiliating the victim, in reducing him to the lowest level, they grow in their own eyes and satisfy one of the most important human needs of self-affirmation.

We cannot help but bring up such a rather widespread crime as the murdering of a child by a young mother (alas, the involvement of a lover in this act is far from always seen). Virtually all the murdered children were born outside of marriage. Generally, sexual license is a characteristic feature in the behavior of the female delinquents. Per 1,000 of the prisoners investigated by us, 20 percent had venereal diseases, 25 percent had gynecological ones and 3 percent had children. The risk group for AIDS (prostitutes, lesbians and drug addicts) was 35 percent.

There is a large amount of concern in the fact that in the notorious youth "gangs" there inevitably is present a sexual demoralization of the juvenile girls. Here often one finds those of them who belong to families which are the poorest off in the sense of material and cultural support, who do not have good relations with their parents and who feel themselves unnecessary and superfluous. At the age of 12-14 and sometimes earlier, such girls commence their sexual life, they drink and smoke, participate in minor thefts, they allow themselves hooliganistic pranks, while the most aggressive and cruelest beat up on their contemporaries and are involved in thefts. Simultaneously, there is a growing alienation from the family and school, and there are more frequent runaways from home and vagrancy. It is no accident that there has been a rapid increase in the army of completely unemployed juveniles (since 1984, this has increased by

6-fold), who have abandoned school (those who studied in school prior to committing the crime was 1.5-fold less) and those without jobs (their number over this time interval tripled).

In these groups seemingly only minor infractions and misdeeds are committed which do not represent a great social danger. But this is only at first glance. In the hideouts and other abodes of these groups, robbery, theft and violence are frequent. There the antisocial features and attitudes of the individual which define a criminal orientation are completely reinforced. Very often after release from the places of incarceration the young men and women return to their group in which their authority is now immeasurably higher. For this reason, it can be felt that such an environment possesses significant criminogenic potential and should be the object of the most serious preventive efforts.

For understanding female juvenile criminal conduct, of great importance is a study of the antisocial youth groupings, the relationships within the group and particularly in the organized and highly structured juvenile associations. On this level of use is the research conducted by A.B. Kashelkin in Kazan and Dzerzhinsk (Gorkiy Oblast) [1].

This research in particular shows that the dynamics of the number of juvenile girls who prefer to be in contact with antisocial juvenile groups has a constant trend to increase. It must be assumed that such a bad situation arises basically for the reason of the breakdown and destruction of the family, the loss of its functions as the emotional center and social control and a marked weakening of the influence of school and the formal, official youth organizations. This also means that in the designated cities, which, evidently, are no exception, the juveniles have lost their interest in the customary social values and institutions and in the traditional forms for carrying out their leisure. They no longer believe the world of adults. Since in the given instance we are concerned with girls, the existing situation can be viewed as doubly alarming.

Here a role is also played by the fact that as a result of not always well thought-out actions by the mass information media, these groupings have obtained an unprecedented nationwide fame. Around the image of the young "grouppie" a halo of mystery, recklessness and courage have been created and to a certain degree this has served as an intriguing, attracting circumstance which is extremely significant in the juvenile milieu.

Moreover, an extremely crucial aspect is the desire of the girls for personal security, for conflicts between the various groups and the very social atmosphere in the city can have a completely lethal effect on their moral, mental and physical state and social status, catching them on "enemy" territory or without the protection of an elder or strong person. If one does not belong to a group or is not the girlfriend of one of its members, there is a high risk of being beaten, raped or at least insulted.

In a word, belonging to a group and constant contact with the members of one's gang serve as a reliable guarantee for inviolability and even a condition for achieving certain psychological comfort.

Such comfort is acquired and maintained by a particular position in the juvenile hierarchy and increased respect due to belonging to the group on the part of not only one's contemporaries. The girls have authority also among the children who are not a member of the group or who hold unstable positions in it. On the one hand, thus, the psychological factor and the feeling of belonging to a particular "fraternity," and on the other, concrete rationalistic considerations on ensuring one's own tranquility determine the unflagging attraction to maintaining contacts with the groups.

At the same time, it is important to point out that in the nature of the relationships of the girls with the group members, there is present also a very unattractive reverse side of the coin which has caused a protest among many of them. This is the question of the widely practiced coercion in sexual congress without voluntary choice and agreement. The problem is that the psychology of a group member is shaped from childhood under the conditions of harshness and ruthlessness for others, and a cynical, consumer attitude toward women. The very sociomoral situation for existing within these associations, the culture, the basic values and rules of conduct, notions and customs are strongly reminiscent of the early tribal communities.

A separate matter of discussion is the so-called common girls, many of whom subsequently become prostitutes. This is a group of girls most disdained by the juveniles and among them one encounters completely different types: from those who are confident of themselves and who are openly amoral delinquents, those obviously searching for new sexual impressions and the support of the most authoritative members of the group to frightened, depressed beings who carry out any orders of the "group members" and their influential friends and are incapable of independently altering the situation which has formed around them. For example, in 80 percent of the Kazan youth groups, there were instances of the violent forcing of under-age girls to engage in sexual relations and in 1/5 of the cases their age did not exceed 14-15 years [1, p 235]. The guilty parties were far from always brought to justice and this cannot help but encourage similar new crimes.

As a whole, the juvenile girls more frequently commit a crime precisely in a group, as their criminogenic and generally their experience in life, their subjective age and psychological capabilities do not allow them to act alone. Among those sentenced for the first time by the court, around 80 percent were such girls and here over 1/2 was the immediate perpetrator of the crime and 1 out of 5 participated in its organization. Ordinarily they were well-acquainted with their future partners in the group

crime and the groups themselves often functioned for a long time, beginning with minor infractions and amoral deeds.

For this reason, it appears natural that a predominant majority of the juvenile female criminals had previously received a record in the corresponding inspectorates of the internal affairs bodies and certain of them had been convicted, having been given a reprieve which is now employed for them noticeably more often. Thus, while in 1984, this involved only 16.7 percent of the persons convicted, in 1990 it was already 1/2 of them. Incidentally, as a result of a survey conducted in one of the VTK, we established that a reprieve was employed for almost a good half of the delinquents held there. For 45 percent, the reprieve was cancelled due to their failure to observe standards of behavior, that is, the ignoring of imposed obligations (to report regularly to the police for registration, to find a job or continue studies, to return home no later than at 2100 hours and so forth), while 55 percent during this period of granted liberty committed a new crime. It can be said that they did not pass the moral test and "failed" rather quickly (they lacked self-discipline, personal organization, there was no individual educational work or parental supervision), having objectively perceived the unique "moratorium" simply as a fortuitous avoidance of a real punishment.

It is easy to understand the judges who, in pitying the juveniles who have transgressed the law, do not want to place them behind barbed wire and defer the sentencing. At the same time, many, having entered the colony, in conversations expressed regret that they had been given a reprieve on their sentence, otherwise they would have come to their senses sooner and would not have committed a repeat crime. Symptomatically, some 80 percent of those who newly committed a crime, at times even a more severe one, previously received the designated benefit from the legal system.

The administration of the corrective labor institutions also is showing a humane attitude to the juvenile prisoners, in more and more widely providing an opportunity for parole. In 1990, because of this 21.5 percent of them returned from places "not so distant" in comparison with 4.7 percent in 1984.

However, it must be pointed out that parole is becoming available to juvenile criminals not only upon the serving of a certain portion of the sentence. For this it is also essential to earn a positive recommendation from the administration, not to violate the established conditions, to work conscientiously and obtain a secondary education and specialty. In addition to this, an agreement is required on job placement after release and establishing a place of residence.

In accord with the legislation, juveniles, upon reaching their maturity, should be moved to adult colonies. Over the last 6 years, there has been a tendency to reduce the transfers of young girls there, from 2.7 to 40.9 percent [sic.]. To us this practice seems humane and advisable,

because with such a move their studies suffer significantly and their behavior deteriorates and the prospect of an early release becomes more distant. Certainly having fallen to a new and unfamiliar environment, yesterday's juveniles, in order to better adapt, largely begin to imitate their elders among whom are many hardened criminals.

What sort of life do our failed "heroines" have in the places of incarceration, and how do their relationships develop?

First of all, it is only right to state that in the colonies the situation is completely normal and calm and violations of the accepted order are comparatively rare. Even rarer are clashes between prisoners settled with the aid of violence, although there are impulsive, externally unmotivated actions occurring as if from nothing and all of a sudden which are capable at times of clouding the atmosphere. Hence, their behavior must be predicted also considering this major circumstance.

One of the important explanations for the relative good conditions in the "girls" colonies is probably that there is not inherent to them the sharp stratification into groups and typical of the male colonies, including the "boy" ones. There are no clearly expressed, universally recognized leaders the authority of whom is unassailable. Nor does one observe the so-called abandoned (in the male colonies these would include, for example, the passive homosexuals) who are on the inferior levels of the hierarchical ladder in the community of criminals. In comparison with the female colonies for adults, lesbianism is less widespread here, but there are conflicts based on this when out of jealousy or for other "love" reasons they slit their wrists. Generally, interest in sexual questions among the isolated girls is very great.

They would not be women if they did not try to make themselves attractive, if they did not follow fashion and devote a great deal of time to taking care of themselves. But there is still much of childhood in them and this can be seen not only in the unpredictable behavior and the immature judgments but also that in the fact, for instance, that some of them still play with dolls.

As everywhere, the girls even under the conditions of incarceration are lively, energetic, they try to be out in the air, they participate in physical culture and if it were not for the uniform and the prison setting, a majority of them would make an impression of ordinary young people the life of whom is in no way troubled. Here, for example, is K., 17 years old, rather pretty, feminine, moderately coquettish, and glancing at her one wishes to suppress why she ended up in the colony. She has been punished for the fact that she murdered her 6-month-old son, striking his head on the edge of the foundation in a basement. She threw him down there. Another gentle, delicate girl with humble manners is the 18-year-old T. who was condemned for committing 20 apartment thefts.

Such are the juvenile female criminals and, alas, they are selfish, aggressive and cruel, and the danger for society because of what they have perpetrated is beyond any doubt and we are firmly convinced that they, at least the basic mass of them, have been correctly punished but the educational measures are being implemented in a far from effective manner. The problem is that the professional training for the co-workers in the corrective institutions is unacceptably low, they do not have a sufficient understanding of age psychology and pedagogics and this in no way is compensated for by conscientiousness and loyalty to duty. As for the conditions of serving a criminal sentence by the female juvenile delinquents, undoubtedly even now much could be changed for the better. For instance, it is essential to lift certain unjustified restrictions on contact with the outside world and not limit the number of meetings, packages and remittances, to permit telephone calls with parents and close friends, to provide somewhat greater opportunities for continuing education and broadening the choice of the acquired professions. Moreover, we feel that it is essential to give up a significant portion of the traditional prison routine which undoubtedly has a negative impact on the malleable psyche of the juveniles.

We have not examined the reasons for the criminal conduct of the girls. This is a very complex problem requiring special analysis. We would merely emphasize again that the roots to this lie in family problems and more precisely in the fact that the children psychologically and often physically are repulsed and rejected by their own parents. Consequently, the prevention of juvenile crime should be carried out through strengthening the underpinnings of the primary cell of society, by all-round aid to it and this, certainly, does not exclude social programs aimed at the given category of the nation's citizens.

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Social Tension in the Kalmyk ASSR

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[Article by Mariya Nikolayevna Mukhanova, graduate student at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] Social conflicts have become an attribute of public life. This is shown by the results of research conducted in the Kalmyk ASSR (April-May 1990) within the scientific

research project "The Dynamics of the Positions of Social Groups, Communities and Social Tension" of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (the leaders, Doctors of Philosophical Sciences V.O. Rukavishnikov and A.V. Dmitriyev).

The control poll was tied to assessing the results of a postal poll conducted by the collective of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in March-April 1990.

Following a standard method, some 329 persons were questioned representing the adult urban population of the republic. A quota type of sample was used. The quota features: sex, age, nationality and sphere of activity. This was conducted at the place of employment with the aid of an individual questioning.

Around 1/2 of those who replied (41 percent) recognized the presence of social tension, while 37 percent pointed to its intensification, in comparison with the previous year. Here the respondents put forward economic, ecological, political and social problems as the significant factors influencing the increase in tension.

Economic problems were named as the most important factor causing social tension. There was particular concern over the state of the consumer market and the related sociopsychological consequences. This was the opinion of 44 percent of the workers, 20 percent of the engineer and technical personnel, 20 percent of the employees in public health and the service sphere.

One of the most depressing realities characterizing the current state of the economy as a consequence of increased inflation is the norming of consumption, that is, the introduction of rationing, cards, that is, a complete limitation in the system of personal needs. A majority of the responding urban dwellers in the republic (57 percent) stated that they lived in a "society of distribution" and that this was an acceptable prospect in the future because of the bad economic policy. Particularly after the unsuccessful governmental plans for "improving" the economy and which involved the buying up of all the goods and products.

In replying to the question on the degree of satisfaction for basic demands, 56 percent of those answering pointed to the unsatisfactory material situation of their family. Only 10 percent felt that their families were meeting their basic needs. The poll confirmed the hypothesis that in the short run (2-3 years) the respondents expected a deterioration of the standard of living in their families. Only 14 percent of those replying hoped for a bettering of their state.

The poll showed that in public attitudes a new trend has appeared linked to increased pessimism. The mass mind has been permeated by a feeling of uncertainty, a lack of confidence. Some 22 percent of those replying felt that "they would not live to see better times."

The respondents noted the growing aggressiveness in society, the anger, the loss of honor and dignity, the traditions and customs and spiritual values, as well as the violating of the principles of justice. Among those affirming this viewpoint, 70 percent were representatives of the creative intelligentsia, scientific workers and white collar personnel, 25 percent pensioners and 16 percent of the students.

One out of 4 respondents (basically women) cited as the main reason for the absence of their security the increase in crime, particularly among the youth, the low level of work of the law enforcement bodies, the poor legal protection of the individual and tension in interethnic relations. This opinion was confirmed by the fact that in 1989 alone, the number of crimes, in comparison with 1988, rose by 35 percent in Kalmykia [1]. The nutrient medium for these antisocial manifestations has been aptly characterized by one of the respondents in the following words: "We live constantly in a cold apartment and eat on rations. All around there is poverty, shortages and thievery. Where is safety to be found?" (Kaspiysk, a teacher).

Along with the economic problems, one observes increased cruelty, the collapse of the family, loneliness, an increase in mental illnesses and nationalism. At present, the possibility of economic growth, the development of political democracy and the achieving of social equality are in doubt.

Some 30 percent of those replying from the various socioprofessional and age groups mentioned as one of the factors for social tension the complex ecological situation in the republic. The reason is that the incorrect farming in recent years has increased the area of deserts in Kalmykia by 10 percent. A situation has arisen where residing on the republic's territory has become simply threatening for the life of people. According to the data of the Kalmyk Ministry of Health, just in Maloderbetovskiy Rayon, infant mortality in 1984 was 15.7 percent, in 1986, 18.8 percent, in 1987, 9.4 percent and in 1988, 19 percent. The number of infectious illnesses has risen. Since 1988, they have observed illnesses and congenital defects in neonates. The harmful discharges of the Astrakhan Gas Condensate Complex represent a serious problem for republic ecology. Just as a result of a single emergency release, gas was smelled in 23 population points, in the town of Elista there were symptoms of poisoning of the population, particularly among children [2]. In 1988, the republic was declared to be an ecological disaster zone.

The crisis phenomena have begun to also determine the attitude of a majority of the people toward politics and ideology. Some 20 percent felt that "the government as a whole is carrying out a correct policy and although significant difficulties are being encountered in the process of implementing this, positive results have already been achieved"; "the government has good ideas but is unable to implement them" was the opinion of 41 percent of the persons replying; 20 percent felt that "the

program of measures and how this is being carried out causes many doubts"; 12 percent assumed that "the present government is incapable of solving the problems confronting the nation and it should retire."

Society has entered the crisis psychologically unprepared. Only a minority has adapted to the new realities (persons in the shadow economy, the underground millionaires and cooperative members). But the majority has placed its hopes on the state or political leaders.

Some 34 percent of the respondents expected positive changes from the decisions of the President and 34 percent from the Congress of People's Deputies. At the same time, 53 percent of those replying did not expect changes for the better in line with the elections of the new republic parliament. Some 17 percent felt that power in their city belonged to the soviet, 77.5 percent to the party bodies, 19.5 percent to the representatives of the shadow economy (the replies could be given for three items).

Another sociopsychological reaction engendered by the crisis is the strengthening of conservative trends in the minds of people. For a portion of the respondents, the crisis has not so much an economic basis as a moral one. They are experiencing nostalgia for the traditional "dependable" values of order and discipline. According to the data of the poll, 51 percent felt that "there must be a rigid policy and discipline and there has been enough discussion."

Among the public, active and "aggressive" types of reactions are developing to social tension. One of these consists in refusing to recognize the crisis and its objective socioeconomic causes as well as in the irrational personification of its "guilty parties" (the search for "scapegoats"). The ethnic and national differences turn out to be the guilty ones while the philistines consider the representatives of another nationality (for example, in Kalmykia, the representatives of the Transcaucasus Republics) to be the "source of evil."

Regardless of the fact that over the period of 1985-1990, the processes of the democratization of social conscience have gone rather far, however the conservative, anticonflict views as before have maintained strong positions in the general complex of sociopolitical notions among the republic's urban population. This is expressed, in particular in the attitude of the respondents toward the holding of strikes. Some 48 percent of those replying felt that "strikes are not justified under any circumstances," while 41 percent "would prefer not to participate in a strike," since they did not believe that "we can achieve anything with the aid of strikes." Some 57 percent of the respondents "agreed fully" and 21 percent "shared the viewpoint" feeling that "a struggle and opposition among different social forces is harmful as it can give rise to a serious conflict and it is essential to search for a way out of the crisis."

Here 80 percent of the respondents favored a viable democracy, asserting that "conservative elements in the

party and economic apparatus represent the greatest danger." And only 9 percent "agreed fully" and 28 percent "partially shared" the viewpoint that the "informal groups are capable of undertaking real measures for improving the state of affairs in the nation."

The research showed that in the republic processes are continuing to develop linked to the increase in internal contradictoriness, the growing doubts as to the justness of the social, economic and political organization of society and the forming of more critical views of the masses concerning daily reality.

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On the Use of Public Polls in the Paid Services Sphere

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[Article by Vitaliy Ivanovich Anikin, candidate of economic sciences and leading science associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Consumer Market and Marketing. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] Both scientific as well as popular literature abound in data on the miserly role of the sphere of paid services in the everyday life of the Soviet family. At present, it is particularly urgent to move from stating the fact to elaborating a system of measures for eliminating the heaviest and most fatiguing housework in this sphere. The necessity for this is intensified on the threshold of the market management mechanism. Its economic regulators should be able to "tune" to the priority directions in the development of the supply and demand of services.

In working out economic organizational measures, it is impossible to exaggerate the role of the simple quantitative growth in the providing of services. In contrast to commodities for which such a demand is essential, the shortage of services much less justifies the comparatively small share of them and volume in the expenditures of the urban dwellers. Another no less significant factor is the conscious rejection of the public (including its materially best-off part) of the available services. As the data of a sociological survey conducted at a number of the Moscow enterprises and organizations¹ indicate, some 52.4 percent of those questioned (their families) do not use laundries, 49.1 percent the services for the repairing

and individual tailoring of clothing, and 10.9 percent (including 17 percent of the men and 8.8 percent of the women) the hairdressers.

The natural question arises on the reasons for the rejection of domestic services. The main thing here is to disclose the relationship of voluntariness and compulsion, the traditions and habits initially inherent to the family (person), the underdevelopment of the services market and the negative impact of this on the forming of the volume and structure of consumption (see the table).

Reasons for Refusal to Turn to Enterprises in the Domestic Service Sphere (in % of the Number of Persons Questioned, Up to Three Reasons Could Be Noted)

Reasons	Men	Women
Prefer to do everything independently	40.2	34.4
Necessary services are always in short supply	45.1	37.3
Territorial remoteness of enterprises	14.8	23.8
Poor quality and low level of services	61.5	57.9
Long time for carrying out orders	31.1	28.8
High prices and rates	32.8	37.3
Inconvenient operating hours	19.7	15.1
Other reasons	0.9	1.3

The data given in the table for each type of paid service seemingly should answer the posed question.

The proportional amount of respondents who pointed to the first cause could be interpreted as the significance of the "voluntary component" and the frequency of the references to other factors as a valid argument for refusing to receive the services. However, such conclusions are superficial and do not reflect the deep-seated mechanism for the manifestation of social psychology.

We are convinced that the desire for self-service is unconsciously influenced by necessity or coercion: I prefer to do everything myself not because I like this (or I cannot conceive of other variations), but rather because I have been put under such conditions. This does not cause a feeling of infringement or harm like a shortage of goods. We in time become accustomed to the created situation and do not suspect a completely different, more rational organization of our everyday life, of a higher level of consumption not generally but rather in a specific, rather narrow area.

For example, among men the peak in preference for self-service falls on the age group of 36-40 years. But also in this same group there is a maximum percentage of persons questioned who note the shortage of services as

the most important reason for refusing to use them. The coincidence of the two peaks in a single sex-age group is no accident; the link between them is too great. Among women, the dedication to self-service is most characteristic for female respondents with a per capita income of 76-100 rubles (37.1 percent). However, in groups with a higher income, the popularity of an independent solution to domestic problems declines. The female respondents the per capita income in the families of which reaches 201-225 rubles point to a preference for this channel more than 2-fold more rarely (16.7 percent). And this is regardless of the particular susceptibility for representatives in the high income groups to poor quality and a shortage of services which intensify the role of self-service.

One must also relate critically to data on the desire to independently run one's life for reasons supposedly not linked to the shortcomings of public services. It is also essential to consider the lack of information in the public on the opportunities increasing year by year for obtaining the most diverse services. It is essential to correct the conservative force disclosed as a result of the direct polls in the traditions and habits in orienting the public to their own forces and abilities. The conservativeness is not so great as one might assume in having just the data in the table. Just how much we should reduce the initial estimate in each specific instance is a matter of special analysis.

Interesting information can also come from an analysis of the influence of prices and quality of services on the refusal to use them. The existing price level is one of the serious obstacles to increasing consumption. Some 40 percent of the men and 35 percent of the women pointed to this in the group of families with an average per capita income of 76-100 rubles; in families with an income of 101-125 rubles, the figures, respectively, were 47.6 percent and 32.4 percent, and in the group where monetary receipts comprise 225-250 rubles, the figures were 16.7 and 20 percent. As we can see, the trend toward the reduced importance of high prices depending upon increased income is far from uniform. The curve describing it has several characteristic bursts which show that in the group of families with a higher per capita income the importance of high prices in the underconsumption of services is often more substantial. In many instances, the barrier to the broadening of consumption is not the price as such but rather its discrepancy to the consumer properties of the service. The importance of poor quality and a low level of services in the refusal of services rises consistently, beginning with families having a per capita income of 76-100 rubles and ending with families for whom income corresponds to 151-175 rubles. The growing refusal of poor quality intensifies the negative attitude toward the price which is not adequate to the utility of the service. Moreover, families with varying sufficiency consume a different range of services even within one sectorial group of them according to the following properties: the normed quality level, comfortableness, originality and so forth. The respondents also

express their opinion on the price level, understanding the most typical range for themselves or, possibly, even a single assortment item of services. For this reason, subjective opinions on the price level can be expressed in the direct opposite to the assumed perception of the costliness of services depending upon monetary income.

A high price, as a reason for refusal given by the consumers is not an unconditional grounds for reducing it for the sake of activating consumption. From the standpoint of integral socioeconomic efficiency, it would be preferable to switch to a higher quality level of services, particularly when it is a question of improving the consumption structure of relatively high-income groups of families which, in having a sufficiency, "complain" of high prices.

In principle, the valid assumption that with market prices for paid services their physical consumption will decline requires additional argument. An abrupt increase in prices will immediately reduce demand, however later other, better processes for the consumer will appear and first of all there will be a reorientation of the service structure toward the most comfortable types of these, and the producer of them will have a stronger interest in a constant improvement in quality. A significant portion of the respondents agreed for a 20-30-percent increase in prices² as a minimum with a simultaneous activating of the consumption of services under the condition that these would be of high quality, diversified assortment and with minimal time expenditures. Here some 22 percent of the men and 28.8 percent of the women would use the services of laundries more often, and with the same intensity, respectively, 60.4 percent and 43.5 percent. Some 43.2 percent of the men and 37.5 percent of the women would more often resort to the services repairing household equipment, and, respectively, 40.2 percent and 33.3 percent with the same intensity; 41 percent of the men and 41.6 percent of the women would use apartment repairing services.

The territorial development of the network is a virtually unexamined area for considering public opinion in choosing the ways for the development of paid services. This is particularly urgent for such territorial formations as large cities. The network of paid service enterprises is located here disproportionately between the central and peripheral parts. The basic reasons are, in the first place, the failure to observe the urban development standards for providing the residential areas with a network of services and, secondly, the realized shortcomings of the standards themselves [2, p 50]. The standards, as guidelines for the territorial development of the network of paid services, are certainly essential. However, they should be socially directed by the opinion of the public and this up to now has not been taken into account.

Preference in locating the facilities of the social and domestic infrastructure arises in the consumer in the merging of interests of both the inhabitants and the workers of a certain rayon. It is essential to start by

discovering the optimum proportion of their distribution between the residential rayons and the working rayons. The data obtained as a result of the poll show that this is very distant from the actual distribution. The proportional amount of consumers seeking services more frequently at their place of residence is 7.7 percentage points higher than the actual for shoe repair shops, 24 percentage points higher for shops repairing hardware, 28 percentage points for tailor shops and more than 8 percentage points for hairdressers.

It is also essential to disclose the reasons for the predominant providing of services to workers in rayons which are not their place of employment or residence. The share of respondents who have precisely such displaced distribution is very significant and for individual types of services comprises: 23.2 percent for hairdressers, 50.7 percent for the making and repair of clothing, 30.3 percent for the repair of hardware, 29 percent for watch repairs and 10 percent for footwear repairs. To what degree is the remoteness from the rayons of the extended stay of urban dwellers objectively caused by the uniqueness of the services, by the particular skills of the craftsmen and so forth and to what degree it has been caused by the territorially uneven placement of the social and domestic infrastructure and the unsuccessful specializing of their facilities? These questions await a practical study.

In the change of public opinion, important is the neutralization of the influence of factors which are external and limit the freedom of choice. One of the possible variations is to survey different types of families the members of which reside and work (study) in different rayons of the central part of a city, that is, in rayons which are approximately equally highly provided with paid sociocultural and trade services. Here there is a substantial shortcoming: those who reside and work in different rayons in the central part of a city spend a minimum amount of time on the way from home to job and this seriously influences the distribution of the nonworking time budget according to the days of the week and including the portion spent on obtaining paid services [3]. Such a distribution differs from the city average and for this reason cannot be used as the basis.

For working out sounder recommendations it would be advisable to employ a different variation which provides for a supplementing of data on the actual and preferred distribution of service places with information on the reasons for such a discrepancy. An analysis of the reasons and an assessment of their importance would make it possible to separate the desires disclosed as a result of the polls to alter the actual distribution of the places for obtaining services into the following: 1) those caused by territorial differentiation in the availability of service facilities (capacity) and the quality level of the offered services; 2) those related to just convenience for the customer. As a result, it would be possible to argue the normative ratios between the volumes of services at the place of residence, employment (study), in making sociocultural and commercial-domestic trips for working out

a differentiated (according to the city rayons) system of social standards for providing the public with facilities of the social and domestic infrastructure.

The policy presently being carried out of widely involving the public in working out effective solutions to social problems and in particular those related to activating the production and consumption of paid services requires a well reasoned and balanced interpretation of consumer preferences. An appeal to public opinion can beneficially effect the market of paid services only in the instance that here they take into account the entire range of contradictory factors, this opinion of the formers of opinion.

Footnotes

1. The sample (N700) included workers, engineer and technical personnel and white collar personnel in the nonproduction sphere (physicians, teachers). Women were over 70 percent and their predominant majority was caused by the dominant role in family life.
2. According to certain estimates, complete independence in price formation with income compensation would lead to a 20 percent increase in prices a year [1, p 137].

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